[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2010 13:16:01 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > I think, Bruce, that you are stuck in the same kind of
> > picture of mind as dualists
>
> 1. At least I have a picture. You account seems mindless. As you say,
> just a variation of matter. Which you then attribute mental properties.
> Something like having and not having your mind simultaneously.
>
How could my account be "mindless" when it's about explaining how the
subjectness we call "mind" occurs in the world? After all, it's not as if I'm
denying that we have minds, experience, subjectness, etc., etc.
> 2. If Dualism means " there are more phenomena in the universe then
> matter", then "YES" I'm a Dualist. But for me, phenomena are not
> essentially matter or mind, unless it serves us to say so.
>
I rather thought so. It's just that people get all defensive when told their
picture is dualist in nature.
> 3. We start in a different place. I start with people making sense out
> of phenomena by positing that which is matter or mind, making the
> distinction when it serves, dropping it when it doesn't. And you start
> with identifying some thing called the material brain (matter the to
> core) and then ask how it produces mind.
>
Yes, indeed. I am interested in how minds happen in a physical world, what
produces them, sustains them and so forth.
> 4. For you, the brain makes mind. One causes the other. For me, people
> acquire the concepts of mind and matter. And not all concepts can be put
> in a causal relation.
>
We are just talking about different things then. No reason to assume this puts
us at odds in terms of either thing. I don't necessarily disagree with your
claims and, apparently, you don't with mine (unless you happen to think that
mine somehow impinge on yours -- I don't).
> I'm short on time and there is so much to read. Hopefully, you don't see
> me just selecting text out of context.
>
> > because a brain can be conscious even if deprived of sensory inputs
>
> Again, haven't you agreed that brains are not conscious, only people.
>
No, that's a mischaracterization of my position.
> > And yet you talk about "substance" an awful, awful lot!
>
> Because that's how I can make sense out of your position. If don't start
> with material substance, what do you start with?
>
Brains and minds, not metaphysical concepts like "substances" (in the classical
philosophical sense).
> > evidence that brains ARE the cause of them
>
> Quote me where Dehaene says brains cause mind. Sacks quotes
> "responsible."
>
I didn't say Dehaene says it. I said that is Searle's usage which I think is
perfectly reasonable. However, I do think Dehaene's treatment of mind is fully
consistent with that usage.
> > we might say there's evidence of consciousness in that brain
>
> Meaning that the person is conscious, not that we detect C in some
> location.
>
We might "detect C in some location" if we are examining a brain of a a
previously thought comatose person.
>
> > Now if a computer were built that had consciousness,
>
> How would we be in any different position than when a baby is born with
> consciousness. Because we put C into it. Whereas the baby acquired the
> C in some mysterious womb process.
>
We don't know how the baby "acquires" it or what that even means in any detail.
All we know is that certain organisms evidence what we call consciousness. The
issue is to what extent we can replicate that on other non-organic platforms.
> > D found indications that consciousness in the brain is
> > a global phenomenon,
>
> Meaning lots parts of the brain are involved. But that doesn't indicate
> whether the brain parts produce consciousness the way a candle wick
> makes a flame or the brain is an instrument of consciousness the way the
> fingers make music on a guitar.
Certainly not the latter and perhaps not precisely the former. Even allowing
for differences in usage there is yet no reason to presume that brains aren't
the necessary platforms for this function.
> This difference haunts philosophy,
>
> bruce
>
I think the dualist picture and a penchant for metaphysics "haunt philosophy".
SWM
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