[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 15 Mar 2015 20:55:09 -0400
Finnis v Dworkin
From: Dickson, Julie, "Interpretation and Coherence in Legal Reasoning",
The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2014 Edition), Edward N.
Zalta (ed.), URL =
http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/legal-reas-interpret/.
Can interpretation in legal reasoning lead judges to the ‘one right answer’
as regards the legal issue at hand?
Finnis denies that it is possible for interpretation in legal reasoning to
lead judges to one right answer (in the sense claimed in Dworkin) because
of pervasive incommensurabilities in the criteria by reference to which we
are supposed to adjudge one interpretation to be better than another.
Finnis argues, contra Dworkin, that while we should seek good answers and
avoid bad ones, we should not delude ourselves into dreaming of uniquely
correct answers to issues of legal interpretation, for to do so commits us to,
"utilitarianism's deepest and most flawed assumption: the assumption of
the commensurability of basic goods and thus of the states of affairs which
instantiate them."
But then I woudn't see where H. L. A. Hart would fit in this debate!
Cheers,
Speranza
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