[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 20:46:46 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <xznwrjnk-evca@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
>
> > responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6197
>
>
> > SWM:
> > I would disagree though if you think that AI folks, in supposing
> > the "mental" is strictly computational are positing some kind of
> > non-physical process at work.
>
> Whether or not computation is physical is of no importance here. The
> point it that it is separated from the physical input (what I called
> "process A".
>
Then on what grounds do you think that computationalists are uninterested in
the processes which collect and deliver information about the world to the
processor? Of course there are different kinds of information and information
delivery: an apparatus might simply capture signals about an object which allow
construction of a visual image of the object which some other part of the
processor is equipped to read (as in interpret); or it may receive abstract
information about the object in the form of coded data which it is similarly
equipped to read (interpret).
Is your concern with THAT distinction?
Are you making the point that all AIers are focused on the latter, coded kind
of data rather than the former signal type which results in some kind of
internal encoding (to form representations and thence useful data for
interpretation)?
> If process A produces what we consider to be intentional
> representations, then a good part of the requirements of intentionality
> have to be there in process A, whether or not we consider process A
> itself to be intentional.
I don't see how this poses a problem for the AI thesis. Perhaps we have
different understandings of what AI entails?
> If process A is generating representations
> that are about the physical world, then something it is doing has to be
> about things in the physical world.
>
I see no reason to assume that what you have named "process B" must stand apart
from the operations you ascribe to "process A" if this isn't about the
distinction between physical and non-physical.
If the mental or the computational, which you have placed in the "process B"
basket, are conceived in a physical way then there is no real distinction that
I can see between them and what is placed in the "process A" basket.
> The dualistic division leaves that part of the requirements of
> intentionality absent from process B.
Dualism is the supposition that there must be something other than purely
physical processes underlying mental occurrences. If you think "Whether or not
computation is physical is of no importance here" then where is the dualism you
are opposing?
This is why I initially raised the question. I really am not sure that your use
of "dualism" fits the classical philosophical use, in which case I am trying to
determine if perhaps you are making a different point. If so, if your
opposition to dualism really isn't an opposition to what is usually intended by
that term, then maybe this has led to some of our past misunderstandings?
> And as long as thinking is said
> to occur within process B, that leaves the thinking as without some of
> the requirements of intentionality.
>
> Regards,
> Neil
>
> =========================================
First as to "intentionality" -
Your statement above leaves "intentionality" unexplicated. Most of us will be
able to say we know it when we "see" it of course. Although a rather abstract
philosophical term, I think it's pretty clear to most here that what is meant
by "intentionality" is the aboutness of our thinking, i.e., that to think
anything at all is to think about something. We recognize it in ourselves when
we introspectively consider what we are doing when we think and we recognize it
in others when we realize that their actions demonstrate awareness of others,
their environment, etc. But where is this "aboutness" in your "process A".
I suspect you'll say that it's in the fact of perception itself, i.e., that
perceiving is perceiving something which qualifies it as being about something.
I'm not sure, however, that that is a fair account. To think about anything
need not require perception. Cut off from all perception, should such a thing
ever happen, it is hardly unreasonable to suppose that we should be able to
continue thinking about things at least for a time, until our representational
structures break down for lack of reinforcement. Similarly there are many
creatures which manifest degrees of perception of which it would be hard to say
that they are actually thinking about that which they are perceiving.
Of course you might want to say this is not merely about "thinking about" but
about connecting in aware way with one's environment so that thinking in any
normal use of that term isn't really essential. But then to what degree is the
insect or, more, the amoeba anything more than an organic automaton? And if an
organic automaton can be said to have aboutness at this level, then why not an
inorganic automaton with the same levels of functionality thanks to its
operating elements? And then life is no longer the essential precondition you
often seem to presume it is.
Second as to the matter of dualism -
If what you place in "process B" is conceivable as being physical, as you seem
to be saying, then there is no reason for it to be differentiated from what you
have placed in "process A" as far as I can see. In which case where is the
dualism?
If computations are physical processes then what is dualistic about supposing
them to be the operations that, under certain conditions, have consciousness in
the form of intentionality, and so forth?
I know that you have linked your view to the notion that only living things (or
things which, like them, are homeostatic systems with the need and capability
of establishing and maintaining an equilibrium state) can achieve
consciousness. But what is not clear to me in this is how you take this claim
about the importance of homeostasis forward to the actual production of the
condition we call "being intentional", etc.
You have, in the past, suggested that the mechanism (not merely the operations
of some synthetic inorganic device exclusively, of course, but any function
that results in a given outcome, including the function of homeostatic
systems!) that bridges the need of the homeostatic system, the operation that
causes the occurrence of consciousness, is what you have termed pragmatics (as
in operations that are purposeful, e.g., to maintain the system's homeostatic
state). But it is not at all clear how "pragmatics" serves as the missing link
in an account of the occurrence of consciousness.
That homeostatic systems, like living organisms, are constructed to function in
a way that sustains their equilibrium state does not, in any obvious way, tell
us how some living organisms with brains (perhaps only some brains) then become
conscious.
Certainly this may tell us how and why evolution leads to consciousness in the
cases of some organisms (and perhaps not others) but it doesn't tell us what is
being done by the conscious organisms (what is occurring in their key organs,
like their brains) that is, in effect, making the instances of consciousness
happen.
I know I am straying a bit beyond what you were posting about with Budd here
but I am just trying to understand your position in the context of other things
you've said with regard to this question.
You have indicated that you have a better way of thinking about what makes
consciousness than is typically found among philosophers or even some
scientists (AI researchers and perhaps neurobiologists of a certain ilk). I
just want to understand better what it is you have in mind by that claim.
Thanks.
SWM
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