[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 02:03:58 -0000
I won't put a lot of time in responding to you under the circumstances as I
don't want to rehash the same nonsense yet again, but . . .
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
I wrote:
As you know, my view is that being a property dualist finally amounts to the
same thing as claiming so-called substance dualism.
>
>
Budd responded:
> But that's because you are not keen enough on the literature. When someone
> says that "This machine has the property of being conscious," that is
> property dualism by definition and it is a position that
> needn't imply substance dualism.
False on it being "property dualism by definition" unless you think that to
claim that brains cause (are the source of) consciousness is also "property
dualism by definition". In which case you ARE a property dualist even if your
favorite philosopher on the subject, Searle isn't (by his own claim). But if
you really do agree with him AND really are a property dualist as your
ridiculous claim above implies, then what does this suggest for his position,
that it takes a property dualist to hold it?
You are also mistaken on the matter of the implications of property dualism if
you have been paying attention to Searle's own claims about it in his "Why I am
Not a Property Dualist".
> If you think it does, you just made up a story for yourself. But your story
> is not an informed one or you are a windbag who has fun blowing hot air while
> knowing that you aren't really teaching anything but that philosophy can look
> like a waste of time. You would be correct on that!
>
Your guy, Searle, argued in that article referred to by Walter ("Why I am Not a
Property Dualist") that it's all the same, i.e., that property dualism,
finally, implies substance dualism. I guess you must have missed it, huh?
> Searle's point is that it needn't be property dualism to assert that "This
> machine is conscious." Saying "This machine has the property of being
> conscious" adds nothing to saying "This machine is conscious."
>
This isn't about distinguishing between speaking of a phenomenon like
consciousness as a phenomenon or speaking of it in terms of the properties that
constitute such a phenomenon.
> And since Dennett thinks he's not denying he's conscious, he too is a
> property dualist.
>
You don't understand Dennett's position anymore than you really grasp Searle's.
> Searle is saying "Enough already with the property dualism talk--it is not
> necessary."
>
He does say it would be better to drop the categories except that his article
was written in response to the accusation that his position IS property
dualism. As part of that response he asserted that there is no difference, at
bottom, between property dualism and substance dualism. Walter, whether he
likes me to reference his words or not, asserted that Searle wrongly
characterized "property dualism" and that, if so, Searle WOULD be actually be
rightly classified as a "property dualist". I added, in my response to Walter
that, in light of my agreement with Searle's own point that property dualism
is, finally, just another form of substance dualism, if it is dualism at all,
then Searle would also be a substance dualist. So your response re: Searle's
claim that these are old categories that need to be discarded entirely, just
misses the point of my response. (But why am I bothering?)
> Look and see how brains cause consciousness already. It is an empirical
> affair made to look like nonsense by certain Wittgensteinians (like Hacker
> and sometimes Dennett).
>
Another pointless remark in the context of this discussion.
>
>
>
> > It's just a matter of the terms since dualism is only dualism if the
> > argument is that neither of the two types of things being referenced can be
> > explained (in a causal way) in terms of the other. In this I am in accord
> > with Searle as seen in that article of his we previously read on the
> > Analytic list.
>
>
> Then stop saying he's either a property dualist or substance dualist if you
> really are in accord with exactly what he's trying to say.
>
>
I have said that his argument (the CRA especially) requires an implicit
assumption about consciousness that is dualist (in a classically substance
dualism kind of way) and therefore, insofar as he makes and defends that
argument (the CRA), he IS an implicit dualist, whether he recognizes
(explicitly acknowledges) it or not.
<snip>
> > >
> > > That's actually Searle's position in his "Why I'm not a property dualist"
> > > paper. As I've said numerous times, as I understand the term, he
> > > probably IS a property dualist--
> >
> >
> > As I recall, you made the same claim about all the things there are, about
> > so-called ontology as you are now attributing to Searle. Perhaps you didn't
> > mean it as your own position then?
>
>
> Stuart, Walter is correcting you and agreeing with Searle. Walter's just
> fine with calling his and Searle's position a form of property dualism while
> Searle has just about had it with these stupid isms.
>
Budd, Walter can speak (or not speak) for himself. He was responding to my
characterization of HIS opinion which he maintains I misstated and, as part of
his response, he made the point that it was Searle who referenced a
multiplistic ontology in the course of denying the value of a dualistic
presumption about the universe. I accept Walter's statement that he (Walter) is
a "property dualist" (I never felt he was adequately clear on that but in this
thread he has explicitly asserted that he is) and that he believes Searle is,
which, if he is right, and in light of Searle's own claims about that position,
would also make Searle a substance dualist which is consistent with my argument
against Searle's CRA, i.e., that holding that position requires one to be
implicitly dualist about minds (in a Cartesian sort of way).
As to my view of Walter's position, I think his view on what consciousness qua
intentionality is reflects a confusion because to say of consciousness that it
consists of irreducible properties like intentionality, which some physical
entities/events have and some don't, is not to say anything substantive about
the question at all. (See "Throckmorton"). It has the form (that is, the
grammar) of being an answer but it isn't because it's empty of relevant content.
