[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Dualism
- From: "BruceD" <blroadies@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 25 Aug 2010 02:50:58 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote:
copied:
Whether or not computation is physical is of no importance here. The
point it that it is separated from the physical input (what I called
"process A".
It seems to me that this whole debate turns on whether one holds, as
does Stuart does, in the next paragraph
"Of course there are different kinds of information and information
delivery: an apparatus might simply capture signals about an object
which allow construction of a visual image of the object which some
other part of the processor is equipped to read (as in interpret)"
namely, that what goes on the physical brain is the whole story (and
nothing but the story) and hence computation MUST be physical or one
holds, as I do, that "what goes on in the physical brain" only makes
sense when one views the brain as an instrument of a person, with the
implication that computation and interpretation is not physical (nor is
it the movement of a mental substance.)
My position is not Dualistic. Nor is it Monistic. It doesn't employ the
notion of substance. Physics is no more the analysis of a physical
substance than psychology is an analysis of a mental substance. Hence, I
agree...
> Dualism is the supposition that there must be something other
> than purely physical processes underlying mental occurrences.
If one drops the notion of purely physical, then Dualism (or should I
say "substance-ism") goes away. But if you are intent on conceiving of
mind in brain terms, "substance-ism" will continue trouble your account.
> If computations are physical processes then what is dualistic
> about supposing them to be the operations that...have consciousness
Because it is a person who is conscious, not the circuitry. You have
agreed in the past that the brain isn't conscious. But it is consistent
with reductionism to attribute C to brain matter. This is what I find
troubling. Then again, my account...
>...doesn't tell us (what is occurring in their key organs, like their
brains)
> that is, in effect, making the instances of consciousness happen.
But Dehaene's does. He has found the area that "is responsible", his
phrase. But "responsible" isn't a process A or physical theory term. So,
at the critical junction between brain and mind, the language shifts.
Can we do better?
Actually, you wrote..
> what is being done by the conscious organisms that is,
> in effect, making the instances of consciousness happen
Which is another example of the shift from a physical to a to a
psychological account, "what the conscious organism does", as in the way
I play the piano, which I think imputes too much control over our
consciousness.
bruce
>
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