[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 27 Aug 2010 00:44:44 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "gabuddabout" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> > --- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > >
> > > I think, Bruce, that you are stuck in the same kind of picture of mind as
> > > dualists whether you espouse dualism or not. It's easy, after all, to
> > > deny it (Searle does regularly) but if it walks like a duck and quacks
> > > like a duck . . .
> >
> > I believe Stuart's response here is just misinformed. He's demonstrated
> > over the years that he can't read simple English when it comes to Searle
> > and Stuart doesn't really get that Bruce is coming from Hacker's
> > perspective such that consciousness has to do with persons who are more
> > than their brains, yada, yada.
> >
>
>
> Budd, it doesn't matter whose "perspective" Bruce may be coming from. I am
> criticizing the position, not questioning the authority on which it is held!
> As to my capacity to "read simple English", well these kinds of remarks are
> getting increasingly tiresome.
But again you just failed to note the point made. One can hold Bruce's
position which is like Hacker's without the position implying dualism.
>
>
> > Bruce simply, along with Hacker (and Neil and probably the whole
> > populations of Germany and France), thinks that the thesis that the brain
> > causes consciousness is somehow problematic whereas Searle thinks such a
> > view simply retarded.
> >
>
> Irrelevant to what I said to Bruce.
But to an historical point.
>
> > On other occasions, Stuart tried to distinguish Searle's position as
> > consciousness arising/caused "full-blown" from the brain, as opposed to
> > some functional account of system processes which he conflated with BP
> > while yet wanting the account in functional terms PP.
> >
>
> See my longstanding critique of the CRA and why it fails. The problem alluded
> to here is explicated there.
The critique was based on not being able to understand that the point of the
CRA was about the inadequacy of functional explanation. You invented a way for
strong AI to be about BP, something that Searle wouldn't argue with if true.
But strong AI is about PP after all, no matter how many tries you've had for
conflating it with BP.
>
> >
> > > On the other hand, as I have long said, it is not, on my view, a
> > > pejorative claim to say someone is "dualist" in his/her thinking.
> >
> >
> > What Bruce is getting at is simply his notion of having power to do and
> > think things regardless of a story as to how the brain causes consciousness.
>
>
> What I am getting at is answering the question of how brains do it.
You're not getting at it at all. Like me, you are being a cheerleader for a
Searlean position.
>
>
> > But this isn't an argument/can't be an argument against the thesis that
> > the brain causes/realizes cons. in some synchronically causal way that we
> > have no choice but to look into by first looking for NCCs. On Searle's
> > view you can enjoy your phenomenology without thinking that it rules out
> > his brand of brain research when it comes to a good scientific account of
> > mind--the philosophical account is indeed a sort of identity theory without
> > ontological reduction.
> >
>
>
> Again totally irrelevant to the discussion here.
Right. It is about you telling everybody exactly how the brain does it!
>
>
> > Stuart would say that the above quacks like a dualist duck. But he's fond
> > of hearing things he's already settled on six years ago and probably
> > before. He says he once was fine with Searle until he found him
> > equivocating, arguing circularly, contradicting himself--but note that
> > nonreductive materialism combined with causal reduction is not a
> > contradiction.
> >
> >
>
> Nope. I said I once found Searle's CRA convincing and then, after giving it
> more thought, concluded it wasn't and then set out to discover why. I kicked
> a few ideas about that around but finally settled on two problems with it:
>
> 1) It is structured equivocally because the critical third premise (or
> second, depending on the iteration being considered) depends on an
> equivocation for the conclusion to stand; and
There is absolutely no equivocation--where is the equivocation in saying that
syntax is neither the same as nor sufficient for semantics? Note the the first
premise lays down that programs are formal. And note that semantics involves
mental content (except for eliminativists who are trying to squeeze semantics
from syntax by conflating syntax with physics). The "insufficient for" claim
is about the insufficiency of functional explanation--it is shown that a
machine may pass a Turing test and still have no semantics.
>
> 2) The equivocation masks an implicit assumption in the interpretation Searle
> wants us to make of the CR itself, an assumption which is in contradiction to
> what Searle says elsewhere about brains AND which contradicts Searle's own
> assertions about dualism.
There is no equivocation--Searle's implicit assumption is that brains cause
consciousness via BP, and that PP is STILL too formal. But if YOU want to
equivocate between functional explanation and BP without PP explanation, then
you are on notice that I see what is happening.
>
> Now that's all I want to say about this as it's an old argument here and
> elsewhere by now and we have kicked it around many times. If you don't agree
> with my points that's fine. I will simply say you are wrong, most likely
> because you don't understand them. Enough said.
I understand exactly how you come to your conclusion. But it is crooked and
the product of any honest toil.
> > How can "one view the brain as the instrument of a person" when, in fact,
> > the brain is a part of what constitutes the person (the rest being the
> > physical organism that houses it with all its accouterments)? Your
> > continued reliance on this locution is just odd in this context of
> > discussing how minds happen in the world, Bruce.
> >
> >
> > I emphatically agree with Stuart here.
> >
>
> Be still my heart! (And to think, in my haste I almost snipped this!)
> >
> >
> > > Nor does it resolve the question of whether, for minds to be when brains
> > > are doing certain things, something more than what the brains are doing
> > > is required?
> >
> > Quite correct and consistent, contra your misinterpretation of Searle, with
> > Searle's position.
> >
>
> In the above I am not talking about Searle but about the implications of
> something Bruce said! Everything in the universe is not about Searle, Budd.
> There are other issues and thinkers, after all!
The topic indeed revolves around Searle's position that you butcher by
conflating PP with BP in order to miss Searle's point, while in essence sharing
his view.
>
> > >
> > > Aside from the operations of the body to sustain life and feed the brain
> > > its complement of blood supply, what else could be required? Inputs from
> > > the physical world Neil might say, I suppose.
> >
> > This is the hilarious thesis made fun of by Fodor in his review appended
> > below for fun for all.
> >
>
> Who cares if someone makes fun of it? This isn't about the about the
> authority wielded by your latest philosophical infatuation!
Good point. And I forgot to include it--will try to remember below.
>
> > >
> > > Well sure, but that is not the key component because a brain can be
> > > conscious even if deprived of sensory inputs as some scientific
> > > experiments have shown.
> >
> > That's a good point.
> > >
>
> You're scaring me, Budd! Are you all right?
You would be a moron to think that we disgree on a lot since I pointed out that
the upshot of your position is consistent with Searle's. But your critique of
the CRA is utterly moronic.
>
> > >
> > > > My position is not Dualistic.
> > >
> > > Sorry Bruce, but I think it is -- not that there's anything wrong with
> > > that! (Except, of course, there is good reason to think it is not the way
> > > things really are.)
> >
> >
> > Here's how it is not dualistic, Stuart. All Bruce needs to do is say he's
> > uninterested in how the brain causes consciousness when it
> > comes to his "being in the world."
>
> Then he is not addressing the issue I am addressing and there is little point
> of his going back and forth with me over the issue I have focused on -- and I
> certainly don't challenge his desire to think about minds apart from brains.
> More power to him! Just don't latch onto that as an answer to a question
> about how brains relate to minds.
You and Fodor both are identity theorists of a kind, along with Searle. The
"direct realists" are going to be made fun of below, if I remember to append it.
>
>
> > Not that there's anything wrong with that. But it is not the whole story,
> > as Searle points out that Hacker's Wittgensteinian view tends to make his
> > innocent thesis that the brain causes consciousness look (somehow) suspect.
> > That wouldn't necessarily be dualism either.
> > >
>
> I am not deeply familiar with Hacker on this but to the extent I am I find
> myself in disagreement with him. I have no problem with speaking about
> conscious brains even if we usually reserve that kind of usage to persons a
> la Bruce!
Agreed.
>
> > >
> > > > Nor is it Monistic. It doesn't employ the
> > > > notion of substance.
> > >
> > >
> > > And yet you talk about "substance" an awful, awful lot! If you don't use
> > > the concept in your thesis why do you constantly need to refer to it,
> > > deny it, explain why it isn't your concern, etc.?
> >
> > He might be making fun of this whole discussion which tends to go nowhere,
> > including our debate on how to read Searle's simple English.
> > >
> > >
>
> The reason this discussion goes nowhere is because some person or persons
> here keep missing my point and, apparently, some think I am missing theirs.
> We could all be right in which case we are none of us arguing with anyone
> else here although we may be producing lots of marks on our various computer
> screens.
I'm often practicing my typing!
>
> > > >Physics is no more the analysis of a physical
> > > > substance than psychology is an analysis of a mental substance. Hence, I
> > > > agree...
> > > >
> > > > > Dualism is the supposition that there must be something other
> > > > > than purely physical processes underlying mental occurrences.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Glad you do. Let's see where you take it though.
> >
> >
> > Round back to not being interested in Searle's thesis..
> >
>
> You mean Bruce isn't? I thought you said he wasn't interested in any theses
> about how brains do minds? If so, he is simply outside that particular game
> in which case what's the point of his arguing with others who are
> participating in that game if he's really not?
