Say one has a text that says things like "the mind sees," or "the mind understands" or "the mind makes decisions" etc. etc. etc. etc. etc. Now, one simply substitutes the word "brain" for "mind." Is one thereby NOT a dualist? There are, of course, two related problems here: the first is that it is nonsense to say that the mind does things that a person is said to do; this is language taking a holiday. The second problem is that there is the implication that the "mind doing things" is somehow an explanation of people doing things. There are those here that really want to say that "mental states" are the cause of behavior; mental "possessions like "intentions" are the cause of the behavior that we label "intentional." These are the same sorts of people that want to say that Wittgenstein is an "operationalist." That is, his focus on actual behavioral episodes is really saying that the observable behavior is an "indication" of the "real" issue, which is the mental intention. When Wittgenstein says that "meaning is use," he does not mean that use is an "indication" of some mental possession called "meaning" that is somehow the cause of the utterance. Wittgenstein is often quite clear about the cause of an utterance; in several places he actually uses the term "training." Our social training (of course a Skinnerian view would go farther and say exactly what is meant by "training" - in this sense behaviorism extends Wittgenstein)) is the cause of utterances. He is not saying that training "deposits" meanings in our mind or our brain and this "deposit" is then the "real cause" of our utterances. Yet, this is exactly the implication of what has been suggested by some members of this group. It does not matter that they turn around and say "that is not what I am really saying." Ask yourself this: "Does the brain cause behavior?" If you answer "yes," then you are a mentalist, and a dualist. It is TRAINING that causes behavior. The brain somehow mediates this function, and it does so in largely unknown ways.