--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gerardoprim" <gerardoprim@...> wrote: > > (Stuart) Remove the brain or destroy it in the skull, Gerardo, and the mind > is gone. Poof. Just like that. > (Gerardo) True, but irrelevant. This is an evidence of existential > dependence, not of causal relation in its usual scientific sense. > I've already explained, numerous times, the sense in which I am using "causal" and why it is perfectly appropriate. There is no point in demanding a particular meaning when you know 1) precisely how I am using it and 2) that I am fully prepared to use another term if we can agree on it. Here are some meanings of the term reflecting various on-line dictionary, wiki and encyclopedia sites: http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/causal causal One entry found. Main Entry: caus·al Pronunciation: \ˈkȯ-zəl\ Function: adjective Date: circa 1530 1 : expressing or indicating cause : causative <a causal clause introduced by since> 2 : of, relating to, or constituting a cause <the causal agent of a disease> 3 : involving causation or a cause <the relationship?was not one of causal antecedence so much as one of analogous growth ? H. O. Taylor> 4 : arising from a cause <a causal development> http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Causality The philosophical treatment of causality extends over millennia. In the Western philosophical tradition, discussion stretches back at least to Aristotle, and the topic remains a staple in contemporary philosophy. Aristotle distinguished between accidental (cause preceding effect in time) and essential causality, which has one event seen in two ways. Aristotle's example of essential causality is a builder building a house. This single event can be analyzed into the builder building (cause) and the house being built (effect).[2][unreliable source?] [I WANT TO CALL YOUR ATTENTION, SPECIFICALLY, TO THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT -- the caps in the words below have been provided by me to emphasize what is relevant to my point!] Though cause and effect are typically related to events, candidates include OBJECTS, PROCESSES, properties, variables, facts, and states of affairs; which of these make up the causal relata, and how best to characterize the relationship between them, remains under discussion. According to Sowa (2000),[3] up until the twentieth century, three assumptions described by Max Born in 1949 were dominant in the definition of causality: [AND AGAIN TO THIS ONE] "Causality postulates that there are laws by which the OCCURRENCE of an entity B of a certain class DEPENDS ON THE OCCURRENCE of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any PHYSICAL OBJECT, PHENOMENON, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect. "Antecedence postulates that the cause must be prior to, or at least simultaneous with, the effect. "Contiguity postulates that cause and effect must be in spatial contact or connected by a chain of intermediate things in contact." (Born, 1949, as cited in Sowa, 2000) However, according to Sowa (2000), "relativity and quantum mechanics have forced physicists to abandon these assumptions as exact statements of what happens at the most fundamental levels, but they remain valid at the level of human experience."[3] [YOU CAN ALSO EXAMINE THE ENTRIES OFFERED HERE] http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/causation-process/ > (Stuart) I call this kind of strong correlation evidence of a causal > relation. However, I readily grant we use "cause" in a number of different > ways. I use "cause", as in "brains cause minds", to reflect this strong > correlation between brains and minds. I use it, in fact, in precisely the way > Searle does when he says of the wetness of water that it is caused by the > molecular behavior of H2O molecules under certain conditions. > (Gerardo) I clearly stated that I was talking about the scientific sense of > the term. And I clearly stated what I was talking about and why it was appropriate to speak of brains in this way! Note that my usage accords with what is provided above. (See, especially, the capitalized terms in the information provided.) > Of course, you can find many examples of more imprecise usages from Searle > and from other people. Ordinary language is not necessarily "imprecise" (though it may sometimes be and often is in certain specialized circumstances). However, it should be recalled that ordinary language precedes all technical uses which are defined in terms of ordinary language. Ordinary language is the lingua franca of general communication which is what we are using here, by the way. As Wittgenstein showed, it is much more robust and multidimensional for the purpose of communication than specialized jargons qua ideal languages. Our job when speaking is to say clearly what we