[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 26 Aug 2010 00:25:26 -0000
Walter writes:
> Here's my take:
> Anybody who thinks that every item in the world is a physical object is a
physicalist, and hence a substance monist.
> However, not everybody substance monist believes that every property is
(ontologically) reducible to some group of "physical properties" ["OR OTHER,"
as I (Budd) would qualify it so as to block what I'll refer to as blocking
below]:
> if among the
properties that some physicalist believes are not reducible to physical
properties are mental properties, then such a person is (at least) a property
dualist.
The above is blocked by saying that a substance monist may believe that all
properties are physical properties while saying that some properties, like
having thoughts on the part of a brain, are not ontologically reducible to
other sorts of explanation. The "mental properties" are asserted to be at some
descriptive level above some mor basic level of physicalist explanation,
without resorting to property dualism.
> In the paper under discussion, Searle cops to both substance monism and
> property
dualism, given my description of those.
And not under mine.
> He also indicates the sort of philosophy HE takes to be property dualism, and
> it
turns out really to be a species of substance dualism as I understand that term.
Chalmers' version, yes. Searle even attributes a form of substance dualism to
those who prefer functional explanations when it comes to philosophy of mind.
> You may be right that Chalmers is some sort of quasi-this or that, so when I
said that there aren't any property dualists of the kind Searle discusses, my
exaggeration may have been false.
As I think it is.
> But I note that he doesn't give a single
example of any, and I think it's better to let others speak for themselves than
to attack straw men.
Oh, I just took for granted that he was referring to functionalists--and
Chalmers is one.
> You both get into deeper issues than my class system, like, e.g., what does it
mean to ontologically reduce? and what is dualism, really? etc. Those are hard
and interesting, but it's not really what I was talking about.
So, I'll say one final time, that I agree with the substantive position Searle
takes in that paper (and yes, I know and have understood for many years that
Stuart does not), but (not that it matters one little bit) I think it's more
natural to call this position I share with Searle "property dualism."
[Meanwhile, Budd, you're wanted elsewhere, where a discussion (that you
requested!) is going on with respect to a certain Fodor paper.]
W
Thanks, when I have time.
Cheers,
Budd
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