[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 29 Dec 2009 21:45:37 -0800 (PST)
Hi J.
Sorry I've been away. My daughter and I are still away for the holidays. I
won't be more active here until the 4th. Some brief remarks on your mail:
1. Whether TJB is a "theory" is a function of the sense of the term "theory,"
and the behavior of the language participants. I think we're on board on this.
I've never said anything contrary. But where we may or may not differ is in
this respect:
When it is not a theory as such, I might also question its usefulness as
a definition. If I were asked to give a definition of knowledge -- in the sense
of it being neither a formula, "law-candidate," a formalism, etc., -- I would
use Webster's before TJB. And in fact, if someone asked me what "knowledge"
was, I would prefer to say this: it has to do with the coronation
of doubt-removal.
Actually, when I teach in class, I get this sort of thing all of the time.
Periodically, I have minds in the class that cannot think well. They always say
things like, "I'll give you the answer professor if you give me the
definition." I always say back to them: definition? Are you not an English
speaker? Have you never used the word? Definitions are only for people who have
a "foreign language problem." Once you are plugged into the grammar, they are
of no further use.
One more point here. To the extent I am known at all in my "field," it is as a
disciplinary critic. I see myself doing things in political science
that Wittgenstein did in philosophy. For example, I teach what the field calls
"American government," but I do it without reference to any political scientist
whatsoever. I don't mention them. My class is called philosophy and development
of American government. There is no class that I teach that resembles anything
anyone else in the field does. Why am I telling you this? Because if I were
asked to teach epistemology in a philosophy department, I would do something
Wittgenstein would be quite happy with. I would take a third of course and
discuss intellectual history -- what cultures have thought to be "knowledge"
through time. I would teach the sociology and anthropology of knowledge. And
then, with the rest of the class, I would teach uses and sense of "knowledge,"
its grammar, and how current
philosophy on the subject isn't helpful (because it asks the wrong questions).
The class would be 1/3 TJB & Gettier stuff; 1/3 Wittgenstein; & 1/3
historical/anthropological/sociological.
As to the value of propounding questions like "what is knowledge," I would say
it has the same sort of utility as setting bowling pins. If you think about it,
the question is really quite fitting for 3rd graders. As Wittgenstein noted,
one could make a philosophy (by playing games with sense) out of anything --
what is wishing, intention, law, winning, fatherhood, courtesy, etc. etc.
Knowledge is not special here (at least not to asking what it is).
2. I do concede your biographical claims about Gettier. I've never read
anything about him. Thought that was good stuff.
3. On the value of partial definitions, I'm not sure I completely agree. The
passages you and I exchanged in the BB really only say one thing. They say that
definitions are good not if they are partial or full -- but ONLY if they convey
sense. That's the reason W is not opposed to a partial definition in the
passage you cite. Because it did the job in conveying what was important to
know -- which was not IT (the definition). Same with the wishing remark. He
says if you give us a sharp-boundary for a family resemblance term and it does
the trick, that's ok too. The key is to avoid traffic accidents in the language
game. Not to give accounts of words outside of this end.
There are all sorts of anti-definition stuff in Wittgenstein's lectures.
Particularly in philosophy of mathematics, in exchanges with Turing. But
elsewhere too. I don't have time to gather them. Later in the week, I'll do a
"Wittgenstein and definitions" mail, and maybe we can talk more about it.
4. I don't think we are seeing eye to eye on anthropology and "logic." I think
the best way to get through that is to get to the level of example. Because
saying philosophy is or is not logic, or is more cousin to anthropology than
science, is not going to help until we actually see "philosophy" in action.
5. You mentioned the Bouwsma book. Just got it and about 7 other books for
Christmas! Great stuff in there about seeing Wittgenstein as a prophet-like
figure. (I'm going to write about that soon, too). Bouwsma seems like a really
great person.
Regards and thanks
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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