--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > --- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <wittrsamr@> wrote: > > > > > > > > --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote: > > > > > > > > He does say it would be better to drop the categories except that his > > > article was written in response to the accusation that his position IS > > > property dualism. > > So he is condemned to the categories just by responding that he's not a > property dualist--so he must be, yada, yada.. > > What ARE you talking about? > > > As part of that response he asserted that there is no difference, at > > > bottom, between property dualism and substance dualism. > > > At least one specific form of, i.e., Chalmers version which is the > epiphenomenal view of consciousness that Searle thinks mistaken. Chalmers > thinks consciousness is real while doing absolutely no work--> and that > amounts to a form of substance dualism. I don't think it's wise to trust your account of Chalmers' position and, since I am only partially acquainted with it I shall say no more. > Other epiphenomenalists may espouse something like a form of mysterianism in > the follwing way: No amount of empirical research is going to net us exactly > how some physical system is conscious, consciousness being some subjective > category that can't be touched via third person points of view. You might > even find Dennett here given that he doesn't deny he's conscious sometimes. > In fact, Dennett's reason for thinking strong AI viable is by denying that > minds have semantics Or your account of Dennett's position with whom I have more than passing acquaintance myself! > (proposed functionalism of content even though you may never grasp what this > means no matter how many times I explain why functional explanation Oy. > for Searle is not good enough science for a science of mind, including > cognitive science as well as far as Fodor is concerned, but never mind this > as always) is exactly as mysterian as other property dualists who claim not > to be substance dualists. Searle would say that that can't be an a priori > argument for the futility of searching > for empirical generalizations > concerning NCCs. This is a mish-mosh Budd. I'm sorry. > So, plenty of property dualists who are not necessarily substance dualists, > including Dennett, while Searle is explaining why we need not use this > outmoded vocabulary anymore. Can he pull it off? Well, he needs readers who > get him right, firstly. > > > From here on you appear to be responding to Walter so I'll stay out of the rest of it. Better him than me. SWM <snip> > Walter: > > Here's what I think about this: > > > > (1) There are no property dualists of the type Searle disses in his paper. > > > > Chalmers would be a counterexample to this claim. > > > > Because (2) what he there calls "property dualists" are, as he points at > > the end of his paper actually substance dualists. (They've got different > > "cake layers.") > > Chalmers's version of propery dualism is to allow for consciousness as a > feature (an epiphenomenal one) of the world that does no causal work. > Traditional substance dualists try to have it both ways--nonphysical > substance sometimes interfering with the physical world. Chalmers' version > amounts to a substance dualism, too, even if not a traditional one. Maybe > that's a new thing to be learned by noticing a possible taxonomy of issues, > like the famous C.D. Broad's 15 or so positions in philosophy of mind. > > > > (3) On a more traditional definition of "property dualism" (i.e. causal, > > but not what he calls "ontological reducibility"), he actually IS a > > property dualist as am I (and, I'm guessing all the non-computationalists > > who aren't Cartesians). > > But he doesn't want to count as one even though you refuse to go along with > his preferred vocabulary. Causal reducibility without ontological > reducibilty does not necessarily entail property dualism. Maybe it does by > fiat. But the point is that there are no more physical properties to account > for other than those of brains to get consciousness as "something" (some > cake-level, middle-sized frontier of brain juice). And just because we want > to refer to ontological subjectivity as irreducible from an ontological point > of view, it is the causal reducibility which Searle would a Walter to > understand as a position that is not property dualism: > > 1. That rock is wet. Wetness doesn't amount to property dualism. > > 2. That brain is currently conscious. Consciousness doesn't amount to > property dualism--it's just a state it may be in. > > 3. That we inherit the Cartesian vocabulary makes it sound like consciousness > names that very different substance Descartes was talking about. The point > is that it needn't. > > 4. So that this isn't merely a quibble about using different vocabularies for > saying the same thing: > > 5. On Searle's view, good science of mind would include looking for NCCs. > > 6. On a property dualist's view of the Chalmers stamp: Why bother if > consciousness is an epiphenomenon? > > 7. On Walter's sense of the traditional view of property dualism amounting to > the view of causal reducibilty without ontological reduction, there is a > venerable tradition of nonreductive physicalists, of which he maintains both > that Searle and himself are two. > > 8. So Walter is perfectly right in his 4. below. > > 9. I don't think, contra Walter's 5., that Searle is making too big of a > mess. I refer to 3. above. > > So 10. I think Searle makes some sense out of how Chalmers's version of > property dualism is a kind of substance dualism. And how the inheritance of > Cartesian vocabulary makes some other forms of traditional property dualism > look the same way (many, like Armstrong and some qualia-deniers, including > Dennett), even though nonreductive physicalists think they are still > physicalists--let's drop the Cartesian categories and stop calling > nonreductive physicalism a form of property dualism. Ontological > subjectivity may be a unique thing in the world, but so is everything else, > individualistically speaking. Getting rid of the outmoded terminology would > be a step in a direction that helps others see exactly what Walter ends up > claiming: The taxonomy issues don't make a difference--unless they do. > > Hence Searle's paper. I think it was a help in understanding why Searle > thinks he is not a property dualist. Without it, then, like Walter, maybe I > would refer to him as a property dualist just because the original property > dualists are exactly of his stamp: causal reducibility without ontological > reducibility. > > But it is still misleading: Searle is trying to say that consciousness is as > ordinary a feature of a brain as digestion is of a stomach, even if it is a > unique feature entailing ontological subjectivity. > > Others seize on the traditional Cartesian categories in order to call such a > position dualist. This is even after Searle thought they might have been > able to grasp his prose.. That they won't out of sheer stubbornness is > another matter--I even heard it said that one way to "refute" someone's > thesis is simply not to consider it. One way of doing such would be to call > it by the name of an issue that doesn't make a difference. A taxonomic issue. > > Funny how one can have it both ways here: Calling it a taxonomic issue that > doesn't make a difference is one thing, while such calling is supposed to > make a difference in terms of our not reading Searle's paper with interest > because it boils down to a taxonomic issue. That the taxonomic issue makes > it tough for Searle to get his point across, on the other hand, seems more > than a taxonomic issue; even a reason for reading his paper on why, after all > the taxonomic issues, he's STILL not a property dualist. > > > > So, (4) traditional property dualists need not be substance dualists, and > > none of them actually are--including Searle himself. > > > > And (5) While I agree with almost all the substantial points in his paper, > > I believe it makes a mess of the classifications, largely because it's so > > important to him not be considered a dualist. > > > > (6) None of these taxonomy issues make any difference to anything. > > > > W > > Thanks for a very thoughtful post, Walter. Correct me on anything you find > misleading or wrong concerning what I wrote above. > > Cheers, > Budd ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/