[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "swmaerske" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 22:36:34 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart wrote:
> > Cayuse wrote:
> >> I think most of the confusion in this arena arises because the word
> >> consciousness is used in several different language games, and
> >> it is assumed by some to remain invariant when changing from one
> >> language game to another. Defining consciousness in terms of
> >> behavior and then transfering that context to the use that Nagel
> >> makes of the word is just such a case.
> >
> > I'm not making THAT assumption.
> <snip>
>
> >> This is a good platform for moving forward. The use that is "a better
> >> referent for linguistic tagging" is not the one in which Chalmers takes
> >> an interest, and he wants to talk about the other. He proceeds on the
> >> assumption that Nagel's definition is understood to allude to that other
> >> use. Those that have no such understanding will find his arguments
> >> incomprehensible, but that shouldn't stop him writing for those that
> >> do understand what Nagel is alluding to.
> >
> > And my point is that we CAN talk about the private stuff, albeit in a
> > different way than we speak of the public, and that we CAN associate
> > the private stuff with what brains do rather than, as Chalmers proposes,
> > supposing it is some kind of inexplicable basic in the universe akin to
> > gravity or electromagnetism or strong and weak nuclear attraction.
>
> So you ARE making THAT assumption?
>
No. You wrote: "Defining consciousness in terms of behavior and then
transfering that context to the use that Nagel makes of the word is just such a
case". And I wrote "I'm not making THAT assumption."
That is, I am not "transferring that context to the use that Nagel makes of the
word". I am saying that there is no need to speak in terms of ontological
differences between things that are in the world and instances of consciousness
which we call "mind". What we call "mind" consists of phenomena of both the
mental kind (mental events: the experiences we have, our thoughts, etc.) and
the physical kind (the objects of our sensory experiences where sensory
represents one category of mental event).
Well, frankly, I don't know any better way of saying this to make it any
clearer. If you insist on collapsing my meaning with yours (while continuing to
note that your meaning is meaningless for lack of grammar, referent, etc.) then
I just don't see the point of dragging this out.
>
> >> Most concepts arise out of phenomena in the world. Consciousness,
> >> on Nagel's use of the word, has no such provenance. It doesn't arise out
> >> of phenomena in the world but out of a recognition of that
> >> ("first-person")
> >> world (i.e. the idea of that world arises as part of the content of that
> >> world).
> <snip>
> > I would further dispute that Nagel's use is as you suggest.
> > "What it is like to be a bat" is understandable if we consider what
> > experiencing the world as the bat does would entail. Of course,
> > we don't really have access to those experiences so we are always
> > obliged to imagine instead.
>
> Then you missed the point of his paper, but that is a whole 'nother topic.
>
>
> >> Since that world is not a phenomenon in that world, the idea of that world
> >> has no empirical content, and so any correlation between that world and an
> >> object within it (i.e. the physical body assumed to be hosting that world)
> >> is not amenable to scientific investigation.
> >
> > This just continues to confuse the different uses. Your use is really
> > unintelligible by your own admission since there is no referent and
> > no grammar to it. At best it's a placeholder for mystery. But, of course,
> > it is NOT what I am referring to when I speak of "consciousness."
>
> On the first point, it is not unintelligible. I think that many people
> do understand the idea of this "all", and wish to register their
> recognition even though language is not an appropriate tool for the
> job. Even so, it's the only tool in the toolbox, so they use it on the
> assumption that anybody else that has made this recognition will
> understand how they are using it.
>
I was going to pass on the rest but then I saw the above. You say it lacks a
grammar but it is not unintelligible and yet you say there is nothing we can
say about it because "language is not an appropriate tool for the job. Even so,
it's the only tool in the tool box . . ."
Is it any wonder Wittgenstein came to see he had been barking up the wrong tree
(phenomenologically speaking)? If he thought he had been mistaken why should we
think we can contradict him?
Put another way, how do you propose that "many people
do understand the idea of this 'all'" and yet there is now way to explain it.
If there is no way to use language here you cannot even make an assertion like
"many people do understand" it! What it?
Of course we can all agree that we have many kinds of knowledge. We know how to
ride a bike or swing a bat at an incoming pitch and sometimes we can even
explain these things but no explanation ever captures the experience of
actually doing it so one can never explain it to another except by saying
"watch me, do like this", etc. Is THAT the kind of understanding you have in
mind for the "all"? If so, what am I watching? What can you show? What can you
do?
