[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "walto" <walterhorn@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Mon, 23 Aug 2010 19:02:53 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
> I think this is an especially confused view. (It is one, by the way, that
> Walter on Analytic has in the past articulated -- as when he has held that
> "intentionality" is a property that some physical events just happen to have
> -- but which he has not rigorously defended as far as I know.)
>
> The supposition that, to explain the presence of mind in the universe we need
> to posit that it is a separate phenomenon (either at bottom or as a peculiar
> and unique property of some physical stuff) is, I would say, dualism,
> although the position articulated by Walter is subtler in that it doesn't
> route us back to dualism explicitly (in the way claims about ontological
> basics would).
>
> I think a little careful unpacking will show that Walter's position is
> dualistic in the relevant sense, too.
>
Actually, I don't deny being a property dualist.
> Walter, in opposing its characterization as dualism
Except that I don't do that.
>, has suggested that it is really a kind of multi-ism, i.e., that there are a
>great many different things in the world, not just two -- that which is
>physical and that which is mental.
That's actually Searle's position in his "Why I'm not a property dualist"
paper. As I've said numerous times, as I understand the term, he probably IS a
property dualist--and I agree almost entirely with the positions he takes in
that paper....except for his nomenclature. He doesn't like the idea of dualism
of any kind: I have nothing against property dualism, myself.
>But I think this misses the point, since the issue isn't whether there are two
>things or one but, rather, whether to explain the presence of mind in the
>world, we have to posit something underlying mind that isn't physical.
I believe that neither Searle nor I "posit something undrlying mind that isn't
physical," but I'll just speak for my self. In my view, (and I've repeated this
COUNTLESS fucking times), everything in the universe is physical: some of it is
also mental.
>If mind is just some "mental property" that attaches to some physical events
>but not others, as Walter would have it, then how does it happen in the world?
That's a tough question. Several people are working on it, I believe.
>Does it simply burst full blown into existence, conjured up by certain
>physical events? (I suppose this is why Walter has, occasionally, embraced
>"mysterianism", i.e., he recognizes that he is really asserting something that
>is finally inexplicable.)
>
I think it very well may be finally inexplicable and that it is certainly
inexplicable at present.
> Anyway, back to my main point:
Thanks. As I've asked you many times, please don't paraphrase me. As you
somehow find it necessary to pass along what you think I think every so often
(though I haven't the faintest idea why), I'd appreciate it if you'd just quote
me.
Namaste.
W
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