[Wittrs] Re: When is "brain talk" really dualism?
- From: "blroadies" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 19 Aug 2009 21:48:17 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "Cayuse" <z.z7@...> wrote:
> Stuart wrote (elsewhere):
> > We recognize consciousness in others all the time. What we look for
> > is behavior that is indicative of a mental life, e.g., autonomous
behavior,
> > evidence of understanding, reports or behavior that indicate a
thinking
> > process going on. We NEVER see inside anyone else's subjectivity and
yet
> > we have no trouble imputing consciousness to others. Why presume it
> > has to be different with entities that are inorganic machines in
construction?
Bruce (to SWM): That paragraph, I would write. Interesting. We agree
that C is attributed under certain conditions. We agree that C isn't a
special substance, that inorganic constructions may be seen as mental.
1. We disagree on the nature of the concept of mind and brain, most
importantly, whether we can give a sense to a causal relationship.
2. We start (our thinking) at a different place. You start with an
object (brain) and ask "where does mind come from?" while I start "with
a mind" and can make no sense out of asking "where it came from?"
> A belief that other people have hidden "mental states" is instinctive
in
> our species (empathy),
As I understand it, empathy is a process in which we verbalize what it
is to be that person before is, what's going with him etc... This
process need not be thought of looking into a hidden place or that "what
is its to be him" is a state. I can grasp and communicate your anger
without locating it.
bruce
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