[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2010 22:37:39 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
<snip>
>
> >
> > I think a little careful unpacking will show that Walter's position is
> > dualistic in the relevant sense, too.
> >
>
> Actually, I don't deny being a property dualist.
>
Okay. As you know, my view is that being a property dualist finally amounts to
the same thing as claiming so-called substance dualism. It's just a matter of
the terms since dualism is only dualism if the argument is that neither of the
two types of things being referenced can be explained (in a causal way) in
terms of the other. In this I am in accord with Searle as seen in that article
of his we previously read on the Analytic list.
> > Walter, in opposing its characterization as dualism
>
>
> Except that I don't do that.
>
I was never quite sure where you came down since you seemed so reluctant to
commit but I'm glad you are committing here. It makes the discussion, insofar
as there is to be one, more feasible.
> >, has suggested that it is really a kind of multi-ism, i.e., that there are
> >a great many different things in the world, not just two -- that which is
> >physical and that which is mental.
>
> That's actually Searle's position in his "Why I'm not a property dualist"
> paper. As I've said numerous times, as I understand the term, he probably IS
> a property dualist--
As I recall, you made the same claim about all the things there are, about
so-called ontology as you are now attributing to Searle. Perhaps you didn't
mean it as your own position then?
And as I have also previously asserted, I think that to be a "property dualist"
is, in the end, no different than to be a "substance dualist" as Searle himself
argued in that paper. So, on his own terms, if he is one, he is the other.
He certainly denies being either and has surely been accused of "property
dualism" by some of his critics. As we've seen, Dennett goes farther and
accuses him of Cartesian dualism which is "substance dualism".
My view re: Searle is that Dennett has it right. As to my view of your
position, I recall your claim that intentionality is just a property of some
physical things/events and not others (where "intentionality" was a proxy for
what we mean by "consciousness" in that earlier discussion).
Searle and you are certainly right to say that the world consists of many
things. All the different categories of them, cut myriads of ways, do not, on
the level of discussion about what there is (ontology), imply a simple
reduction to one thing or two things or some other particular number of things.
But as I've also proposed, THAT isn't the issue. What is the issue is whether,
to explain the occurrence of minds in the world, we need to posit something
beyond whatever it is we presume underlies all the physics of the universe.
That is, do we need more than physics to explain the presence of minds?
It is that kind of dualism that is the issue and it is the only real issue of
dualism in terms of discussing minds and bodies that there is.
Now one can argue, as some do and maybe you do, that "property dualism" doesn't
go beyond physics since the point is to assert that there are some properties
of physical things that aren't, themselves, physical things (in the way that
the usual array of physical properties are). But insofar as one is positing
some special feature (an inexplicable but irreducible property), all that has
happened is that the assertion of something special added to the universe has
shifted, i.e., the claim has gone from one that asserts the world consists of
physics and X to the claim that the world we know (whatever it amounts to at
some deep metaphysical level) consists of physical properties and X properties.
For someone like yourself who denies "qualia" on the grounds that the term adds
nothing to the list of properties we already acknowledge, that strikes me as a
strange view.
> and I agree almost entirely with the positions he takes in that
> paper....except for his nomenclature. He doesn't like the idea of dualism of
> any kind: I have nothing against property dualism, myself.
>
>
I have long noted that you could be right in calling him a property dualist
though, as I've also said, given his critique of the dualist position, which I
think is accurate, that would amount to not much more (maybe nothing more) than
my claim that dualism of the so-called substance variety underlies his argument
against the possibility of computational consciousness.
>
> >But I think this misses the point, since the issue isn't whether there are
> >two things or one but, rather, whether to explain the presence of mind in
> >the world, we have to posit something underlying mind that isn't physical.
>
>
> I believe that neither Searle nor I "posit something undrlying mind that
> isn't physical,"
I agree that Searle doesn't do so explicitly but I think he certainly does it
implicitly though we have disagreed on this before. As to you, I have made no
assertion with regard to what you hold on such the matter. All I have noted
here is that you took the position in our discussions on Analytic that
intentionality is an irreducible property of some physical things or events
(you weren't clear on which) but not others. As I have also noted, THAT is
fundamentally no different than suggesting that intentionality is an
irreducible property that is separate from all the rest of physics. The
irreducibility, of course, is the issue.
> but I'll just speak for my self. In my view, (and I've repeated this
> COUNTLESS fucking times), everything in the universe is physical: some of it
> is also mental.
>
"Also mental" as in what a property that simply occurs with some physical
phenomena, but not others, happens to be? As you have "fucking" said this
before, note that you have also said that you count yourself a "mysterian" on
this. Insofar as you are a "mysterian" you have basically embraced the kind of
position your friend Larry points out over on Analytic makes no sense, namely
using a term (like "Throckmorton") without any features in mind for reference.
While we know what it is to be "mysterian" (it has a reference since it's to
affirm the ultimate mysteriousness, inexplicability, of something), adopting
THAT position is, in fact, no different from making a statement about
"Throckmorton" under the conditions outlined by Larry. So being a "mysterian"
gets us nowhere but it does appear to fill in some a space in an argument I
suppose. That is, it sounds like it's a position on the matter when all it is
is to say I don't know and no one ever will know either so I won't say and
don't ask me about it except that when you do, I will invoke mysterianism.
> >If mind is just some "mental property" that attaches to some physical events
> >but not others, as Walter would have it, then how does it happen in the
> >world?
>
> That's a tough question. Several people are working on it, I believe.
>
So I've heard. Do you think that a reason not to raise it in other venues then?
>
> >Does it simply burst full blown into existence, conjured up by certain
> >physical events? (I suppose this is why Walter has, occasionally, embraced
> >"mysterianism", i.e., he recognizes that he is really asserting something
> >that is finally inexplicable.)
> >
>
> I think it very well may be finally inexplicable and that it is certainly
> inexplicable at present.
>
>
As I point out above, it is certainly possible that we will never be able to
answer such questions but answering by asserting that it is unanswerable
because "intentionality are properties that some physical things (events?) have
and some don't" isn't really much of an answer. Whether a better answer is
possible, the answer you gave in that case is to do little more than assert
that intentionality at bottom is just "Throckmorton".
> > Anyway, back to my main point:
>
>
> Thanks. As I've asked you many times, please don't paraphrase me. As you
> somehow find it necessary to pass along what you think I think every so often
> (though I haven't the faintest idea why), I'd appreciate it if you'd just
> quote me.
>
I'm fine with your desire to correct what you take to be my
mischaracterizations however I don't wish to make points without attribution
when they involve reference to assertions by others. If you think I have you
wrong (and on balance I think that is false based on what you've said here,
though there are a few points in the above I suppose we could quibble over),
then you are always welcome to correct me.
But insofar as I believe you have made a particular claim I would be remiss to
fail to properly attribute it (since, as the source, your past comments would
be the place to look, and, besides, many here were involved in those earlier
discussions; there is no need to reinvent wheels, even if sometimes that ends
up happening, if a quick reference, fully attributed, to a prior discussion is
possible).
Now I recall your rather snarky attitude in the past which you have apparently
carried with you here. I will trim my tone and comments to the tone and
comments you adopt. I will neither do more nor less, if you wish to continue
this. If you don't, just note that I will still reference comments I believe
you made if that seems necessary and I will always attempt to attribute them
for further reference. You are, likewise, always welcome to clarify, deny,
correct and so forth.
I don't claim that I will always get things right. But I will always try.
SWM
> Namaste.
>
> W
>
>
>
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