In a message dated 3/17/2015 12:55:19 P.M. Eastern Daylight Time, omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes: The implication of saying that "Hart is a good legal philosopher" would depend on, among other things, the evaluation of legal philosophy, in comparison to other branches of philosophy, in that particular context. What it is almost certainly not about is some special, mystical quality of the word "philosopher." Well, we are considering this in a different context. The main assumption seems to be i. Philosophy, like virtue, is entire. which is the type of proposition or claim that Witters would delight in: problematic. And we may need to be able to re-formulate that in terms of 'philosopher'; for one thing is 'Philosophy', and another 'philosopher': cfr. ii. Mr. Hart is a philosopher. iii. Mr. Hart is Philosophy. where (iii) would be in most cases hyperbolic, but not all: cfr. iv. You bought Hart?! That's Philosophy! So we have the presumptuous (and loquacious) Chair of the Department of Philosophy uttering v. Meet Mr. Hart, our man in legal philosophy. It may not be what the Chair is *implying*, but what the addressee can *infer* would be the following disjuncts: vi. Mr. Hart is being underdescribed, and thus maligned. -- for there is more to Mr. Hart than being the department's man in legal philosophy. or vii. Mr. Hart is no good at legal philosophy. It is this (vii) which gets yielded, as joined by (i) -- Philosophy, like virtue, is entire --, the implication being that a philosopher, any philosopher, _simpliciter_, should be strong at metaphysics and epistemology. Granted, if the Chair were to introduce to an invited speaker EACH member of the department as viii. Meet Mr. Hart, our man in philosophy. simpliciter -- he would be repetitive and perhaps less informative than is required (not to mention that he would on occasion be saying what he knew to be false -- e.g. in the case of Anscombe). But surely he should be able to edit the utterance to the by far more polite ix. Please meet Mr. Hart. and let Hart self-describe in any conversation with the invited speaker that may ensue, should either be interested. On a positive note, then, the idea is that this is NOT dismissing legal philosophy as a minor branch of philosophy, but on the other hand, stressing that a legal philosopher should (as the case might be) strong at metaphysics and epistemology (since philosophy, like virtue, is entire) and that in most cases 'philosopher' simpliciter SHOULD do. Note, finally, that the chair's implication seems also to be, mainly, "for the purpose of teaching our enrolled students", too -- for even if 'our man' happens to be merely a research fellow, 'our man' is supposed to be, on occasion, available to interested students -- unless he ain't. It's all so defeasible it almost hurts... Cheers, Speranza ------------------------------------------------------------------ To change your Lit-Ideas settings (subscribe/unsub, vacation on/off, digest on/off), visit www.andreas.com/faq-lit-ideas.html