[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana

  • From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
  • To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 19 Mar 2015 22:04:41 -0400

Hart's rule of recognition (one variant) is easy enough to  recite:

"Whatever the Queen in Parliament enacts is law."

But  McEvoy finds it falsifiable and falsified -- not his terms. _His_ 
terms are  other:  The rule of recognition on which "Concept of Law" depends  
is 
"is circular to the point of being empty and it is also an epistemic  
fiction... if we strip away the fictitious "rule of recognition", we are left  
with nothing very insightful as to what kind of cognitive processes are 
involved  in legal thought [to do that you need to study legal problems], and 
most 
of what  is accurate enough in the book is simply a watered-down version of 
ideas better  dealt with by other philosophers. Imagine a book "The Concept 
of Science" which  claimed there is a kind of "rule of recognition" for 
what constitutes science:  in effect, this is what Ayer and Strawson et al 
claim, and by this "rule of  recognition" they mean 'valid inductive 
procedures'. It turns out the validity  of Strawson's and Ayer's inductive 
procedures 
turns on what is accepted by  scientists, just as Hart's "rule of 
recognition" turns out to depend on what is  recognised as the "rule" by 
lawyers. Both 
theories are fictions, unexplanatory  and circular."
 
-- whereas, naïf me I see the recognition rule not as 'circular' but as  
analytic' and not as 'fiction' but 'philosophical' (philosophers don't have to 
 deal with facts versus fictions). 

On a different note, there's The Fisheries Act. It regulates whaling.
 
Geary objected:

"A whale is not a fish."
 
This, for Hart, is redundant, and makes NOT The Fisheries Act wrong or in  
need of 'change' of revision.
 
(Geary proposes a sub-clause: "A whale is not a fish.").
 
There's recognition, adjudication, and _change_ -- of rule or law. The  
latter is interesting. Because while we colloquially can say that we have  
changed the law -- it is perhaps best analytically, to say that we have  
transferred from Law 1 to Law 2. We do speak of a 'changed law', but it is a  
'different' law (i.e. a new law from which the old law was changed). And I'm  
using 'different' alla McEvoy:
 
"Equality is about treating what is different  differently".

Hart refers to English as displaying 'open texture'. He  also speaks, by 
derivation, of 'the open texture of law' -- a phrase, 'open  texture', which 
Hart borrows from Waismann (-- or 'the Wise man', literally) --  but never 
returns.

In Waismann's work, "open texture" refers to the potential vagueness of  
words under extreme (hypothetical) circumstances. 

Hart's use of the  expression is slightly different -- there is perhaps 
more texture to it  than openness.

In fact, it has been claimed, hyperbolically, that Hart's opus has  been 
wholly misunderstood because those differences have been  underestimated.

The moral seems to be that Hart should not be read as basing his  argument 
for judicial discretion merely on the nature of, say, the English  language.

Primarily, what Hart is doing is putting forward a policy  argument for why 
rules should be applied in a way which would require that  discretion. 

"Natural languages like English are…irreducibly  open-textured" (Concept of 
Law), he stresses. 

And because of the  vagueness and ambiguity of language, legal norms will 
necessarily have or  inherit this open texture. 

Because of the open texture of the language  in which law is expressed (or 
the laws are expressed, if you want to be  analytic) there will be a core of 
settledness and a penumbra of  unsettledness in EVERY legal rule -- "that 
*matters*, adds  Geary.

This is true even of the rule of recognition, that McEvoy finds so  
problematic. 

Hard cases involve the penumbra of unsettledness, while easy cases  involve 
the core of settledness

However, and this is Hart the "positivist", even within the area of open  
texture, rules still provide standards determinate enough to limit, andnot  
exclude, judicial discretion.
 
Clever, no?
 
Cheers,
 
Speranza
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