Stuart: If you recall, its been years, I posted a Dennett review titled "Explaining Consciousness Away." In related Post you suggested that we were only a set of operations, brain events, no observer necessary to explain the operations. Then later you place consciousness at the end of a causal chain. That's how it happens for you. But before I say more. Please tell me whether this C which occurs causally, occurs in the brain and if so is the brain consciousness, is it aware that it is consciousness and where is the person who is thinking this theory. > We might "detect C in some location" > if we are examining a brain of a a previously thought comatose person. Exactly where would we see C. What does it look like? > We don't know how the baby "acquires" it or what that even means in any detail. That's an interesting way of putting it. Perhaps we don't know "how a baby acquires C" because the question makes no sense. Does a person acquire C? Or do we simply attribute C to certain organisms. Perhaps there is no empirical problem here at all. We've created a pseudo-empirical problem through conceptual confusion > The issue is to what extent we can replicate that on other non-organic platforms. An if we did, so what? How does that address the question of whether a physical account of brain can offer a account of mind? bruce