[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 03:22:39 -0000
I think, Bruce, that you are stuck in the same kind of picture of mind as
dualists whether you espouse dualism or not. It's easy, after all, to deny it
(Searle does regularly) but if it walks like a duck and quacks like a duck . . .
On the other hand, as I have long said, it is not, on my view, a pejorative
claim to say someone is "dualist" in his/her thinking.
Anyway, a few remarks in response below:
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
>
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> copied:
> Whether or not computation is physical is of no importance here. The
> point it that it is separated from the physical input (what I called
> "process A".
>
> It seems to me that this whole debate turns on whether one holds, as
> does Stuart does, in the next paragraph
>
> "Of course there are different kinds of information and information
> delivery: an apparatus might simply capture signals about an object
> which allow construction of a visual image of the object which some
> other part of the processor is equipped to read (as in interpret)"
>
I was suggesting here that it seemed to me that Neil's assertion of dualism was
being somewhat idiosyncratically used, given the standard usage in classical
philosophy. If that is so, then his argument against dualism really addresses
something else.
> namely, that what goes on the physical brain is the whole story (and
> nothing but the story) and hence computation MUST be physical or one
> holds, as I do, that "what goes on in the physical brain" only makes
> sense when one views the brain as an instrument of a person, with the
> implication that computation and interpretation is not physical (nor is
> it the movement of a mental substance.)
>
How can "one view the brain as the instrument of a person" when, in fact, the
brain is a part of what constitutes the person (the rest being the physical
organism that houses it with all its accouterments)? Your continued reliance on
this locution is just odd in this context of discussing how minds happen in the
world, Bruce. Nor does it resolve the question of whether, for minds to be when
brains are doing certain things, something more than what the brains are doing
is required?
Aside from the operations of the body to sustain life and feed the brain its
complement of blood supply, what else could be required? Inputs from the
physical world Neil might say, I suppose.
Well sure, but that is not the key component because a brain can be conscious
even if deprived of sensory inputs as some scientific experiments have shown.
> My position is not Dualistic.
Sorry Bruce, but I think it is -- not that there's anything wrong with that!
(Except, of course, there is good reason to think it is not the way things
really are.)
> Nor is it Monistic. It doesn't employ the
> notion of substance.
And yet you talk about "substance" an awful, awful lot! If you don't use the
concept in your thesis why do you constantly need to refer to it, deny it,
explain why it isn't your concern, etc.?
>Physics is no more the analysis of a physical
> substance than psychology is an analysis of a mental substance. Hence, I
> agree...
>
> > Dualism is the supposition that there must be something other
> > than purely physical processes underlying mental occurrences.
>
Glad you do. Let's see where you take it though.
> If one drops the notion of purely physical, then Dualism (or should I
> say "substance-ism") goes away. But if you are intent on conceiving of
> mind in brain terms, "substance-ism" will continue trouble your account.
>
Well if the question is how do minds happen in the world, there's an awful lot
of evidence that brains ARE the cause of them (Searle's sesen of "cause", etc.,
etc.) and very little evidence that anything else is. So the issue is how do
brains do what they do and can what they do be replicated on some other kind of
platform (e.g., computers)?
> > If computations are physical processes then what is dualistic
> > about supposing them to be the operations that...have consciousness
>
> Because it is a person who is conscious, not the circuitry. You have
> agreed in the past that the brain isn't conscious.
I have agreed that we don't typically talk that way and that's because we don't
have direct encounters with brains but with individuals we know as persons with
brains. But all the evidence so far is that brains are the causative agent of
consciousness within the body (Searle's sense of "cause"). Moreover, I have
noted that in cases where we are actually monitoring the brain of a person we
might say there's evidence of consciousness in that brain, and so forth. I
suppose if our world consisted of free floating brains and we had direct
contact with them there would be no need of the distinction you want us to
draw. But of course, the world isn't like that.
Now if a computer were built that had consciousness, would we mean the whole
darned machine was conscious or some key components which, like our brains,
could, in principle be extracted?
> But it is consistent
> with reductionism to attribute C to brain matter. This is what I find
> troubling. Then again, my account...
>
?
> >...doesn't tell us (what is occurring in their key organs, like their
> brains)
> > that is, in effect, making the instances of consciousness happen.
>
> But Dehaene's does. He has found the area that "is responsible", his
> phrase.
In that material we linked to, Dehaene was specifically limiting his reference
to what he called access consciousness, i.e., the part of brain activity we are
aware is occurring when it's occurring. Moreover he didn't say he had found
"the area", he said he had found indications that consciousness in the brain is
a global phenomenon, meaning that it involves the occurrence of many different
things in a linked fashion simultaneously. This certainly involved a claim of
finding implicated areas but his was NOT a claim that instannces of
consciousness occurred in particular brain sections rather than others.
> But "responsible" isn't a process A or physical theory term. So,
> at the critical junction between brain and mind, the language shifts.
> Can we do better?
>
> Actually, you wrote..
>
> > what is being done by the conscious organisms that is,
> > in effect, making the instances of consciousness happen
>
> Which is another example of the shift from a physical to a to a
> psychological account, "what the conscious organism does", as in the way
> I play the piano,
No, my reference to the "organism" was deliberately made so as not to invoke
the idea of "person" as you would have it. I was speaking of the organism as a
particular system in the way Neil describes living things, as self-contained,
self-sustaining, self-propagating homeostatic systems whose "purpose" is to
maintain internal equilibrium for as long as it can. This occurs at a much
deeper level of the entity's operations than playing the piano.
> which I think imputes too much control over our
> consciousness.
>
> bruce
> >
This is a mistake Bruce. You are conflating claims about the organisms with
claims about the persons that we consider SOME organisms to be! And then you
are confusing the usage of the term "consciousness". This discussion is not
aimed at discussing the conscious vs. the sub-conscious of some person or
other. It's about the occurrence of "being a subject" in the physical world,
what we more loosely and more typically call the occurrence of minds.
And that's a biological and neurobiological issue and an issue for so-called
cognitive science which aims to unite disciplines in order to determine what
exactly minds are (besides being the outputs of some brains). However, it is
not, generally speaking, a subject for the clinical psychologist practicing his
or her profession (though such individuals are certainly not barred from taking
an interest in the question, too).
SWM
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