[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 24 Aug 2010 16:00:49 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "walto" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
<snip>
Thanks for the feedback:
>
> Here's what I think about this:
>
> (1) There are no property dualists of the type Searle disses in his paper.
>
As I've said many times, you could be right on that.
> Because (2) what he there calls "property dualists" are, as he points at the
> end of his paper actually substance dualists. (They've > got different "cake
> layers.")
I think he has flagged an important point: "property dualism" insofar as it
matters as "dualism" can finally only be the equivalent of what has
traditionally been called "substance dualism". I agree with that conclusion.
The reason for my agreement will, hopefully, be made clear below.
>
> (3) On a more traditional definition of "property dualism" (i.e. causal, but
> not what he calls "ontological reducibility"), he actually IS a property
> dualist as am I (and, I'm guessing all the non-computationalists who aren't
> Cartesians).
>
Searle wrongly differentiates between what he calls ontological reducibility
and causal reducibility because, in fact, ontological questions are relevant to
causal questions, too. So his declaration that consciousness has a "first
person ontology" which is not reducible to the "third person ontology" of
things, while maintaining that consciousness is still causally reducible (as in
claiming it is caused by brains), is badly confused.
Now, it's conceivable that consciousness (intentionality in your terms) IS some
irreducible property, as you have put it, but this only serves to shift the
center of explanatory gravity from questions about underlying reality(ies)
(i.e., the supposed metaphysical substance[s] that give rise to a world of
appearances) to the world of the appearances themselves. If the physical world
is understood as being all those appearances, all the properties we recognize
as physical in nature (accessible to our senses and, thus, characterizing what
we mean by "physical things") plus some fundamentally different mental
properties then at least two types of fundamentally different things are being
posited. In that case, as Searle points out, there is no real difference
between this kind of dualism and the substance kind. Both presume at least two
kinds of basics in order to account for the presence of minds and physical
entities in the world (even if a more basic basic is allowed for in certain
formulations of the argument).
> So, (4) traditional property dualists need not be substance dualists, and
> none of them actually are--including Searle himself.
>
The problem here, I think, is your focus on the "substance" term. Although
there are still some around, I suppose, who embrace claims about underlying
"substance", the idea of such a "substance" looks to be largely archaic today
and has mostly fallen out of use in the face of modern physics. The issue is,
therefore, not about claims of "substances" per se but about what is presumed
to be ontologically basic (which is only to ask what are the basic things we
need in order to have this and that in the world)? Searle rightly points out in
that paper that dualism, in any of its forms, finally boils down to the same
thing whether we are speaking of substances or properties. Dualism is about
whether or not we need to posit more than one basic in the universe to account
for the presence of minds along with all the physical phenomena the minds are
intentional about.
That's why he rejects dualism in any form. (The problem for him, of course, as
I've suggested, is that, while explicitly rejecting it, as he does in that
paper, he inadvertently relies on it in the course of making his arguments
about the possibilities of computational consciousness. But that's a different
issue than what we are discussing here.)
> And (5) While I agree with almost all the substantial points in his paper, I
> believe it makes a mess of the classifications, largely because it's so
> important to him not be considered a dualist.
>
You may be right that he errs in his classifications but I think you are wrong
about his conclusion concerning the implications of claims of property dualism.
If you're right about his classificatory errors, on the other hand, that would
go a long way toward explaining why he botches it when it comes down to his
arguments against the possibilities of computational consciousness.
> (6) None of these taxonomy issues make any difference to anything.
>
> W
>
There are some who think that no philosophical arguments "make any difference
to anything". Certainly scientific research will proceed, whatever philosophers
conclude or whatever arguments rage on-line. The world goes on. But in terms of
understanding Searle's views, understanding the meaning and implications of
claims like dualism, and so forth, which is what these discussions have been
about, some difference is made -- though it is rarely evident in the postings.
SWM
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