[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "Cayuse" <z.z7@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: <Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 19:04:11 +0100
Stuart wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> I think most of the confusion in this arena arises because the word
>> consciousness is used in several different language games, and
>> it is assumed by some to remain invariant when changing from one
>> language game to another. Defining consciousness in terms of
>> behavior and then transfering that context to the use that Nagel
>> makes of the word is just such a case.
>
> I'm not making THAT assumption.
<snip>
>> This is a good platform for moving forward. The use that is "a better
>> referent for linguistic tagging" is not the one in which Chalmers takes
>> an interest, and he wants to talk about the other. He proceeds on the
>> assumption that Nagel's definition is understood to allude to that other
>> use. Those that have no such understanding will find his arguments
>> incomprehensible, but that shouldn't stop him writing for those that
>> do understand what Nagel is alluding to.
>
> And my point is that we CAN talk about the private stuff, albeit in a
> different way than we speak of the public, and that we CAN associate
> the private stuff with what brains do rather than, as Chalmers proposes,
> supposing it is some kind of inexplicable basic in the universe akin to
> gravity or electromagnetism or strong and weak nuclear attraction.
So you ARE making THAT assumption?
>> Most concepts arise out of phenomena in the world. Consciousness,
>> on Nagel's use of the word, has no such provenance. It doesn't arise out
>> of phenomena in the world but out of a recognition of that ("first-person")
>> world (i.e. the idea of that world arises as part of the content of that
>> world).
<snip>
> I would further dispute that Nagel's use is as you suggest.
> "What it is like to be a bat" is understandable if we consider what
> experiencing the world as the bat does would entail. Of course,
> we don't really have access to those experiences so we are always
> obliged to imagine instead.
Then you missed the point of his paper, but that is a whole 'nother topic.
>> Since that world is not a phenomenon in that world, the idea of that world
>> has no empirical content, and so any correlation between that world and an
>> object within it (i.e. the physical body assumed to be hosting that world)
>> is not amenable to scientific investigation.
>
> This just continues to confuse the different uses. Your use is really
> unintelligible by your own admission since there is no referent and
> no grammar to it. At best it's a placeholder for mystery. But, of course,
> it is NOT what I am referring to when I speak of "consciousness."
On the first point, it is not unintelligible. I think that many people
do understand the idea of this "all", and wish to register their
recognition even though language is not an appropriate tool for the
job. Even so, it's the only tool in the toolbox, so they use it on the
assumption that anybody else that has made this recognition will
understand how they are using it.
On the second point, I believe we've already reached an agreement on this.
>> MRI scans detect brain activity, not consciousness (unless one
>> insists on playing a different language game to that of Nagel).
>
> I don't think Nagel's doing quite what you say though I agree he may
> be keeping a foot on both sides of this particular metaphysical border.
I agree that Chalmers' goals are different to Nagel's goals,
but Chalmers finds Nagel's definition to be the most suitable
for his argument.
>> If you're looking for utility in the world then
>> you will find none in this use of the word,
>
> But it is YOUR use of the word, not mine.
That isn't in dispute. My point is that it can't be rejected simply
on the grounds that it has no practical utility in the world.
The best you can do is to express a disinterest in this use.
>> because it isn't a phenomenon in the world.
>
> If it has no referent and no grammar, as you yourself have said,
> then it also isn't anything we can speak about. So why do you
> insist that when I am speaking about "consciousness" I am
> speaking about THAT "use" (which, on this view, is no real use
> in a language at all)?
I'm insisting on no such thing. What I'm insisting on is that this use
can't be rejected simply on the grounds that it has no practical utility
in the world.
>> Anybody wanting practical application must stick to language
>> games in which consciousness is defined in neurological and
>> behavioral terms.
>
> No, because it is characterized by experience and experience
> can be described in terms of its contents.
I'm not talking about the nature of the content
but about the existence of that content.
>> Chalmers is interested in the philosophical problem,
>
> So am I. But I define that problem differently, i.e., it is one of
> conceptual clarification, getting clear on what we have in mind
> when we use certain words in order to properly place the
> relevant referents in the larger schema we have of the world.
You define the philosophical problem in terms of a different
language game to that of Chalmers.
> Developing and arguing for metaphysical theories about
> consciousness do not strike me as pertinent because
> metaphysical excursions are by definition unresolvable
I agree, but that doesn't allow a recognition of the "all"
to be swept under the carpet.
> and, in this case, you have already told us there is nothing to talk about!
> If there isn't, you can't develop metaphysical theories about it either!
What I said was that language is an inappropriate tool for any such
discussion, but that doesn't mean that there isn't anything to talk about.
It just makes any such conversation difficult (but not impossible given
that many people do understand the idea of this "all").
>> Again, a good platform of moving forward. The idea of that world
>> arises as part of the contents of that world. The error, I think,
>> is to "thingalize it" as Anna so aptly put it.
>
> What do you think I am "thingalizing"?
> Isn't this just to confuse your use with mine again?
No confusion here, since it wasn't an accusation in respect of your
use of the word. My comment referred to those that recognize this
idea and take it further into metaphysical speculation.
>> The "subjective sense to our existence", as you put it, consists in
>> the fact that the contents of consciousness manifest as a "view"
>> (though more than just visual) from the perspective of a organism
>> embedded in its habitat.
>
> When you make THAT point you already affirm my point since
> you cannot speak of an organism being embedded in its habitat
> without recognizing a concept of an objective world.
The concept of an objective world arises in relationship with, and in
mutual dependence on, the concept of "being an organism embedded
in its habitat", and all of this interdependence takes its place within
consciousness (on my use of the term).
>> I think we have reached an agreement.
>
> Yes, but only if you also cease supposing that I am talking about what
> you have called "the microcosm" when I use the term "consciousness".
I believe we've already reached an agreement on this.
>> I submit that what LW called the microcosm in the TLP is what
>> he later alludes to with his example of the "visual room" in the PI
>> (and that would be consistent with the "visual room" having no owner).
>
> What is your evidence that he meant the same thing?
In the TLP he speaks of the microcosm as "the world" and states
that there is no subject in that world that thinks or entertains ideas.
This is consistent with the recognition that I spoke of earlier.
In the PI he gives an expample of the "visual room" and states that
there is no owner. This is consistent with the recognition that I spoke
of earlier. I see no reason to believe that the two are different.
> But assuming he did, why do you think his new way of speaking
> about it doesn't represent an improved way of thinking about it, too?
> A way he adopted when he realized he had gone astay in the earlier book?
They are both expressions of the same recognition.
>> And I submit that this particular philosophical problem can't be explained
>> away as a grammatical error like so many other philosophical problems can.
>
> Then why do you think Wittgenstein didn't say THAT rather than
> simply changing his approach to dealing with philosophical issues
> (explicitly saying that there are NO philosophical problems, only
> puzzles)
Having reached to conclusion he reached in the TLP,
there was nothing here for language to gain a foothold on.
> and announcing that he had been wrong in the Tractatus?
He does not explicitly reject his ideas on the microcosm, and his
example of the "visual room" leads me to believe that he hasn't done so.
> After all, if you can say it explicitly and intelligibly, he could have as
> well.
> But he never said anything of the kind (or do you have some citation
> that indicates otherwise? -- if so, I'd be most interested in seeing it).
I'm doing what LW specifically advised against in the TLP.
That is my choice.
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