Well, more cheeky things have gone on in this super-cloud than are found in
good philosophy!
>
>
> > >
> > > > If one drops the notion of purely physical, then Dualism (or should I
> > > > say "substance-ism") goes away. But if you are intent on conceiving of
> > > > mind in brain terms, "substance-ism" will continue trouble your account.
> > > >
> > >
> > > Well if the question is how do minds happen in the world, there's an
> > > awful lot of evidence that brains ARE the cause of them (Searle's sense
> > > of "cause", etc., etc.) and very little evidence that anything else is.
> > > So the issue is how do brains do what they do and can what they do be
> > > replicated on some other kind of platform (e.g., computers)?
> >
>
> > Is replication simulation or pound for pound emulation?
>
>
> You know or should know my view: By "replication" I mean to completely copy,
> down to the small RELEVANT operating details whereas by "simulation" I mean
> what Searle means, i.e., to model digitally using computational technology.
> Of course, both words in ordinary language could do duty in both cases so
> here is a case where, for clarity, we want to stipulate (i.e., indicate which
> of a set of legitimate meanings of the term in question we are invoking). I
> have done this in the past. Now I have reiterated. Perhaps you will commit it
> to the memory banks now?
Okay, just as long as cashing out "relevant" meets Searle's causal reality
constraint which he thinks PP as well as serial processing doesn't. But maybe
one can conflate PP with BP and get away with a Searlean position which is
noted not to be his osition because he argues against strong AI..............
>
>
> > Is PP conflated with BP such that a PP explanation is equivalent to some
> > BP explanation?
>
>
> This is fiddle-faddle. It's not about which explanation is better for what a
> computer can do but what a computer can do.
OY!
>
>
> > Then you are with Searle even though without understanding why he thinks
> > functional explanation insufficient for a sound philosophy/science of mind.
> >
>
> See above.
OY, OY!
>
> <snip>
>
> > > . . . we don't have direct encounters with brains but with individuals we
> > > know as persons with brains. But all the evidence so far is that brains
> > > are the causative agent of consciousness within the body (Searle's sense
> > > of "cause"). Moreover, I have noted that in cases where we are actually
> > > monitoring the brain of a person we might say there's evidence of
> > > consciousness in that brain, and so forth. I suppose if our world
> > > consisted of free floating brains and we had direct contact with them
> > > there would be no need of the distinction you want us to draw. But of
> > > course, the world isn't like that.
> >
> > I'll bet that someday you'll come to appreciate Fodor too, along with
> > coming back home to Searle after understanding he's not quacking in the way
> > you seem to mishear him.]
> >
>
> I distinctly hear him quacking at this very moment, through you!
I think you're projecting. Listen closer!
>
>
> > >
> > > Now if a computer were built that had consciousness, would we mean the
> > > whole darned machine was conscious or some key components which, like our
> > > brains, could, in principle be extracted?
> >
> > Interesting question. Searle's response to the systems reply goes
> > something like that if you understand it.
> > >
>
> Searle misses the point of the system reply.
Um, they are conflating PP with BP at some point or not. If not, they are
contradicting themselves. If so, then it is Searle original position and one
he's not arguing against when replying to the systems reply.
>
> > >
> <snip>
>
> > > > imputes too much control over our
> > > > consciousness.
> > > >
> > > > bruce
> > > > >
> > >
> > > This is a mistake Bruce. You are conflating claims about the organisms
> > > with claims about the persons that we consider SOME organisms to be! And
> > > then you are confusing the usage of the term "consciousness". This
> > > discussion is not aimed at discussing the conscious vs. the sub-conscious
> > > of some person or other. It's about the occurrence of "being a subject"
> > > in the physical world, what we more loosely and more typically call the
> > > occurrence of minds.
> > >
>
> > > And that's a biological and neurobiological issue and an issue for
> > > so-called cognitive science which aims to unite disciplines in order to
> > > determine what exactly minds are (besides being the outputs of some
> > > brains). However, it is not, generally speaking, a subject for the
> > > clinical psychologist practicing his or her profession (though such
> > > individuals are certainly not barred from taking an interest in the
> > > question, too).
> > >
> > > SWM
> >
>
> > I'm glad to here some of those responses, Stuart. Nice job on them.
> >
> > Cheers,
> > Budd
> > =========================================
>
> Now you've really gone and done it, Budd. I am beginning to think the world
> is turning topsy turvy after what now seems to be some seven long years. Are
> you feeling okay?
>
> SWM
Well, I'm not a moron!
Cheers,
Budd
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