[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 00:18:45 -0000
--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> <snip>
> >
> > >
> > > I think a little careful unpacking will show that Walter's position is
> > > dualistic in the relevant sense, too.
> > >
> >
> > Actually, I don't deny being a property dualist.
> >
>
> Okay. As you know, my view is that being a property dualist finally amounts
> to the same thing as claiming so-called substance dualism.
But that's because you are not keen enough on the literature. When someone
says that "This machine has the property of being conscious," that is property
dualism by definition and it is a position that needn't imply substance
dualism. If you think it does, you just made up a story for yourself. But
your story is not an informed one or you are a windbag who has fun blowing hot
air while knowing that you aren't really teaching anything but that philosophy
can look like a waste of time. You would be correct on that!
Searle's point is that it needn't be property dualism to assert that "This
machine is conscious." Saying "This machine has the property of being
conscious" adds nothing to saying "This machine is conscious."
And since Dennett thinks he's not denying he's conscious, he too is a property
dualist.
Searle is saying "Enough already with the property dualism talk--it is not
necessary."
Look and see how brains cause consciousness already. It is an empirical affair
made to look like nonsense by certain Wittgensteinians (like Hacker and
sometimes Dennett).
> It's just a matter of the terms since dualism is only dualism if the argument
> is that neither of the two types of things being referenced can be explained
> (in a causal way) in terms of the other. In this I am in accord with Searle
> as seen in that article of his we previously read on the Analytic list.
Then stop saying he's either a property dualist or substance dualist if you
really are in accord with exactly what he's trying to say.
>
>
> > > Walter, in opposing its characterization as dualism
> >
> >
> > Except that I don't do that.
> >
>
> I was never quite sure where you came down since you seemed so reluctant to
> commit but I'm glad you are committing here. It makes the discussion, insofar
> as there is to be one, more feasible.
>
> > >, has suggested that it is really a kind of multi-ism, i.e., that there
> > >are a great many different things in the world, not just two -- that which
> > >is physical and that which is mental.
> >
> > That's actually Searle's position in his "Why I'm not a property dualist"
> > paper. As I've said numerous times, as I understand the term, he probably
> > IS a property dualist--
>
>
> As I recall, you made the same claim about all the things there are, about
> so-called ontology as you are now attributing to Searle. Perhaps you didn't
> mean it as your own position then?
Stuart, Walter is correcting you and agreeing with Searle. Walter's just fine
with calling his and Searle's position a form of property dualism while Searle
has just about had it with these stupid isms.
>
> And as I have also previously asserted, I think that to be a "property
> dualist" is, in the end, no different than to be a "substance dualist" as
> Searle himself argued in that paper. So, on his own terms, if he is one, he
> is the other.
Quite correct!
>
> He certainly denies being either and has surely been accused of "property
> dualism" by some of his critics. As we've seen, Dennett goes farther and
> accuses him of Cartesian dualism which is "substance dualism".
> My view (re: Searle) is that Dennett has it right.
That's because Dennett is denying mental contents--the sort of thing Fodor
would like to have a science about but which we can't given the assumptions
Dennett and others maintain while having an "intentional stance" without
commitment to Intentionality.
>
As to my view of your position, I recall your claim that intentionality is just
a property of some physical things/events and not others (where
"intentionality" was a proxy for what we mean by "consciousness" in that
earlier discussion).
>
> Searle and you are certainly right to say that the world consists of many
> things. All the different categories of them, cut myriads of ways, do not, on
> the level of discussion about what there is (ontology), imply a simple
> reduction to one thing or two things or some other particular number of
> things. But as I've also proposed, THAT isn't the issue. What is the issue is
> whether, to explain the occurrence of minds in the world, we need to posit
> something beyond whatever it is we presume underlies all the physics of the
> universe. That is, do we need more than physics to explain the presence of
> minds?
No for Dennett, Walter and Searle--as should be obvious if you can read.
>
> It is that kind of dualism that is the issue and it is the only real issue of
> dualism in terms of discussing minds and bodies that there is.
So why do you think Searle is a property dualist in a way that Dennett is not?
Recall that Searle's critique of strong AI is that functional explanations are
never sufficient explanations of BP.
>
> Now one can argue, as some do and maybe you do, that "property dualism"
> doesn't go beyond physics since the point is to assert that there are some
> properties of physical things that aren't, themselves, physical things (in
> the way that the usual array of physical properties are).
A crumpled shirt's crumpliness has a certain feel about it. This feel is not
an object. But the feel couldn't be had without objects. But this doesn't
imply that "crumply feel" is some extra physical thing in addition to its
realizers. And neither does this imply anything about the crumply feel being
nonphysical.
> But insofar as one is positing some special feature (an inexplicable but
> irreducible property),
You know why you just defined special feature the way you did? It is too stack
the deck. But you're not playing with a full one.
> all that has happened is that the assertion of something special added to the
> universe has shifted, i.e., the claim has gone from one that asserts the
> world consists of physics and X to the claim that the world we know (whatever
> it amounts to at some deep metaphysical level) consists of physical
> properties and X properties.
This is the point of distinguishing between property dualism and substance
dualism, moron. Property dualists are trying to be respectable physicalists
like Dennett without being retarded like Dennett given his eliminativism about
Intentionality.
>
> For someone like yourself who denies "qualia" on the grounds that the term
> adds nothing to the list of properties we already acknowledge, that strikes
> me as a strange view.
That's just you. The discussion of qualia is also worthless for Searle.
