--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: > responding to http://groups.yahoo.com/group/Wittrs/message/6197 > SWM: > I would disagree though if you think that AI folks, in supposing > the "mental" is strictly computational are positing some kind of > non-physical process at work. Whether or not computation is physical is of no importance here. The point it that it is separated from the physical input (what I called "process A". If process A produces what we consider to be intentional representations, then a good part of the requirements of intentionality have to be there in process A, whether or not we consider process A itself to be intentional. If process A is generating representations that are about the physical world, then something it is doing has to be about things in the physical world. The dualistic division leaves that part of the requirements of intentionality absent from process B. And as long as thinking is said to occur within process B, that leaves the thinking as without some of the requirements of intentionality. Regards, Neil ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/