[Wittrs] Re: Further Thoughts on Dennett, Searle and the Conundrum of Dualism

  • From: "gabuddabout" <gabuddabout@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Tue, 30 Mar 2010 19:43:24 -0000

--- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "iro3isdx" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
> --- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@> wrote:
> > If the man truly has no bigger role in the experiment than you give
> > him credit for; that is, if he plays only the role of a cog in the
> > machinery implementing so-called rote processes, then he would fail
> > to understand the English version of the stories.
> This makes no sense.  I am wondering what it is that you fail  to
> understand about human learning.
> I watch a science program on TV.  Even though I play no role at  all in
> the actions of that TV program, I seem to be able to learn  from it.
> Regards,
> Neil

Well, it seems that one needs to be okay with understanding the difference 
between functional properties and first-order properties ahead of time.  Stuart 
may be right to suggest that it comes down to different intuitions.

But the intuitions it comes down to are not the ones Stuart tirelessly repeats 
(process-based views of consciousness and Searlean nonprocess-based (!) ones..

The intuitions may be about functional properties and how some conflate them 
with physical properties and some do not.

That's why it is difficult to know exactly what Dennett's "intentional stance" 
amounts to.  Is it really intentionality if at a level below what is the 
intentional level where we can mean things when we say them?  And just what is 
discharging the intentionality all about if the real story is about how real 
physical process serve to cause the intentional level where some good 
philosophy can happen?


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