[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 15 Aug 2009 03:53:44 -0700 (PDT)
--- On Fri, 8/14/09, blroadies <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx> wrote:
From: blroadies <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
Subject: [Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
Date: Friday, August 14, 2009, 3:58 PM
--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups. com, Glen Sizemore <gmsizemore2@ ...> wrote:
> > Say one has a text that says things like "the mind sees,"
> > or "the mind understands" or "the mind makes decisions"
> > etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. Now, one simply substitutes the word
> > "brain" for "mind." Is one thereby NOT a dualist?
Bruce: Yes, without question. But, in this context, the folks here that I've
been talking with over the years, well, at least for some, this is a
(I'll coin a term) a "dependent dualism" in the sense that (if I read
them correctly) mind stands is causally dependent upon brain. Nothing
about or in mind that isn't prior in brain, and, hence, "mind" is of no
different substance or matter, amounts, perhaps, to just another way of
talking about brain.
GS: What it is is a way to maintain the tired old epistemology while escaping
the embarrassment of positing a nonphysical stuff. When we are finally able to
talk in some complete way about how physiology mediates behavioral function
there will be no mention of terms like "knowledge," "intention," or "belief"
etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. This will not be because these terms have "been
reduced" to some more basic parts, but because they represent a conceptual
dead-end. As Skinner was fond of saying, the problem with "mental" explanations
is not that they are mental, but that they are not explanations.
Bruce: Moreover, the popular alternative, the one typically attributed to me,
is a "substance dualism." Which is to say that the starting point for a
physicalistic analysis is positing a substance. I don't start there. But
that's another matter.
GS: Sorry, I don't get this.
Cordially,
Glen
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