[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 13:12:53 +0100
> Stuart wrote:
>> Cayuse wrote:
>> This is nothing to do with the nature of the content but
>> about the existence of that content whatever its nature.
>> No content, no consciousness.
>
> One of the ways the "content" can be affected is that it can be shut off.
> Many a drunk has been known to pass out in his cups. Voila, no content!
I think most of the confusion in this arena arises because the word
consciousness is used in several different language games, and
it is assumed by some to remain invariant when changing from one
language game to another. Defining consciousness in terms of
behavior and then transfering that context to the use that Nagel
makes of the word is just such a case.
>> My claim that the correlation is conceived rests on the fact that
>> another person's consciousness is not a phenomenon in the world,
>> makes no appearance in the world, but rather it's a concept we harbor.
>
> And my point is that everything we think is thought of by being a
> "concept we harbor." What we mean in most uses re: others'
> consciousness is their behavior but, as Chalmers correctly notes I think,
> not in all cases. Sometimes we mean the kind of subjectness we have.
> The "concept we harbor" Chalmers points out involves these two different
> kinds of referent. But, of course, one is a better referent for linguistic
> tagging since one is public, as language is, while the other is private
> where language lose its usual anchors, lines and landmarks.
This is a good platform for moving forward. The use that is "a better
referent for linguistic tagging" is not the one in which Chalmers takes
an interest, and he wants to talk about the other. He proceeds on the
assumption that Nagel's definition is understood to allude to that other
use. Those that have no such understanding will find his arguments
incomprehensible, but that shouldn't stop him writing for those that
do understand what Nagel is alluding to.
>> So we correlate another person with the consciousness that we
>> conceive to be associated with them, in which case the correlation
>> itself is nothing more than a conception.
>
> Every idea is "nothing more than a conception." That doesn't
> mean conceptions never arise out of, reflect, and refer to real things.
> Just because we cannot see the other's mental life doesn't mean
> we are only supposing they have it when we interact with them in the
> course of our own activities. Indeed, we start with the observables,
> the interactions and build from there. So the idea of another having a
> mind is grounded in the idea of others acting in certain ways based
> on our long ago learned responses to such actions.
Most concepts arise out of phenomena in the world. Consciousness,
on Nagel's use of the word, has no such provenance. It doesn't arise out
of phenomena in the world but out of a recognition of that ("first-person")
world (i.e. the idea of that world arises as part of the content of that
world).
Since that world is not a phenomenon in that world, the idea of that world
has no empirical content, and so any correlation between that world and an
object within it (i.e. the physical body assumed to be hosting that world)
is not amenable to scientific investigation.
> I really don't see what is gained by suggesting that the consciousness
> of others cannot be studied scientifically since we obviously can do
> just that (think of using fMRIs to study brain activity, of collecting and
> analyizing data re: behavior, of examining those with brain impairments
> to see how their perceptions and responses are affected, etc.).
MRI scans detect brain activity, not consciousness (unless one insists
on playing a different language game to that of Nagel). If you're looking
for utility in the world then you will find none in this use of the word,
because it isn't a phenomenon in the world. Anybody wanting practical
application must stick to language games in which consciousness is
defined in neurological and behavioral terms. Chalmers is interested
in the philosophical problem, and I'm convinced that this particular
philosophical problem can't be explained away as a grammatical error
like so many other philosophical problems can.
> Neither is "one's own" consciousness a phenomenon in the
> world, rather it is the very existence of that ("first-person")
> world (and does not have an owner).
>
> The state of being conscious is, in a certain sense, the source
> of our world, insofar as by "world" what's meant is the full gamut
> of our perceptions, reflections, conceptions, and so forth.
> But that doesn't mean that our own consciousness is thereby
> excluded from being thought about as an object of consideration.
Again, a good platform of moving forward. The idea of that world
arises as part of the contents of that world. The error, I think,
is to "thingalize it" as Anna so aptly put it.
> The "world" is not just our subjective condition but also the shared
> environment in which we find ourselves. So our "world" means at
> least two things and the point is to keep clear on what we mean
> by such a term each time we utter it.
We have the same problem again. "The world" as the term is used
in this context alludes to what Nagel alludes to on his use of the
term consciousness, and it is (as you put it) not a good referent
for linguistic tagging.
> There is a subjective sense to our existence, to be sure, one that
> we all recognize as uniquely our own. But we also recognize we
> are in a shared world everytime we step off the curb and look around
> for an onrushing vehicle before trying to get across the street.
> It's this latter sense in which we recognize that the phenomenon
> of our own consciousness is a fit subject for scientific inquiry.
The "subjective sense to our existence", as you put it, consists in
the fact that the contents of consciousness manifest as a "view"
(though more than just visual) from the perspective of a organism
embedded in its habitat. All useful conceptual models arising
(as part of that view!) are consistent with that fact. It makes no sense
to ask why this perspective should manifest in this manner, or why
it is conceptually consistent, since any answer must assume taking
up a position outside that view, and this is not possible. This is where
explanation ends, rendering this situation unfit for scientific enquiry.
Science deals with phenomena in the world, and the world is not a
phenomenon in the world.
> The other sense is certainly a-scientific as you suggest, but it is
> also irrelevant to the question of whether we can recognize a causal
> relationship between brains and minds and whether this can be
> studied scientifically. In Wittgensteinian terms they are just different
> games and mixing them by suggesting that playing one vitiates
> playing the other is mistaken.
I think we have reached an agreement.
>>> Who is to say whether or not consciousness persists after brains die,
>>> when consciousness is not a phenomenon in the world?
>>
>> This kind of talk is precisely what LW rejected as "nonsense" in the TLP.
>
> If it's not a phenomenon in the world then it cannot persist in the world
> but the consciousness I am interested in IS a phenomenon in the
> world as I've explained above. Therefore its persistence in the world
> is certainly an issue.
I'm not sure what the first line of the above means (re: it cannot persist)
but the rest is consistent with our having reached an agreement.
> Wittgenstein rejected the TLP in his later work, not only explicitly
> but also in the actual approach he took to philosophy and the issues
> he had under scrutiny. We've been over this already. I suggested you
> might want to make the case that he didn't really reject his earlier work
> but merely went on to a new and different stage but you said that wasn't
> what you were interested. Okay, I accept that. But then why come back
> to the same claim if you're not willing to make the case for it?
I've already made that case. I submit that what LW called the
microcosm in the TLP is what he later alludes to with his example
of the "visual room" in the PI (and that would be consistent with the
"visual room" having no owner).
> Look, I understand the strength of your affinity for this way of
> seeing things. There is a great beauty and even satisfaction to be
> contemplating an ultimate mystery, to be mystified. Everything
> seems to flow to a stop, all questions crumble because no answers
> are possible any longer. All that remains is to assert, again and
> again, the mystery, it's the ALL, it's the "microcosm", and so on.
>
> But I suggest that you are allowing this MYSTERY to mesemerize
> you. The later Wittgenstein, I submit, realized this which is why he
> pulled away from his earlier Tractarian way of thinking and told us that
> everything is before us, that the philosopher has nothing new to say,
> that all we have to do is look and then we will see things more clearly.
And I submit that this particular philosophical problem can't be explained
away as a grammatical error like so many other philosophical problems can.
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