<snip>
>
> > My view (re: Searle) is that Dennett has it right.
>
> That's because Dennett is denying mental contents--
This just shows how little you understand Dennett.
> the sort of thing Fodor would like to have a science about but
> which we can't given the assumptions Dennett and others maintain
> while having an "intentional stance" without commitment to
> Intentionality.
>
?
>
>
> >
> As to my view of your position, I recall your claim that intentionality is
> just a property of some physical things/events and not others (where
> "intentionality" was a proxy for what we mean by "consciousness" in that
> earlier discussion).
> >
> > Searle and you are certainly right to say that the world consists of many
> > things. All the different categories of them, cut myriads of ways, do not,
> > on the level of discussion about what there is (ontology), imply a simple
> > reduction to one thing or two things or some other particular number of
> > things. But as I've also proposed, THAT isn't the issue. What is the issue
> > is whether, to explain the occurrence of minds in the world, we need to
> > posit something beyond whatever it is we presume underlies all the physics
> > of the universe. That is, do we need more than physics to explain the
> > presence of minds?
>
> No for Dennett, Walter and Searle--as should be obvious if you can read.
>
What people say explicitly about some issues is not always consistent with
other things they say which is why it is possible and often wise to raise
questions concerning the implications of others' positions.
> >
> > It is that kind of dualism that is the issue and it is the only real issue
> > of dualism in terms of discussing minds and bodies that there is.
>
> So why do you think Searle is a property dualist in a way that Dennett is
> not? Recall that Searle's critique of strong AI is that functional
> explanations are never sufficient explanations of BP.
> >
I don't assert Searle is a property dualist. It's Walter who said he was, in
the past and more recently, after claiming that Searle's explanation of what
property dualism is did not accord with what most property dualists would hold
about their own positions.
My claim, which I have argued for many times, and whih I see no reason to
repeat the argument for now, is that Searle is a dualist of the kind some like
to call "substance dualism" and which Dennett has called "Cartesian dualism".
If Walter is right about what property dualism is, then I would agree with him
that Searle is that but it isn't MY claim, it's his.
As to Dennett, the answer to your claim should be obvious. Dennett argues that
consciousness can be explained by a description of the kinds of physical
processes that go on in computers, i.e., as an outcome of certain kinds of
complex physical systems. Thus he is not arguing that mind is a different type
of phenomenon at bottom than the rest of the things of the universe. Searle, on
the other hand, maintaining that mind requires a "first person ontology", IS
assuming that it is not reducible to the kinds of physical processes
(implemented algorithms) that go on on computers, no matter how complex the
system constituted by such processes and thus concludes that computers cannot
cause (Searle's sense of "cause") consciousness.
> > Now one can argue, as some do and maybe you do, that "property dualism"
> > doesn't go beyond physics since the point is to assert that there are some
> > properties of physical things that aren't, themselves, physical things (in
> > the way that the usual array of physical properties are).
>
> A crumpled shirt's crumpliness has a certain feel about it. This feel is not
> an object. But the feel couldn't be had without objects. But this doesn't
> imply that "crumply feel" is some extra physical thing in addition to its
> realizers. And neither does this imply anything about the crumply feel being
> nonphysical.
>
We are not in disagreement on this but your example simply doesn't have any
relevance to the point I was making.
>
> > But insofar as one is positing some special feature (an inexplicable but
> > irreducible property),
>
>
> You know why you just defined special feature the way you did? It is too
> stack the deck. But you're not playing with a full one.
>
>
Bdm, bmp!
> > all that has happened is that the assertion of something special added to
> > the universe has shifted, i.e., the claim has gone from one that asserts
> > the world consists of physics and X to the claim that the world we know
> > (whatever it amounts to at some deep metaphysical level) consists of
> > physical properties and X properties.
>
> This is the point of distinguishing between property dualism and substance
> dualism, moron. Property dualists are trying to be respectable physicalists
> like Dennett without being retarded like Dennett given his eliminativism
> about Intentionality.
> >
I see you are once again raising the discussion to your own uniquely high
level. Or (to drop the sarcasm for your benefit) lowering it!
> > For someone like yourself who denies "qualia" on the grounds that the term
> > adds nothing to the list of properties we already acknowledge, that strikes
> > me as a strange view.
>
> That's just you. The discussion of qualia is also worthless for Searle.
>
>
Whatever. That isn't the issue here either.
> >
> >
> > > and I agree almost entirely with the positions he takes in that
> > > paper....except for his nomenclature. He doesn't like the idea of
> > > dualism of any kind: I have nothing against property dualism, myself.
> > >
> > >
> >
> > I have long noted that you could be right in calling him a property dualist
> > though, as I've also said, given his critique of the dualist position,
> > which I think is accurate, that would amount to not much more (maybe
> > nothing more) than my claim that dualism of the so-called substance variety
> > underlies his argument against the possibility of computational
> > consciousness.
