[Wittrs] Re: Further Thoughts on Dennett, Searle and the Conundrum of Dualism

  • From: "SWM" <SWMirsky@xxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Fri, 26 Mar 2010 20:57:29 -0000

--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, Gordon Swobe <wittrsamr@...> wrote:

> Our messages crossed in the mail. Yes, I meant "non-physical substances 'or' 
> properties" (not 'of').
> For the moment, consider that "irreducible" needn't entail "non-physical".
> Dualists believe that the apparently irreducible nature of mental phenomena 
> implies non-physicality. Searle rejects that idea.
> -gts

Yes, we know his explicit position. The problem lies with his implicit one.

I'm not sure that "'irreducible' needn't entail 'non-physical'" in this case. 
Since the point is to say what has a physical derivation, to suppose that 
anything is not reducible to physical constituents is to suppose that it is 
"non-physical" at least in this sense.

And that is the point of the CRA, to argue that because there is nothing mental 
(no understanding) in any of the underlying processes of the CR, those 
processes can never produce understanding in any other configuration either.

Now because Searle is on record as a non-dualist in relation to his claims 
about brains, it looks like we can say well he's not a dualist! But then, if it 
takes dualism to make the CRA work, does what he officially espouses really 


Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/

Other related posts: