[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: Donal McEvoy <donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: "lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx" <lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- Date: Sun, 22 Mar 2015 22:21:50 +0000 (UTC)
Having previously explained why "less favourably" is measured or judged
differently in pregnancy/disability cases than it is in gender/race cases,
there is a point to be added about Richard's notional category of "women who
are treated less favourably than other women on the grounds of their
pregnancy", which he set out confidently in his passage below.
>With all Donal's heavy lifting, in the end it is as if an elephant has given
>birth to a mouse: the silly "top law firm" has not noticed ("less favourable"
>than what?) that the pregnancy-law's set of potentially disadvantaged persons
>is not coextensive with that of the gender-law since the former also includes
>members of the same gender, i.e. women who are treated less favourably than
>other women on the grounds of their pregnancy. But Donal doesn't spell that
>out. He practically has to leave it vague and write ambiguously for it to at
>least sound and look like he and his approach are solving (serious) problems
>(like the one that I just solved by spelling out the reason for having this
>separate law).>
On this I commented:
>At this above point in Richard's post, I was relieved to find (after all the
>heavy lifting), it is as if an elephant has finally given birth to a mouse.
For it is mistake to suggest that the reason we have a separate law for
pregnancy is because "the pregnancy-law's set of potentially disadvantaged
persons is not coextensive with that of the gender-law since the former also
includes members of the same gender, i.e. women who are treated less
favourably than other women on the grounds of their pregnancy." No, no, no.>
At least one of these "No, no, no"s concerns this notional category of "women
who are treated less favourably than other women on the grounds of their
pregnancy".
Consider where a male executive wants a secretary but dismisses from
consideration both males and pregnant females, so that only a non-pregnant
female would get the job. Clearly males might have a claim for gender
discrimination here without using any "special protection" related to pregancy.
On Richard's argument, however, the pregnant female would not have a claim,
because she is only treated less favourably than a non-pregnant female and not
less favourably than a male; Richard's assumption is that unless she is treated
less favourably than a male, the pregnant female has no claim - that is, the
pregnant female here needs a special section for pregnancy to protect her
against being treated worse than non-pregnant females.
But this is a basic error on Richard's part. (I suggest it is an error that
arises from not being accustomed to thinking legal issues through in a
problem-solving way.)
If Richard were right in his contention, a male executive could discriminate
between female candidates on the ground of their breast size without any
females having a case for gender discrimination. Men would have a
discrimination case if the male executive decided he only wanted a secretary
with large breasts but a woman would have no case because she is not, in
Richard's logic, being treated less favourably than a male but only less
favourably than another female. On Richard's logic, the law would need a
special section for small breasted women to give them protection against
discrimination on the grounds of their small breasts (as against women with
large breasts) just as Richard is contending that the law needed a special
section for pregnant women to give them protection against discrimination on
the grounds of their pregnancy (as against women who are not pregnant).
This, of course, is balderdash. And it shows Richard's suggestion is nonsense
even before we look at the different way "less favourably" is measured in
pregnancy cases:- a woman discriminated against, or treated worse, than another
women on the ground that her breasts are smaller has a case of discrimination
without invoking any kind of "special protection"; equally a pregnant woman
discriminated against, or treated worse, than another women on the ground that
she is pregnant has a case for discrimination without invoking any kind of
"special protection". In both cases, "small breasts" and "pregnancy" are
"gender-specific" grounds and thus may be discriminatory against women without
any need for a special section. As a matter of logic and legal analysis,
Richard's suggestion - though perhaps superficially plausible - is a
non-starter: there was never any need for a separate section for "pregnancy" to
protect pregnant women from being treated worse than non-pregnant women.
Given Richard's basic error, it can be seen that there is no justice in
Richard's claim, "But Donal doesn't spell that out." Donal can't really be
fairly criticised for not spelling out something that it is entirely/utterly
mistaken.
Really, then, it's as if Richard's elephant gave birth to a still-born mouse.
Donal
On Sunday, 22 March 2015, 14:34, Omar Kusturica <omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx>
wrote:
I can only repeat what I already said, on Grice's own stated premise that
philosophy is entire, his inference that a man is maligned by saying that he is
good at one discipline of philosophy is completely illogical. So either Grice
was being illogical here or he did not really believe that philosophy is an
entire virtue. That, I suppose, is not for me to judge.
O.K.
On Sun, Mar 22, 2015 at 3:21 PM, Redacted sender Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx for DMARC
<dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> wrote:
My last post today!
There is only one problem in philosophy: namely all of them.
How would Lord Russell go on to formalise that? (Recall Grice as quoted in
D. F. Pears's obituary: "If you cannot put it in symbols it's not worth
saying it at all!" -- his reprimand to Strawson).
In a message dated 3/22/2015 10:00:21 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: "on the assumption that philosophy is an entire
virtue,
saying that someone is good at one discipline of philosophy implies that
he is good at all of them. Such an implication would not hold on the
assumption that the various branches of philosophy are separate, although even
then
an OPPOSITE implication would not hold. (It would just remain unspecified
whether he is good at other branches of philosophy or not.) Either way the
supposed 'implicature' does not obtain."
I'm not sure we should talk about implicature here or disimplicature for
that matter. For we don't have to assume that the utterer INTENDED the
inference to be drawn, which is a necessary condition for the thing to count as
an implicature (or disimplicature: intentionally saying less than one
means).
An implicature is not like a baby. An unwanted baby is still a baby. An
unwanted implicature is a 'contradictio in terms'! (It's perhaps more like a
plastic flower, which is not a flower, of course).
I am introduced:
"This is Dr. Puddle, our man in Legal Philosophy"
"my inference"
which does not mean that the utterer IS implicating -- poor thing, he
possibly ain't --
"is actually of the disjunctive form."
"I come to believe either (a) or (b)."
(a) that the utterer is underdescribing (and thus maligning) Dr. Puddle."
It may make the world of difference if I meet Dr. Puddle and _he_ says:
"I'm their man at legal philosopher."
which would be presumptuous, on the face of it, but ultimately perhaps
self-derogatory (seeing that philosophy, like virtue, is entire).
(b) Dr. Puddle is not really good at _Legal Philosophy_.
Because by describing Puddle as "our man in legal philosophy" the utterer
is stressing what the utterer sees as the _essence_ of Puddle, or his
utility in the Faculty. And a GOOD legal philosopher needs to be a good
metaphysician, a good epistemologist, and a good ethicist.
IF this is considered an 'implicature' (or a 'disimplicature') there may
ways of cancelling it:
"This is Dr. Puddle: our man in legal philosophy; I don't mean to imply
that he is bad at all other branches, you know. Right, Dr. Puddle?"
This may be as it is, but Grice is doubtful that THAT is an efficient
cancellation.
Grice recalled Warnock telling him at Collections, about a tutee:
"He has beautiful handwriting".
Grice remained silent for a while.
Warnock continued, inferring from Grice's silence that Warnock's comment
was abrupt.
Warnock went on to say:
"Of course I do not mean to imply that he is hopeless at philosophy".
Grice has a sad note to this: Warnock MAY no longer be said to have
'implicated' that his tutee was hopeless at philosophy, "even if", Grice goes
on,
cancellation at all, "this is all I will end up believing".
Cheers,
Speranza
* Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. There is only one problem in
philosophy: namely all of them.
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