mean and avoid the pitfalls of ambiguity through such specification. This is not best accomplished by speaking only in (specialized) tongues. Searle is NOT being imprecise in his usage as you allege precisely BECAUSE he specifies what he means. One can argue that he has got his facts about water and wetness wrong but not that the usage is wrong because, if it's his own stipulated meaning he has told us what he has in mind, and, if it's in accord with other standard usages, then he is in good company. AS IT HAPPENS, IT IS IN ACCORD. Allow me to demonstrate: From the wiki entry: ". . . cause and effect are typically related to events, candidates include OBJECTS, PROCESSES . . ." The brain is an object and also runs a mix of processes. If consciousness is seen as a process-based system, as I have repeatedly argued, then the relevant brain processes ARE the consciousness. Thus we can say the brain CAUSES consciousness. If the brain processes are seen as causative of the mental events (another way of speaking when we are interested in the states of being a subject, having a mind), then we can say what the brain PRODUCES (or causes) those mental events in the subject, i.e., the mind. That is, the object (brain processes) cause the state of being a subject (the mental events we associate with being a mind). Also from wiki (again see above): "Causality postulates that there are laws by which the OCCURRENCE of an entity B of a certain class DEPENDS ON THE OCCURRENCE of an entity A of another class, where the word entity means any PHYSICAL OBJECT, PHENOMENON, situation, or event. A is called the cause, B the effect." Again, this is fully in accord with Searle's usage. So his usage is neither imprecise nor idiosyncratic. I want to be very clear here because I seem to be repeating myself ad infinitum: 1) Ordinary or natural language precedes all specialized languages and jargons. (This means that specialized languages or jargons derive their meanings from ordinary or natural language.) 2) Ordinary or natural language consists of a wide variety of what Wittgenstein called language games which consists of varying rules of word usage depending on context, intent, etc. (This means that words in ordinary language have a certain ambiguity because they apply to a variety of language games, an ambiguity we sometimes have to delve into and remove, but it also means that ordinary language is therefore way more robust in terms of what it can communicate than specialized languages which aim to address very particular things in as unambiguous way as possible by distilling out more precise meanings.) 3) We are speaking ordinary language on this site even if occasionally some of us bring in some specialized terms. When I specify what I mean and give reasons that is what I am doing. However, I have also said, repeatedly, that I am not wedded to any term. If we all want to replace "causes" with Quine's "gavagai", for instance, I'm good with that AS LONG AS WE'RE ALL IN AGREEMENT AS TO WHAT IS MEANT. However, for me to be in agreement this use of "gavagai" MUST denote the existentially dependent relation that I am speaking of when I say "brains cause minds". So let's all agree to say "brains gavagai minds" if you want to. Or pick some other term. ONLY KNOW THAT WHAT I MEAN IS WHAT SEARLE DOES WHEN HE SAYS "brains cause minds". AND WE KNOW WHAT SEARLE MEANS BECAUSE I HAVE SAID IT THOUSANDS OF TIMES ALREADY, IF WE COUNT THIS SITE AND THE ONES PRECEDING. That's what I mean in this case. There is no need to continue to quibble over words. I am glad to use another term if "cause" bothers you and some others here. But whatever other term we settle on will have to mean the same thing I mean when I use "cause" in the disputed way or I will NOT be able to participate in the agreed usage. Of course, I think this problem really goes deeper or people would not get so exercised about it. I think there are some who just do not want to acknowledge the kind of relation between brains and minds that I am alluding to and are hiding their deeper disagreement behind this choice of word question. So let's move past it and see if we can't come to some kind of understanding about all this. > But my purpose is to increase the conceptual precision, not to decrease it, > so I wouldn´t follow Searle on this. Of course, you may have a completely > different purpose on this, and then it would be > clear the reason why we don´t agree. Clarity is achieved by examining our uses and specifying our meanings. I have already told you why Searle's use is NOT lacking in precision. > By the way, I described again my distinctions of types of mental terms hoping > that you could explain your thoughts or criticisms about them. > > Regards, > Gerardo. > I thought I had offered my criticisms twice already, no? All right, I'll try to find time to do it again. SWM