Of course, many religious systems are premised on just this kind of thing. In
Buddhism we said it's not the text, it's not the doctrine, it's the doing. The
roshi would say "watch me" or "sit like this" and aim to show, not say. Other
religions to varying extents have this aspect to their practice, too. But
religion is a different game. If Wittgenstein had it right, we can't explain it
in terms of other language games. It's just something you do and participate in
through its own set of rules. So are you suggesting that this is a religious
claim or analogous to one?
Of course if it is it's irrelevant to the points I have been making about
science and brains because it's a different game entirely.
> On the second point, I believe we've already reached an agreement on this.
>
>
> >> MRI scans detect brain activity, not consciousness (unless one
> >> insists on playing a different language game to that of Nagel).
> >
> > I don't think Nagel's doing quite what you say though I agree he may
> > be keeping a foot on both sides of this particular metaphysical border.
>
> I agree that Chalmers' goals are different to Nagel's goals,
> but Chalmers finds Nagel's definition to be the most suitable
> for his argument.
>
>
> >> If you're looking for utility in the world then
> >> you will find none in this use of the word,
> >
> > But it is YOUR use of the word, not mine.
>
> That isn't in dispute. My point is that it can't be rejected simply
> on the grounds that it has no practical utility in the world.
> The best you can do is to express a disinterest in this use.
>
>
I have pointed out that it is not consonant with mine and therefore you cannot
adversely criticize my application on the ground that it doesn't accord with
this use.
> >> because it isn't a phenomenon in the world.
> >
> > If it has no referent and no grammar, as you yourself have said,
> > then it also isn't anything we can speak about. So why do you
> > insist that when I am speaking about "consciousness" I am
> > speaking about THAT "use" (which, on this view, is no real use
> > in a language at all)?
>
>
> I'm insisting on no such thing. What I'm insisting on is that this use
> can't be rejected simply on the grounds that it has no practical utility
> in the world.
>
>
That's not the ground I have advanced. The ground is that you have said, and I
have agreed, that it has no grammar, no place in our language. As such there is
no use to make of it except as placeholder for mystery. But the idea of such a
mystery is itself without a purpose except to enable the person embracing it to
stop his thinking in an ultimate puzzle. That is it serves a kind of
psychological purpose, inspiring in us feelings of awe grounded in a great
confusion.
But Wittgenstein in his later phase was trying to get us to untie such knots,
demystify our puzzles. THAT's why he abandoned his earlier ideas from the
Tractatus since they don't do that! As you have shown, if anything they
reinforce this notion of mysteriousness. When you have climbed to the top you
will see that it's all nonsense and so kick the ladder away. Those things
whereof we cannot know, thereof we must remain silent.
> >> Anybody wanting practical application must stick to language
> >> games in which consciousness is defined in neurological and
> >> behavioral terms.
> >
> > No, because it is characterized by experience and experience
> > can be described in terms of its contents.
>
> I'm not talking about the nature of the content
> but about the existence of that content.
>
>
And I'm talking about the nature of the content and its existence, too, i.e.,
that it manifestly comes from the activities of brains.
> >> Chalmers is interested in the philosophical problem,
> >
> > So am I. But I define that problem differently, i.e., it is one of
> > conceptual clarification, getting clear on what we have in mind
> > when we use certain words in order to properly place the
> > relevant referents in the larger schema we have of the world.
>
> You define the philosophical problem in terms of a different
> language game to that of Chalmers.
>
>
I would disagree there but I will agree that I find Chalmers' solution to be
wrongheaded. The only reason to choose dualism is if you cannot explain
consciousness in physical terms and I think we manifestly can unless we start
out by assuming dualism, in which case we are trapped in a circular puzzle of
our own making.
>
> > Developing and arguing for metaphysical theories about
> > consciousness do not strike me as pertinent because
> > metaphysical excursions are by definition unresolvable
>
> I agree, but that doesn't allow a recognition of the "all"
> to be swept under the carpet.
>
What is this "all"? The sum total of every molecule and energy bit in the
universe? Well we can conceive that there is such a thing but we cannot
recognize it because it is beyond us to be take account of every last bit at
the minutest level of existence. Can this "all" be anything else? Well, insofar
as it's "the microcosm" you've referenced it's nothing at all because it has,
as you've said, no grammar and no referent. There's nothing to talk about.
>
> > and, in this case, you have already told us there is nothing to talk about!
> >
> > If there isn't, you can't develop metaphysical theories about it either!
