[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: Rob de Villiers <robbitgrey@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Fri, 18 Dec 2009 07:38:05 -0500
Sean,
Yes, Wittgennstein's "a-theoretical" cum "purely descriptive"
conception of philosophy has caused great consternation, even
distress or fury, to many.
Your characterisation of the issue in terms of "laws" is, I
think, more or less OK... but I would be inclined to describe
the situation as Wittgenstein rejecting the notion that
philosophy is theory construction or hypothtico-deductive-
explanatory undertaking... which might boil down to the same
thing as being "against LAWS". But I think something is going
a bit awry when you say "Wittgenstein is against LAWS, not
"theories", since the plain fact of the matter is that he most
plainly and categorically rejects the notion that philosophy
is a theoretical or theory-constructing enterprise at all.
The quotes you give from various sources are indeed pertinent,
but it surprises me that you do not mention and quote PI $109,
which seems to me Wittgenstein's fundamental, central and core
statement on this matter. I do not have PI on me right now, so
cannot accurately reproduce it. At any rate this and several
preceding and subsequent remarks in PI are to my mind pretty
clear on this, and definitive.
Discussing the roots of philosophical confusion in the Blue
Book, Wittgenstein writes in a way that certainly ties in
with your recourse to the notion of "laws", but which goes
considerably further in the direction I have tried to
intimate:
"Our craving for generality has another main source; our
preoccupation with the method of science. I mean the method
of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the
smallest possible number of primitive natural laws; and,
in mathematics, of unifying the treatment of different
topics by using a generalization. Philosophers constantly
see the method of science before their eyes, and are
irresistibly tempted to ask and answer in the way science
does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and
leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say
here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to
anything, or to explain anything. Philosophy really is '
purely descriptive'. (Think of such questions as "Are there
sense data?" and ask: What method is there of determining
this? Introspection?)"
Of course you are perfectly correct to say "One assumes he
is not against something like this in science" ... since
"something like this" might well be, in large measure,
definitive of what science is anyway. To say that philosophy
should not try to imitate science does not entail that science
is in some way doing things wrong - let alone that it should
imitate his philosophising! All it entails is that philosophy
is an undertaking that is in toto different from science, its
tasks, problems and issues are of a quite different nature or
type. This of course goes completely against the grain of
venerable traditions dating way back but more recently
manifested in the line of descent: Russell &c, -> Logical
Positivism -> Quinean "Post-Positivism", -> Davidson, Dummett,
and many others who all, to some degree or other, conceive
of philosophy as a "theory constructing", explanatory enterprise
thoroughly contiguous and continuous with the sciences, albeit at
a perhaps "higer" or "more general" or "more fundamental" level.
Hence there has, in many philosophical quarters been either virtual
dismissal or polite ignoring of Wittgenstein or else much wailing
and gnashing of teeth. But of course, Wittgenstein's a-theoretical
conception of philosophy is one of the very things that makes him
so revolutionary and unsettling ...
Peter Hacker (sometimes along with Gordon Baker) has written
extensively, and I reckon pretty definitively, on Wittgenstein's
a-theoretical, purely descriptive conception of philosophy, not
least in the Analytical Commentary itself but many places else-
where too (although even Hacker and Baker winded up with
fundamental disagreements on Wittgenstein's method!!!)
Hacker might not be the last word on Wittgenstein but he is
certainly one of the most sound and scholarly we have, on most
of the basics. I could provide a string of specific biblio-
graphical references should anyone want, but for now I will
just point you in the direction of some of Hacker's essays,
in particular 'Philosophy: a contribution, not to human
knowledge, but to human understanding' available at
http://info.sjc.ox.ac.uk/scr/hacker/RecentPapers.html.
Regards,
Rob.
--
Rob
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