[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2010 23:12:32 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
<snip>
> > SWM:
> > I pointed out that you had not clarified what you mean by
> > "intentionality" and noted that it is not an easy concept to explain,
> > even if we will tend to think we know it when we "see" it.
>
> That was unclear. The paragraph that began "Your statement above
> leaves 'intentionality' unexplicated" also ended in "But where is this
> 'aboutness' in your 'process A'." It did not seem that there was any
> disagreement on what was meant by the term.
>
Then perhaps I wasn't clear enough as you say. (I had supposed that the text
between the opening of that paragraph and its concluding line contained enough
information to warrant that ending but perhaps not.)
I wasn't claiming we had a disagreement on the term, though -- just that we
might have because I didn't think (and still don't think) that it is a simple
question as to what "intentionality" is. Even for those who use it in the
standard philosophical way (aboutness, rather than having a purpose or
objective) are not necessarily going to be talking about the same thing
because, frankly, this concept of aboutness is not at all concrete and may
refer to lots of things, e.g., some special extra-physical condition of being
an aware subject (having awareness) or some particular combination of
operations, such as making connective associations with certain kinds of
representations, etc.
And then there is the question of where we draw the line between the claim that
aboutness is present and where it isn't.
So any explanation, it seems to me, that depends to a significant extent on a
claim about "intentionality", as yours did, must first deal with all these
difficulties I think. That is, we must first be clear on our key terms
including "intentionality".
>
> > SWM:
> > I was, finally, making the point that it doesn't help to invoke
> > a term, like "intentionality", by way of explaining a phenomenon
> > (like consciousness) if the term, itself, is not clear and has yet
> > to be sufficiently explicated.
>
> I don't believe that I ever suggested that consciousness could be
> explained by invoking the term "intentionality."
>
> Regards,
> Neil
Again we have a disconnect then. I took your claim about what constitutes the
mental (which is another way of saying "having a mind" and so forth) to include
your invocation of the need for intentionality which you seemed to be ascribing
to living things but denying to non-living things -- all without ever
explicating "intentionality".
Here's the relevant text to which I was responding:
http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6207
"The dualistic division leaves that part of the requirements of intentionality
absent from process B. And as long as thinking is said to occur within process
B, that leaves the thinking as without some of the requirements of
intentionality."
It seems pretty clear that you were invoking "intentionality" in your account
of two processes (A and B) whose confusion or inadequate explication you
suggested was a source of the failure of some to achieve a good explanation of
consciousness.
As I recall, we were talking about whether whatever it is that mind is, is
sufficiently like what computational processes running on computers can do,
under certain circumstances, such that computers could produce consciousness as
brains do. It was THAT issue that led you to the above statement (by way of
discussing whether certain approaches to what mind is, e.g., the AI approach,
imply dualism).
C you have held, in our discussions, that computers are not likely to be good
candidates for accomplishing what brains can accomplish (produce minds)
because, you have suggested, they lack something that living systems have which
you laid out at one point in roughly this manner: homeostasis --> pragmatics
--> perception --> intentionality.
Now perhaps I have the line of progression in your thesis wrong. If so, I will
gladly accept any revisions you think will better capture your position. But,
finally, the issue about which you have taken this position (or some amended
version of it) is the question of what it takes to make a mind and whether
computational platforms are viable candidates to do it?
As we've seen in these threads and on Analytic, Walter treats intentionality as
a proxy for consciousness (mind) and I would suggest that this is a pretty
standard move. It is one, moreover, with which I am largely in accord -- though
I would add that it is not clear that intentionality is the ONLY feature that
matters in the occurrence of mind or that it is, in fact, a single feature
itself.
However, for the purposes of considering this question it is enough to suppose
that it is at least ONE of the features we associate with minds.
So I would suggest that you did raise the issue of intentionality in this
context.
If I've again gotten you wrong, I will accept further correction from you which
may hopefully lead us finally to the point where we are both prepared to say we
understand the other's position.
Note that, as of now, I do think I understand your claims re: this, as I've
articulated above but I am aware that you have repeatedly denied every effort
I've made at restating your position so it is not not unlikely you will do so
again. Nor is it impossible that I am somehow getting you wrong. But if I am,
the way to fix this is for you to offer a set of statements articulating your
views that have sufficient clarity and fixedness such that we can both feel
comfortable that a shared understanding is in place.
An important place to start is in making sure that we define what we mean by
key terms or answer questions, if ambiguities or variant meanings are
identified, as is clearly the case with a term like "intentionality".
SWM
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