[Wittrs] Re: Further Thoughts on Dennett, Searle and the Conundrum of Dualism

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2010 18:06:22 -0700 (PDT)

--- On Sun, 3/28/10, SWM <wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:

>  Gordon Swobe wrote:
>> Here we see the logical structure of Searle's formal
>> argument as given in his article in Scientific American that
>> I referenced earlier.
>> 
>> (A1) Programs are formal (syntactic).
>> (A2) Minds have mental contents (semantics).
>> (A3) Syntax by itself is neither constitutive of nor
>>      sufficient for semantics. (This is what the Chinese room 
>>      experiment shows.)
>> 
>> (C1) Programs are neither constitutive of nor
>>      sufficient for minds. (This conclusion should follow without >> 
>> controversy from the first three axioms.)
>> 
>> That concludes his negative argument.

> Only in that iteration. As we've seen...

No, not "only in that iteration". 

About 10 years after his original CRA paper, Searle formalized his argument 
with axioms as above precisely to help people like you understand it. 
-gts 




      

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