[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 20:34:04 -0400
In a message dated 3/19/2015 5:48:48 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
donalmcevoyuk@xxxxxxxxxxx quotes:
"Equality is about treating the same the same and treating what is
different differently".
I like that: it has an analytic ring to it! -- and Russell would formality
in terms of the theory of relations!
Anatole France's paraphrasis is perhaps even more difficult to formalise:
"In its majestic equality, the law forbids rich
and poor alike to sleep under bridges, beg
in the streets, and steal loaves of bread."
And Derrida would play with 'different differently', and spell it
"differAnt differAntly"
As Palma well knows, 'différance' is a term that Derrida coins on the basis
of a pun that the French language (but not the English language that Hart
writes in -- which was standard English -- he took elocution lessons to
drop his Yorkshire accent when working for the chancery -- and he never
recovered it!). Derrida's irritating pun is possible because in French the
word
"différer" can mean either to "differ" or to "defer", depending on context.
(Différence can mean to differ from something or to defer something).
Apparently, it can all be traced back to Pericles, who never read Derrida
in the original. Pericles exclaimed in a funeral oration:
"If we look to the laws, they afford
equal justice to all in their private differences; if no
social standing, advancement in public life falls
to reputation for capacity, class considerations
not being allowed to interfere with merit; nor
again does poverty bar the way".
(It was soon adapated by the Romans -- 'equality'; only different. It was
Cicero who came up with "æqualitas" (or the shorter "æquitas" in his profuse
correspondence) as translating Pericles's important concept.
Hart would start alla Kelsen, with analysis.
The English abstract noun “equality” translates Gr. isotes, and then Lat.
both aequitas, aequalitas. Strictly “Equal,” and “equally” signify a
qualitative relationship, so I was not joking when I was referring how Russell
would go on formalising this. ‘Equality’ (or ‘equal’) signifies
correspondence between a group of different objects, persons, processes or
circumstances that have the same qualities in at least one respect, but not
all
respects, i.e., regarding one specific feature, with differences in other
features.
Thus, ‘equality’ needs to thus be STRONGLY distinguished from ‘identity’
(and cf. 'sameness' vs. 'similarity')
If Russell was formal, so was Aristotle. Aristotle is first and foremost
concerned with formal equality -- expressed as a principle in reference to
Plato:
“Treat like cases as like”
(and cf. the first part of McEvoy's adage: "treating the same the same").
The imperative, "Treat like cases like!" is found in both Aristotle's
ethics (Nicomachean Ethics, V.3. 1131a10-b15) and his politics (III.9.1280
a8-15, III. 12. 1282b18-23).
In Kant's moral philosophy, it is the categorical imperative formulates the
equality postulate of universal human worth.
Hart is Kelsenian. "A constitution that says "Every individual is equal
before the law" ... may *not* [emphasis Speranza's] be reaching out to a MORAL
concept of equality" writes Leslie Green in his Intro to Hart's Concept of
Law.
Hart is into 'approximative equality': It is , for Hart, what he cals
'approximative equality' which
"makes obvious the necessity for a system of mutual
forebearance and compromise which is the base of both legal and moral
obligation"
(The Concept of Law).
And note the order, which for Russell is possibly gratuitious (conjunction
being commutative): "legal and moral obligation". Hartian order of
priorities, no doubt!
Not perhaps Hare's or Grice's. When referring to the 'familiar discussion'
of 'universalizability', he refers to some sort of very basic manual (with
as a tribute to Kant, he calls the IMMANUEL). The manual will have
conceptual generality. There will be no way of singling out a special subclass
of
addressees, and so it enjoy formal generality, too. Finally, applicational
generality, as no injunction will prescribe a certain kind of conduct in
circumstances in which _any_ addressee would not be likely to be subject.
Cheers,
Speranza
References
Grice, H. P. On conceptual, formal, and applicational generality, in "The
Conception of Value", Clarendon Press.
Hare, Richard M., 1984, “Rights, Utility and Universalization: Reply to
J.L. Mackie.” in: Raymond G. Frey (ed.), Utilities and Rights, Minneapolis,
Minn 1984, Oxford: Blackwell 1985.
Hare, Richard M., Moral Thinking. Its levels, Method and Point, Oxford:
Oxford University Press 1981.
Hart, H. L. A. The Concept of Law.
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