[Wittrs] Re: Further Thoughts on Dennett, Searle and the Conundrum of Dualism

  • From: Gordon Swobe <gts_2000@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Sun, 28 Mar 2010 05:47:39 -0700 (PDT)

> The issue is whether a computer can be conscious. The man
> is already. But his consciousness is irrelevant 

The man had consciousness when he entered the room, so you and Dennett 
misunderstand the experiment when you suggest that it tests whether 
implementing a formal program will cause consciousness. We would never know 
from the experiment if programs cause consciousness.

The experiment plainly illustrates Searle's third premise that syntax does not 
give semantics, and nothing more. 



Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts: