[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "blroadies" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 21:56:32 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Stuart W. Mirsky" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> A "high degree of correlation" will not always imply causation.
...other things need to be present
> including a clear indication that the X and Y being considered are
directly related*
Exactly. The problem. There is no way to show the direct relationship
between a X fiber firing (the cause) and my report of feeling pain (the
effect).
Further complexity. If brain is mind, then the X fiber firing IS the
pain, not its cause. Two sides of the coin argument. But what's the
coin? We have two sides but no thing that has sides.
More complexity. If X is the cause of Y it can be mediated by other
factors A, B, C, all of which are at the same conceptual level as X and
Y, molecules, let's say. So X drinking alcohol deprives the brain of
oxygen required by fiber molecules. The "brain is drunk" is another way
of saying that the oxygen molecules are blocked by the alcohol
molecules. But "Bruce being drunk" requires a level of analysis that
isn't available at the molecular level because there is no "Bruce"
there.
bruce
and not merely coincident (as in having another common cause for both
of them) and that there is an ontological or chronological relationship
between them (observations of ontological or chronological dependence).
So we can certainly speak of a "high degree of correlation"
independently of "causation" but my point has always been that the
degree of correlation must also fit into a certain context. But when it
does, what's the point of asking if that still implies causation? What
else could imply it? And how could causation ever be identified in any
other way? We can't see it and we can't logically deduce it in any
certain way a la Hume.
>
> SWM
>
> ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
>
> * Where someone like Bruce gets traction is in the claim that there is
no conceivable way we can assert a context of "direct relation" between
minds and brains BECAUSE they are fundamentally different things. But my
argument is that this presupposes dualism (which needs to be separately
defended) and that, indeed, we CAN explain mind in a way that allows it
to be said to exist in a direct relation with brains, i.e., by seeing it
not as a distinctly different ontological basic but as a function of
what some physical things do in some cases (e.g., the turning of
wheels).
>
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