>
> What I said was that language is an inappropriate tool for any such
> discussion, but that doesn't mean that there isn't anything to talk about.
> It just makes any such conversation difficult (but not impossible given
> that many people do understand the idea of this "all").
>
How would we know since there is no way to articulate it? If you say you
understand it, how could I know you do or not? If I say I understand it, how
could you know? And if we can have no independent confirmation, how would we
ever know we weren't just fooling ourselves? Isn't it the same problem here as
that of a "private language"?
>
> >> Again, a good platform of moving forward. The idea of that world
> >> arises as part of the contents of that world. The error, I think,
> >> is to "thingalize it" as Anna so aptly put it.
> >
> > What do you think I am "thingalizing"?
> > Isn't this just to confuse your use with mine again?
>
> No confusion here, since it wasn't an accusation in respect of your
> use of the word. My comment referred to those that recognize this
> idea and take it further into metaphysical speculation.
>
>
> >> The "subjective sense to our existence", as you put it, consists in
> >> the fact that the contents of consciousness manifest as a "view"
> >> (though more than just visual) from the perspective of a organism
> >> embedded in its habitat.
> >
> > When you make THAT point you already affirm my point since
> > you cannot speak of an organism being embedded in its habitat
> > without recognizing a concept of an objective world.
>
>
> The concept of an objective world arises in relationship with, and in
> mutual dependence on, the concept of "being an organism embedded
> in its habitat", and all of this interdependence takes its place within
> consciousness (on my use of the term).
>
>
But I am talking about an interdependent universe which implies an objective
reality. I am not construing consciousness as you do. Therefore your way of
seeing it is irrelevant to any claim that brains cause consciousness.
> >> I think we have reached an agreement.
> >
> > Yes, but only if you also cease supposing that I am talking about what
> > you have called "the microcosm" when I use the term "consciousness".
>
>
> I believe we've already reached an agreement on this.
>
>
> >> I submit that what LW called the microcosm in the TLP is what
> >> he later alludes to with his example of the "visual room" in the PI
> >> (and that would be consistent with the "visual room" having no owner).
> >
> > What is your evidence that he meant the same thing?
>
> In the TLP he speaks of the microcosm as "the world" and states
> that there is no subject in that world that thinks or entertains ideas.
> This is consistent with the recognition that I spoke of earlier.
> In the PI he gives an expample of the "visual room" and states that
> there is no owner. This is consistent with the recognition that I spoke
> of earlier. I see no reason to believe that the two are different.
>
>
But he applied the concept in a very different way in each case. In the first
it was part of building a metaphysical picture of the way things are. In the
second it was merely to recognize another dimension of our experience, i.e.,
that to be a subject was also to be part of everything we experience as
subjects and vice versa and that at some point, if we think deeply enough, such
distinctions dissolve. But, of course, there is no recommendation here to
dissolve them, merely to recognize this possibility.
> > But assuming he did, why do you think his new way of speaking
> > about it doesn't represent an improved way of thinking about it, too?
> > A way he adopted when he realized he had gone astay in the earlier book?
>
> They are both expressions of the same recognition.
>
But applied in markedly different and contradictory ways. The first was part of
a world picture building game. The second part of an understanding of the
things we say game.
>
> >> And I submit that this particular philosophical problem can't be explained
> >> away as a grammatical error like so many other philosophical problems can.
> >
> > Then why do you think Wittgenstein didn't say THAT rather than
> > simply changing his approach to dealing with philosophical issues
> > (explicitly saying that there are NO philosophical problems, only
> > puzzles)
>
> Having reached to conclusion he reached in the TLP,
> there was nothing here for language to gain a foothold on.
>
Then why did he tell his readers in the PI that he had been mistaken in the TLP?
>
> > and announcing that he had been wrong in the Tractatus?
>
> He does not explicitly reject his ideas on the microcosm, and his
> example of the "visual room" leads me to believe that he hasn't done so.
>
He uses "recognition" differently, to a different end.
>
> > After all, if you can say it explicitly and intelligibly, he could have as
> > well.
> > But he never said anything of the kind (or do you have some citation
> > that indicates otherwise? -- if so, I'd be most interested in seeing it).
>
> I'm doing what LW specifically advised against in the TLP.
> That is my choice.
>
Yes it is. All right, I'll leave it at that. There's nothing more I can say to
you on this except to note that I once thought much as you do and so I can see
where you're coming from and where you want to go. . . or at least I believe I
can. Good hunting then.
SWM
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