[Wittrs] Re: [Wittrs] Re: Mind´s role in science, and mental terms in causal statements
- From: Anna Boncompagni <anna.boncompagni@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 20 Aug 2009 13:09:24 +0200
SWM Does Wittgenstein aim to bring all apparently intelligible discourse to
a grinding halt merely because there are different uses in play here,
different kinds of referents and referring, different language games?
When the doctor asked me where it hurt, should I just have mumbled there's
nothing we can talk about?
I wouldn't call it a grinding halt, but yes I think LW would say there are
different games going on in here. On the one hand he would "save" our
ordinary use of terms when talking to our doctor, on the other hand he would
prevent us from speaking of mental states in scientific terms, looking for
them inside the brain, or inside us. In doing so we are usually entering the
M3 contest. Freudian entities are recognizable speculative constructs due to
cultural traditions, but maybe "private experience" as a something to be
looked for inside "me" is not that far.
Is your opinion that LW can't help us in this discussion?
Thank you
Anna
2009/8/20 gerardoprim <gerardoprim@xxxxxxxxxxxx>
>
>
> (Stuart) Remove the brain or destroy it in the skull, Gerardo, and the mind
> is gone. Poof. Just like that.
> (Gerardo) True, but irrelevant. This is an evidence of existential
> dependence, not of causal relation in its usual scientific sense.
>
> (Stuart) I call this kind of strong correlation evidence of a causal
> relation. However, I readily grant we use "cause" in a number of different
> ways. I use "cause", as in "brains cause minds", to reflect this strong
> correlation between brains and minds. I use it, in fact, in precisely the
> way Searle does when he says of the wetness of water that it is caused by
> the molecular behavior of H2O molecules under certain conditions.
> (Gerardo) I clearly stated that I was talking about the scientific sense of
> the term. Of course, you can find many examples of more imprecise usages
> from Searle and from other people. But my purpose is to increase the
> conceptual precision, not to decrease it, so I wouldn´t follow Searle on
> this. Of course, you may have a completely different purpose on this, and
> then it would be clear the reason why we don´t agree.
> By the way, I described again my distinctions of types of mental terms
> hoping that you could explain your thoughts or criticisms about them.
>
> Regards,
> Gerardo.
>
>
>
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