[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2010 14:31:30 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Stuart writes:
>
> "The older and more classical view of consciousness, of course, is that it is
> a unified awareness, an observer of, and actor upon, events in its
> environment."
>
> You can have consciousness as a unified field without that implying > any
> form of dualism at all.
You certainly can if you recognize that the so-called unified field isn't a
bottom-line but an outcome, a system level property as it were.
The point I was making, though, was that the unified field, in the case that
represents dualism, is conceived as an irreducible, the self or observer in the
mix to which any further breakdown to something that is NOT the unified field,
isn't possible.
It is that commitment to irreducibility that constitutes the dualism.
> One can also have mental events without presupposing dualism.
Of course. That is what Dennett does in his book, Consciousness Explained, and
what Searle, when making his Chinese Room argument, (CRA) fails to do.
> It's just that the explanation of the mental events is as a system feature
> of a brain.
Your pal Searle does seem to recognize this, albeit only hazily, in his talk
about brains.
But because he doesn't go into any kind of detail with regard to brains he can
get away with the haziness.
The problem for him arises when he talks of computers since his CRA pivots on
the notion that understanding (his proxy for consciousness in the CR) cannot be
broken down to something else.
The fact, he tells us, that no understanding is evident in the room, as he has
specked it, demonstrates that no understanding could ever be in any room made
up solely of the same constituents as make up the CR.
But, of course, THAT is the mistake since, if understanding is really a system
property, then all the CR demonstrates is that IT is an inadequate system to
produce understanding.
For us to think the problem is in the constituents of the system rather than in
the robustness (or lack of same) of the system itself, we must think that
understanding is a property of one of the constituent elements of the system
rather than of how these elements all work together. And so forth.
> How else does one explain the ability to shift one's focus of attention
> within the unified field--I see a chair now, I see the space between myself
> and the chair which makes the chair look fuzzy in the background, I can sense
> the feel the shirt on my back, now my chest, I can look at all the books on
> the shelf, think about some mambo groove, etc.
>
What has this to do with the issue of whether consciousness is a system
function or a process function or some mysterious irreducible property that
some physical things/events have and some don't?
> One can even observe events as well as act upon events without presupposing
> dualism.
>
Of course. So what?
> So one wonders just what distinguishes the classical view from a "modern" one
> right after you just tried.
>
> Cheers,
> Budd
>
> =========================================
If "one" is wondering, as you say, then "one" has missed the point.
SWM
=========================================
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