[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2009 03:58:02 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@...> wrote:
>
> --- On Thu, 8/13/09, Stuart W. Mirsky <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
>
>
> From: Stuart W. Mirsky <SWMirsky@...>
> Subject: [Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
> To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
> Date: Thursday, August 13, 2009, 10:10 PM
>
>
>
>
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups. com, Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@ ...> wrote:
> >
> > Say one has a text that says things like "the mind sees," or "the mind
> > understands" or "the mind makes decisions" etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. Now,
> > one simply substitutes the word "brain" for "mind." Is one thereby NOT a
> > dualist? There are, of course, two related problems here: the first is that
> > it is nonsense to say that the mind does things that a person is said to
> > do; this is language taking a holiday. The second problem is that there is
> > the implication that the "mind doing things" is somehow an explanation of
> > people doing things. There are those here that really want to say that
> > "mental states" are the cause of behavior; mental "possessions like
> > "intentions" are the cause of the behavior that we label "intentional. "
> > These are the same sorts of people that want to say that Wittgenstein is an
> > "operationalist. " That is, his focus on actual behavioral episodes is
> > really saying that the observable behavior is an "indication" of the "real"
> > issue, which is
> the
> > mental intention. When Wittgenstein says that "meaning is use," he does not
> > mean that use is an "indication" of some mental possession called "meaning"
> > that is somehow the cause of the utterance. Wittgenstein is often quite
> > clear about the cause of an utterance; in several places he actually uses
> > the term "training." Our social training (of course a Skinnerian view would
> > go farther and say exactly what is meant by "training" - in this sense
> > behaviorism extends Wittgenstein) ) is the cause of utterances. He is not
> > saying that training "deposits" meanings in our mind or our brain and this
> > "deposit" is then the "real cause" of our utterances. Yet, this is exactly
> > the implication of what has been suggested by some members of this group.
> > It does not matter that they turn around and say "that is not what I am
> > really saying." Ask yourself this: "Does the brain cause behavior?" If you
> > answer "yes," then you are a mentalist, and a dualist. It is TRAINING that
> > causes behavior. The brain somehow mediates this function, and it does so
> > in largely unknown ways.
> >
>
> SWM: Do we have a mental life or not? By "mental life" I mean mental images,
> thoughts, memories, beliefs, sensations, etc.
>
> GS: It is telling that you put "memories" and "beliefs" in the same category
> as the others. Think about that. But I have answered the question above many
> times,
I'm sorry but I don't recall your answering even one time. Moreover, my list
above is not intended to suggest that all the things listed are the same.
Merely because I enumerated them in a single sentence doesn't imply that. As
with most things, there are family resemblances that prompted me to put them
together but that doesn't make them the same in every way.
Now as to your answer to my question, I will pose it again. Do we have a mental
life or not?
The further sentences I wrote above were intended to explicate what I mean by
the term "mental life" to help us avoid getting into a debate over the meanings
of the term. I hope you will see your way clear to answer it here.
But I won't wait for your answer to respond to your question since you think I
have failed to do so before.
>yet you have not answered any of the questions that I put forth. So I will ask
>this" "Does the brain cause behavior?" What is your answer?
>
The brain produces what we call mind or consciousness. Another way of saying
this is to use Searle's locution, that the brain causes mind.
Behavior is what things do. Some things which have no brain (and therefore no
mind with all that that entails) still may be said to have behavior so,
clearly, we don't need brains for behavior (think of the behavior of a storm or
of a rock if you drop it, etc.). But I am quite aware that THAT is not what you
have in mind by your question. Nevertheless, I mention it to help us stay clear
on what this is about.
In creatures with brains, their conscious (intentional) behavior is caused by
what is going on inside their brains. That is, the choose to act based on a
thought process which may include a lot of different things including having
awareness, understanding, reasoning, etc.
We also say that so and so does something because he or she had a reason.
Generally by "cause" we only mean the reason a person acted. But "cause" has a
wider application. I may do something unthinkingly, in reaction to a stimulus
and thus someone might say the cold wind caused me to pull the coat more
tightly around my neck. Sometimes to describe a cause is to talk about a
stimulus and sometimes it's to talk about reasons. In the case of humans, our
brains are the organ that enable us to process stimuli and proceed to act. They
are also the organ in which the process known as thinking (and reasoning) occur.
Do brains cause behavior? It depends on what we are asking about.
> SWM: When we sleep do we dream? When we're awake can we daydream? When we're
> not paying attention to our immediate surroundings but lost in thought, are
> there mental things going on? When we meditate do we run the risk of being
> lost in our own thoughts? Do we have minds or is the word "mind" a misnomer,
> a non-starter or simply another word for "brain"? (I'll leave the discussion
> of what dualism is to a later stage assuming we reach it.) Thanks. -- SWM
>
> GS: You have not answered any of my questions, but in this post, I asked only
> one. Most of what you asked me I have already commented on rather
> extensively, and I am surprized that you ask me the same questions again. And
> I am doubly puzzled that you ask me if the mind is simply another name for
> the brain! My answer is that, given what I wrote above(!), "You claim it is!"
>
> Cordially,
> Glen
>
If you answered my questions before, I am unaware of that. Perhaps I merely
forgot. To have a fair exchange please bear with me and answer again as I have
tried to do above (though I, too, thought I had answered before).
You say I am saying the mind is another name for the brain. My response is that
in a sense that is the case and in a sense it isn't.
Certainly not every brain has the attributes of a mind. A dead brain or a
comatose one will not. So just being a brain isn't enough. What's needed is an
operating brain in good working order.
Such a brain, if it is like ours (with the capability of producing the many
features we associate with mind) will, of course produce a mind. Might we want
to say that in that case it IS a mind (because "produce" looks strange)? I
wouldn't dispute that. While I would note that, by "mind" we mean something
other than a brain (even one in good working order, etc.), I am also cognizant
of the appropriateness of speaking of the brain as being conscious rather than
just producing it.
In fact, I am not much attached to any of these locutions as long as we keep in
mind that brains and minds are different things in a lot of contexts because a
brain can exist without a mind (though it certainly isn't clear that a mind can
exist without a brain).
By "mind" I mean the state of having a mental life (the things I referred to
above). This mental life consists of a number of features or attributes
associated with being a subject (being on the experiencing end of experience).
Now it's your turn Glen: Are you in agreement that we have mental lives?
SWM
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