[lit-ideas] Re: Hartiana
- From: "" <dmarc-noreply@xxxxxxxxxxxxx> (Redacted sender "Jlsperanza@xxxxxxx" for DMARC)
- To: lit-ideas@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 20 Mar 2015 08:19:35 -0400
My last post today!
In a message dated 3/20/2015 7:42:50 A.M. Eastern Daylight Time,
omarkusto@xxxxxxxxx writes:
Perhaps Grice would have wanted to be introduced as "our man at
everything." However, the notion that, if one is good at philosophy, one is
equally
good at metaphysics, aesthetics, philosophy of science, philosophy of law,
and whatever comes to mind under the heading 'philosophy of such and such'
strikes me as a phantasy, and a hybristic one. Even Bertrand Russell, who
certainly was very broadly educated - honestly probably more so than Grice -
acknowledged that he didn't know much about aesthetics, and didn't publish
on it.
Again, the source of this is the very wise and Aristotelian adage,
"Philosophy, like virtue, is entire".
This has a VERY COMPLEX logical form. If we think of Achilles, for example,
and his alleged virtues. Surely Aristotle was obsessed with bravery, as he
should. But surely, too, if Achilles was virtues, it is virtue as a
'unity' we should be looking at.
Grice was a captain with the Royal Navy, and we all know about coordinates
in longitude and latitude. When he left the Navy to return to philosophy
(although once a captain, always a captain) he applied Long. and Lat. to
philosophy. He claimed that we are still talking about what Thales spoke,
because Philosophy has LATITUDINAL unity.
And Thales did not just say that all is water. Since there is LONGITUDINAL
unity, Thales was a philosopher, therefore, he philosophised in an unitary*
way.
So, if there is LATITUDINAL unity in philosophy, it means that legal
philosophy fits somewhere. This is perhaps well expressed by McEvoy, in a
different context, when he writes in Re: Hartiana:
"In the hands of "legal philosophers", 'legal philosophy' is effectively a
form of 'philosophy-lite', that takes law-related issues as its
subject-matter."
where the keyword is "PHILOSOPHY-LITE" (as used by McEvoy and Jim Wilson,
"New and Selected Philosophy-lite" -- but not necessarily me).
Take again Hart and Grice on convention. Hart speaks seriously of at least
two-people scenario. Grice goes further and speaks of the New Highway Code
he once invents while lying in his tub.
The idea is merely to enhance conceptual analysis.
For by referring to this Highway Code, Grice is into something else:
"X [may be current] only for utterer U"
i.e. a 'convention' may not NEED two (or more) individuals, as Hart's usual
scenarios are.
X is current iff it is only U's practice to utter X in such-and-such
circumstances.
In this case, U WILL surely have a readiness to utter X in such-and-such
circumstances -- even 'meaning' something.
This is related to a slightly different scenario "in which X is NOT current
at all, but the utterance of X in such-and-such circumstances is part of
SOME SYSTEM OF COMMUNICATION which U [ALONE] has devised but which has
never been put into operation (like the highway code which I invent one day
while lying in my bath)."
Or a legal system designed by von Wright (Hart loved what he called
"Scandinavian legal philosophy" and he was ready to use the proper
nationalistic
label). (Keyword: Scandinavian realism).
In that case, U surely HAS a procedure for X in, granted the _attenuated_
sense (i.e. way) that U has envisaged a possible system of practices which
WOULD involve a READINESS to utter X in such-and-such circumstances."
---- Studies in the Way of Words, WOW, p. 128. (Cfr. Robinson Crusoe's
legal system -- before Friday enters the scene).
When Chomsky read this (in Searle's compilation, "The philosophy of
language", Oxford readings in philosophy, ed. by Warnock) he said,
"Behaviourist!" in a bad tone, but neither Grice nor Hart are behaviourist in
the old
Watson-type style of 'machine-without-the-ghost' type of behaviourism (even if
for Hart it seems an analytic truth that a rule needs to be associated
with some relevant behaviour -- or other -- 'manifested' as Witters would
prefer).