>
>
> > and I agree almost entirely with the positions he takes in that
> > paper....except for his nomenclature. He doesn't like the idea of dualism
> > of any kind: I have nothing against property dualism, myself.
> >
> >
>
> I have long noted that you could be right in calling him a property dualist
> though, as I've also said, given his critique of the dualist position, which
> I think is accurate, that would amount to not much more (maybe nothing more)
> than my claim that dualism of the so-called substance variety underlies his
> argument against the possibility of computational consciousness.
That's because you're a moron. The argument is about functional explanation
being insufficient for explanation of BP processes, whether amounting to
consciousness or actual flight (as opposed to simulation, which functional
explanations are perfect for and why computers are awesome).
>
> >
> > >But I think this misses the point, since the issue isn't whether there are
> > >two things or one but, rather, whether to explain the presence of mind in
> > >the world, we have to posit something underlying mind that isn't physical.
> >
> >
> > I believe that neither Searle nor I "posit something undrlying mind that
> > isn't physical,"
>
>
> I agree that Searle doesn't do so explicitly but I think he certainly does it
> implicitly though we have disagreed on this before.
Your argument sucked really bad. And you had to misinterpret Searle in order
to pull it off, which can't work.
> As to you, I have made no assertion with regard to what you hold on such the
> matter.
First he says it:
> All I have noted here is that you took the position in our discussions on
> Analytic that intentionality is an irreducible property of some physical
> things or events (you weren't clear on which) but not others.
Then he takes it back..
> As I have also noted, THAT is fundamentally no different than suggesting that
> intentionality is an irreducible property that is separate from all the rest
> of physics. The irreducibility, of course, is the issue.
Your argument is akin to saying that the science of sociology must be based on
something separate too, but it doesn't fly.
>
>
> > but I'll just speak for my self. In my view, (and I've repeated this
> > COUNTLESS fucking times), everything in the universe is physical: some of
> > it is also mental.
> >
>
> "Also mental" as in what a property that simply occurs with some physical
> phenomena, but not others, happens to be? As you have "fucking" said this
> before, note that you have also said that you count yourself a "mysterian" on
> this. Insofar as you are a "mysterian" you have basically embraced the kind
> of position your friend Larry points out over on Analytic makes no sense,
> namely using a term (like "Throckmorton") without any features in mind for
> reference. While we know what it is to be "mysterian" (it has a reference
> since it's to affirm the ultimate mysteriousness, inexplicability, of
> something), adopting THAT position is, in fact, no different from making a
> statement about "Throckmorton" under the conditions outlined by Larry.
Actually, when you argue about how mysterious consciousness seems to be if
gotten "full blown" out of physics, you count as a mysterian too.
> So being a "mysterian" gets us nowhere but it does appear to fill in some a
> space in an argument I suppose.
You said it...
> That is, it sounds like it's a position on the matter when all it is is to
> say I don't know and no one ever will know either so I won't say and don't
> ask me about it except that when you do, I will invoke mysterianism.
>
>
> > >If mind is just some "mental property" that attaches to some physical
> > >events but not others, as Walter would have it, then how does it happen in
> > >the world?
> >
> > That's a tough question. Several people are working on it, I believe.
> >
>
> So I've heard. Do you think that a reason not to raise it in other venues
> then?
>
> >
> > >Does it simply burst full blown into existence, conjured up by certain
> > >physical events? (I suppose this is why Walter has, occasionally, embraced
> > >"mysterianism", i.e., he recognizes that he is really asserting something
> > >that is finally inexplicable.)
> > >
> >
> > I think it very well may be finally inexplicable and that it is certainly
> > inexplicable at present.
> >
> >
>
> As I point out above, it is certainly possible that we will never be able to
> answer such questions but answering by asserting that it is unanswerable
> because "intentionality are properties that some physical things (events?)
> have and some don't" isn't really much of an answer. Whether a better answer
> is possible, the answer you gave in that case is to do little more than
> assert that intentionality at bottom is just "Throckmorton".
Windbag...
>
> > > Anyway, back to my main point:
> >
> >
> > Thanks. As I've asked you many times, please don't paraphrase me. As you
> > somehow find it necessary to pass along what you think I think every so
> > often (though I haven't the faintest idea why), I'd appreciate it if you'd
> > just quote me.
> >
>
> I'm fine with your desire to correct what you take to be my
> mischaracterizations however I don't wish to make points without attribution
> when they involve reference to assertions by others. If you think I have you
> wrong (and on balance I think that is false based on what you've said here,
> though there are a few points in the above I suppose we could quibble over),
> then you are always welcome to correct me.
He was right to correct you.
Cheers,
Budd
>
> But insofar as I believe you have made a particular claim I would be remiss
> to fail to properly attribute it (since, as the source, your past comments
> would be the place to look, and, besides, many here were involved in those
> earlier discussions; there is no need to reinvent wheels, even if sometimes
> that ends up happening, if a quick reference, fully attributed, to a prior
> discussion is possible).
>
> Now I recall your rather snarky attitude in the past which you have
> apparently carried with you here. I will trim my tone and comments to the
> tone and comments you adopt. I will neither do more nor less, if you wish to
> continue this. If you don't, just note that I will still reference comments I
> believe you made if that seems necessary and I will always attempt to
> attribute them for further reference. You are, likewise, always welcome to
> clarify, deny, correct and so forth.
>
> I don't claim that I will always get things right. But I will always try.
>
> SWM
>
> > Namaste.
> >
> > W
> >
> >
> >
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