--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@...> wrote: > ... it requires reconceptualizng what we call "consciousness" as an array of operations of the type even computers are seen to be capable > The older and more classical view of consciousness..is that it is.. an observer of, and actor upon, events in its environment. Stuart, are you saying that your "new" view of consciousness excludes the observer who "operates." So there is no difference between Stuart observing himself write the Post and the letters appearing on the screen? > ... at bottom, they all boil down to a supposition that consciousness is a different "animal" than the physical world it encounters > (hence, dualism). Once again I point out that one concept of dualism (yours in fact) refers to two the possibility of two substances, the physical and, as you put it here, a different animal. My concept differences in two regards. 1. There are no absolute substances of any kind, physical or mental. 2. What we call "physical" or "mental" is dependent upon the usefulness of the concept in context. So, while the brain structure is conceptualized as physical, the "living brain", the "computing brain" has no physical referent. > ...supposing some physical things just happen to have a consciousness feature makes no sense to me because consciousness is not a property of anything. It can't be detected in the brain. This "property" talk is just so much more physicalism. The only thing that is real is the physical. So C must be a property of it. You seem critical of this and yet it seems to be your position. > The color red is caused by light reflecting off a surface and interacting with our sensory apparatus which, > when processed in our brain yields the experience of the red color. Where is the "who" that experiences? You removed the observer above and now he reappears. bruce ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/