--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > --- On Tue, 3/30/10, gabuddabout <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > That's why it is difficult to know exactly what Dennett's > > "intentional stance" amounts to. Is it really > > intentionality if at a level below what is the intentional > > level where we can mean things when we say them? > > In his essay "Analytic Philosophy and Mental Phenomena", Searle points out > the incoherency of Dennett's theory about the intentional stance: > > "Also, when I adopt the intentional stance is that supposed to be intrinsic > or not? Do I really have an intentional stance or is just a case of adopting > an intentional stance to my intentional stance? If the former, we are left > with intrinsic intentionality; if the latter, it looks like we are in a > vicious regress." - Searle > > My position with Stuart is that Dennett's functionalism entails a form of > eliminativism, and that eliminativism is motivated by fear of (a false > understanding of) dualism. > Yes, Searle makes arguments, whether we agree with them or not. My position with Gordon is that he doesn't but, instead, relies on assertions and imputations of motivations which aren't relevant when considering the merits of an argument. > Certainly Dennett's views qualify as eliminativist with respect to > qualia/qualities of experience -- I think even Dennett would admit as much -- > and they seem to amount to eliminativism (or obscurantism) with respect to > intentionality also. > I believe he has agreed that he is "eliminativist" where things like "qualia" are concerned. But what's your point? That he IS eliminativist in some sense. Okay, so what? The issue is what's wrong with that position aside from the fact you don't cotton to it, Gordon? > In that same essay, Searle quotes Dennett admitting that people feel pains, > while Dennett also argues that computers cannot experience pain because pains > (and other qualia) do not technically exist. Dennett then has the audacity to > ask his readers to believe that he has not contradicted himself. > > -gts > I don't know the text offhand that you are alluding to so it's a little hard to comment on whether he has really "contradicted himself" as you allege (i.e., we can't judge that from your paraphrases), however it would depend on what we mean by "pain", "feel" and "consciousness", wouldn't it? For instance, if consciousness is just an array of certain system properties then where do we draw the line? Was my cat (rest in peace!) conscious and, if so, was she conscious as I am or only on a different point of the continuum on which humans, cats, lizards, frogs, fish, snails, spiders and so forth are situated? And if only on a different point of the common continuum, might we not want to say that some entities on the continuum of consciousness have more features than others? Thus it would make sense to say of a computer, that had only certain of the features we generally associate with being conscious, that it was conscious in some ways but not others. Presumably, if one could build a conscious machine, one would be building in many of the system properties we think of as part and parcel of our consciousness and, it might even be possible (possibly even likely) that we could give a machine a way of feeling pain because, if it's all about the system properties and the "machinery" for producing these, then why not a computational machine-based system as well as a naturally occurring organic one? But to see this you have to break with the idea that consciousness must be a bottom line irreducible thing (either an ultimate stuff of some sort of ultimate property associated with certain physical events but not others, as some have preferred to put this). I don't know the text of Dennett's you are alluding to (nor have you even given us Searle's direct text making that allusion) but, on the face of it, it seems perfectly reasonable to agree that machines don't feel pain as of now and that a machine could be built that had enough of the features we associate with being conscious to call it conscious and still not expect that it must also feel pain to qualify as conscious. After all, even if we equipped a computationally operating machine with sensory apparatuses and gave it the ability to perceive and recognize its perceptions, and to do things with those perceptions such that we might fairly say that it knows what it is "seeing", there is no reason to think its "mental" life would have to be precisely like ours. What would be important is that it had the same functionalities. The fact that it is built of different stuff, perhaps operates in different ways, etc., would only make its consciousness different than the kind of mental lives we have. It wouldn't, thereby, keep it from being conscious UNLESS you start by restricting consciousness only to the precise things brains do in the way they do it. But that would be odd since even Searle acknowledges that we cannot say that only brains could be a source of consciousness. He agrees that machines could, in principle, be built to be conscious if they can be found to do what brains do (his issue is that he thinks computers don't do what brains do and that that closes the door on them) and he further agrees that conscious aliens from outer space could come to earth even if we discovered that there was nothing inside their skulls (or whatever passed for that) but a nondescript "green slime". Everything, Gordon, finally depends on breaking the presumptive intuition that consciousness is an irreducible something in the universe and seeing it as a system property instead. SWM ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/