>
> That's because you're a moron.
Hmmm . . . do you have other such profound criticisms to present?
> The argument is about functional explanation being insufficient for
> explanation of BP processes, whether amounting to consciousness or actual
> flight (as opposed to simulation, which functional explanations are perfect
> for and why computers are awesome).
> >
I'm not going to rehash Searle again for your benefit as it will do no one much
good and certainly it won't help you toward any better understanding of the
issues.
> > >
> > > >But I think this misses the point, since the issue isn't whether there
> > > >are two things or one but, rather, whether to explain the presence of
> > > >mind in the world, we have to posit something underlying mind that isn't
> > > >physical.
> > >
> > >
> > > I believe that neither Searle nor I "posit something undrlying mind that
> > > isn't physical,"
> >
> >
> > I agree that Searle doesn't do so explicitly but I think he certainly does
> > it implicitly though we have disagreed on this before.
>
> Your argument sucked really bad. And you had to misinterpret Searle in order
> to pull it off, which can't work.
>
Another profound claim, eh? "Sucked"? I will skip responding to this despite
this typically stupid usage only because I know responding to you never does
any good.
>
>
>
> > As to you, I have made no assertion with regard to what you hold on the
> > matter.
>
> First he says it:
>
> > All I have noted here is that you took the position in our discussions on
> > Analytic that intentionality is an irreducible property of some physical
> > things or events (you weren't clear on which) but not others.
>
> Then he takes it back..
>
I was referring in my comment which you seem to have misunderstood to whether
or not I had claimed that he (Walter) was a property dualist. My position
before was that he sounded as if he wasn't but that I was never quite sure
because he had refused to clarify or amplify in our earlier discussions
(preferring instead to make snide remarks about shoes and such).
In the current discussion he has clarified his position, saying he is
comfortable with being considered a property dualist. It's his position, about
his position, not mine about his.
However I certainly have claimed that Walter has in the past said:
1) That intentionality (as a proxy for what we mean by consciousness) is an
irreducible property which some physical things (events?) have and some don't.
2) This position of his is probably best characterized as "mysterian".
I have gone on to say that I think that THAT position is based on certain
confusions.
>
> > As I have also noted, THAT is fundamentally no different than suggesting
> > that intentionality is an irreducible property that is separate from all
> > the rest of physics. The irreducibility, of course, is the issue.
>
> Your argument is akin to saying that the science of sociology must be based
> on something separate too, but it doesn't fly.
> >
No, it's nothing of the sort.
> >
> > > but I'll just speak for my self. In my view, (and I've repeated this
> > > COUNTLESS fucking times), everything in the universe is physical: some of
> > > it is also mental.
> > >
> >
> > "Also mental" as in what a property that simply occurs with some physical
> > phenomena, but not others, happens to be? As you have "fucking" said this
> > before, note that you have also said that you count yourself a "mysterian"
> > on this. Insofar as you are a "mysterian" you have basically embraced the
> > kind of position your friend Larry points out over on Analytic makes no
> > sense, namely using a term (like "Throckmorton") without any features in
> > mind for reference. While we know what it is to be "mysterian" (it has a
> > reference since it's to affirm the ultimate mysteriousness,
> > inexplicability, of something), adopting THAT position is, in fact, no
> > different from making a statement about "Throckmorton" under the conditions
> > outlined by Larry.
>
>
> Actually, when you argue about how mysterious consciousness seems to be if
> gotten "full blown" out of physics, you count as a mysterian too.
>
>
Except my position is that it is fully explainable as an outcome of certain
kinds of physical processes performing certain functions. The only reason it
looks "mysterian" to you is that you cannot conceive of consciousness in this
way, i.e., you are trapped in a dichotomous mind/body picture.
> > So being a "mysterian" gets us nowhere but it does appear to fill in some a
> > space in an argument I suppose.
>
> You said it...
>
Though you'd never understand the point.
<snip>
> >
> > As I point out above, it is certainly possible that we will never be able
> > to answer such questions but answering by asserting that it is unanswerable
> > because "intentionality are properties that some physical things (events?)
> > have and some don't" isn't really much of an answer. Whether a better
> > answer is possible, the answer you gave in that case is to do little more
> > than assert that intentionality at bottom is just "Throckmorton".
>
> Windbag...
> >
Another telling argument, I see . . .
<snip>
> > > As I've asked you many times, please don't paraphrase me. As you somehow
> > > find it necessary to pass along what you think I think every so often
> > > (though I haven't the faintest idea why), I'd appreciate it if you'd just
> > > quote me.
> > >
> >
> > I'm fine with your desire to correct what you take to be my
> > mischaracterizations however I don't wish to make points without
> > attribution when they involve reference to assertions by others. If you
> > think I have you wrong (and on balance I think that is false based on what
> > you've said here, though there are a few points in the above I suppose we
> > could quibble over), then you are always welcome to correct me.
>
> He was right to correct you.
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
You'd think anyone who argues with me is right given your desperation for
allies!
SWM
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