[Wittrs] Re: Understanding Consciousness
- From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 29 Aug 2010 01:25:28 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <blroadies@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "SWM" <SWMirsky@> wrote:
>
> > ... it requires reconceptualizng what we call "consciousness" as an
> array of operations of the type even computers are seen to be capable
>
> > The older and more classical view of consciousness..is that it is.. an
> observer of, and actor upon, events in its environment.
>
> Stuart, are you saying that your "new" view of consciousness excludes
> the observer who "operates." So there is no difference between Stuart
> observing himself write the Post and the letters appearing on the
> screen?
>
First, what I have been describing is not my "new view" but the view I hold
which has been pretty much already conceived and fleshed out by Dennett well
before I came along.
But yes, the observer is not in the mix EXCEPT AS AN OUTCOME.
That is, in order to account for consciousness as we find it in ourselves,
which involves an observer as well as the observed, this view does not assume
an observer "all the way down" as some here have put it.
As to whether there is a "Stuart observing himself" there most assuredly is.
But that self is an outcome of a lot of different, perfectly non-conscious
things going on in Stuart's brain.
The various features that we ascribe to consciousness, however we describe them
(such as awareness, thinking, remembering, picturing, understanding, aboutness)
are all part of a complex system of many interactive brain activities none of
which, itself, is an instance of being conscious (including the experience of
being a self that is experiencing which is part of what it means to be
conscious in the way we are). Being conscious, so-called consciousness, is an
outcome of the array of processes operating in a kind of fortunate pandemonium,
combined into a unified system of integrated operations performing related and
interacting tasks via the natural engineering accomplished by millennia of
evolutionary development.
Or, at least, THAT is the concept of consciousness I have been talking about
these many years past over several lists like this one.
So is there a difference between me and the letters I type on the computer
screen? Well, of course. Why would you think this thesis about consciousness I
have described should imply anything else? First of all, I am the work of
brains, not computers. We don't know to what extent brains and computers
operate in the same fashion and there's good reason to think they don't.
However the issue is not whether the brain is a computer or the computer is a
brain. The issue is whether what the brain does in its way is sufficiently
analogous
with what a computer does to allow the computer to do roughly the same thing,
i.e., produce consciousness.
> > ... at bottom, they all boil down to a supposition that consciousness
> is a different "animal" than the physical world it encounters
> > (hence, dualism).
>
> Once again I point out that one concept of dualism (yours in fact)
> refers to two the possibility of two substances, the physical and, as
> you put it here, a different animal. My concept differences in two
> regards.
>
Except I am discarding that view and suggesting that a better way of thinking
about this is to understand consciousness as an outcome of a complex array of
processes performing certain tasks working together in a certain way
(interactively with simultaneity, etc.). Certainly dualism implies two
ontological basics (whether you want to call it "substances", which I consider
outmoded, or not). But in my describing the dualist view you should not take my
words to be an endorsement of that view.
> 1. There are no absolute substances of any kind, physical or mental.
This only shows that you explicitly deny dualism. So does Searle. The problem
is that your every statement about this matter of mind ends up pointing back to
the dualist picture.
> 2. What we call "physical" or "mental" is dependent upon the usefulness
> of the concept in context.
>
That the meanings of terms are determined by or manifested in their uses is not
in dispute by me. But that doesn't mean we cannot use them to talk about things
or that finally talking about things is nothing more than talking about the
words we use to talk about them. THAT is not what it means to say the meaning
of a word is to be found in its use. We cannot hide behind a kind of linguistic
relativism to sustain problematic theses. In this case, the fact that you deny
being a dualist while persistently describing the issue in dualist terms
suggests that you are simply not coming to grips with the implications of your
own ideas.
> So, while the brain structure is conceptualized as physical, the "living
> brain", the "computing brain" has no physical referent.
>
I'm sure that would not be consistent with Dehaene's work since he is looking
precisely for such things, i.e., what things the brain DOES which result in
consciousness (including experience, thinking, awareness, and so forth).
Moreover, that site we linked to bore evidence that he, at least, thought he
had found some of what he is seeking in his research.
>
> > ...supposing some physical things just happen to have a consciousness
> feature
>
> makes no sense to me because consciousness is not a property of
> anything.
Well there we agree up to a point. I would not, however, say one could not use
"property" in this way under any circumstances, just that it is not the usual
way and therefore it suggests things which can be misleading. I would rather
speak of consciousness as a feature (less restrictive term than "property" with
fewer misleading connotations) or as an array of so many features such as
understanding, awareness, aboutness, and so forth.
> It can't be detected in the brain.
What is detected are the physical corollaries which are enough if this can be
accomplished at a sufficiently fine level of detail. Moreover, there are some
theorists (like Dennett) who think that, if you get that level of detail, you
really can bridge the gap and actually access another's consciousness. I am
agnostic on that one though I will note that Dehaene spoke on that site as
though he also considered that a distinct possibility. Ramachandran, a
neuroscientist/physician also considers this a real possibility.
>This "property" talk is
> just so much more physicalism. The only thing that is real is the
> physical. So C must be a property of it. You seem critical of this and
> yet it seems to be your position.
>
I recognize that there are uses of "property" which are non-physical (for
instance, the properties of an even prime number). However, I prefer a term
like "feature" as noted above.
> > The color red is caused by light reflecting off a surface and
> interacting with our sensory apparatus which,
> > when processed in our brain yields the experience of the red color.
>
> Where is the "who" that experiences? You removed the observer above and
> now he reappears.
>
> bruce
>
If the issue is to explain how consciousness such as we find it in ourselves
occurs, then the point is also to say how the "who" happens (even if Horton
hasn't heard it!). If the color red can be seen to be caused by certain events
in the world, then perceiving the redness (the occurrence of a subject "who")
is caused by something else that happens in the world.
There are really only two choices in the end. Either the "who" is separate from
the world it observes (in which case it is either always there, or slips in
from some other realm or merely is conjured up ex nihilo) OR it is not, in
which case it is just the outcome of so many things happening as part and
parcel of what we know as the physical world.
If consciousness cannot be explained in a way such as Dennett offers, if that
is seen to fail, then THAT is a powerful argument for consciousness being
otherworldly, a parallel existent of one of the types described above. ALL of
them, of course, are dualist in conception because they ALL presume a separate
genesis for minds that is outside the realm of the physical.
SWM
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