Where exactly LEGAL Philosophy fits in Philosophy's latitudinal history may
well incite a dispute between Grice and Hart, which is where the fun of
philosophy rests.
"Philosophy, like Virtue, is One."
Or, if you prefer, there is only one problem in philosophy, namely all of
them.
Cheers,
Speranza
* Not to be confused with Unitarianism -- but related to it! I'm not
surprised that Grice's philosophical unitarianism (cfr. 'virtue unitarianism)
may provoke as much controversy as 'theological' unitarianism did --
especially in Ancient Rome.
Appendix on unitarianism.
Unitarians trace their history back to the Apostolic Age, i.e. the life of
Jesus and the decades immediately after his death, and claim this doctrine
was widespread during the pre-Nicene period, that is, before the First
Council of Nicaea met in 325. Many believe their Christology (understanding of
Jesus Christ) most closely reflects that of the "original Christians." (For
a discussion of the New Testament evidence, see Nontrinitarianism.)
While it is evident that other Christologies existed in the late 1st and
early 2nd centuries, at least some Jewish-Christian congregations tended to
hold the view that Jesus was a great man and prophet, even the Son of God,
but not God himself. (See Ebionites.)
One of the earliest controversies over the nature of Christ that involved
the propagation of "unitarian" ideas broke out at Rome during the episcopate
of Victor I (189–199). This was the so-called "Monarchian controversy",
which originated in a revolt against the influential Logos theology of Justin
Martyr and the apologists, who had spoken of Jesus as a second god. Such
language was disturbing to some. Justin's language appeared to promote
ditheism (two gods). The view, however, was defended by Hippolytus of Rome,
for
whom it was essential to say that the Father and the Logos are two distinct
"persons" (prosopa).
Some critics of Justin's theology tried to preserve the unity of God by
saying that there is no difference to be discerned between the ‘Son’ and the
‘Father’ (unless ‘Son’ is a name for the physical body or humanity of
Christ and ‘Father’ a name for the divine Spirit within). This sort of
thinking, known as Modal Monarchianism or Sabellianism, would one day lead to
a
compromise doctrine that the Father and the Son are consubstantial (of the
same being).
Other critics preserved the unity of God by saying that Jesus was a man,
but differentiated in being indwelt by the Spirit of God to an absolute and
unique degree. They thus denied that Jesus was God or a god. They became
known as "adoptionists", because they suggested that Jesus was adopted by the
Father to be his Son. This view was associated with Theodotus of Byzantium
(the Shoemaker) and Artemon.
So even at this early stage we find evidence of proto-Arianism (Justin's
view) and proto-Socinianism (the Adoptionist view), though they were, as yet,
not fully formed. Both of these theologies have similarities to latter day
Unitarianism.
The Monarchian controversy came to a head again in the mid-3rd century. In
259 the help of Dionysius of Alexandria, was invoked in a dispute among the
churches in Libya between adherents of Justin's Logos-theology and some
modalist Monarchians. Dionysius vehemently attacked the modalist standpoint.
He affirmed that the Son and the Father were as different as a boat and a
boatman and denied that they were "of one substance" (homoousios). The
Libyans appealed to Dionysius of Rome, whose rebuke to his Alexandrian
namesake
stressed the unity of God and condemned "those who divide the divine
monarchy into three separate hypostases and three deities".
Another crisis occurred over Paul of Samosata, who became bishop of Antioch
in Syria in 260. Paul's doctrine is akin to the primitive Jewish-Christian
idea of the person of Christ and to the Christology of Theodotus of
Byzantium (adoptionism). To many his doctrine seemed plain heresy, and a
council
of local bishops was held to consider his case in 268. The bishops found it
easier to condemn Paul than to expel him, and he remained in full
possession of the church with his enthusiastic supporters. However, the
bishops
appealed to the Roman emperor, who decided that the legal right to the church
building should be assigned "to those to whom the bishops of Italy and Rome
should communicate in writing". It was the first time that an
ecclesiastical dispute had to be settled by the secular power. So Paul was put
out of
his church.
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