... yes: "knowledge is true, justified belief. It has these three properties. If, therefore, one element is missing, you don't have knowledge." (Notice that this is exactly what lawyers do). And when a conundrum can be invented, you search for a better law to account for the matter and defend it with the ritual of proof. In a Wittgensteinian universe, this is not only a language fallacy, but it's not philosophy properly conceived. It's premised upon a confusion. Wittgenstein, therefore, would not offer a theory of knowledge as such, he would offer what I had called an end-theory, or what might be called "an account," because the behavior involved in doing the latter is not the same as the behavior involved in doing the former. The key is not the word that you use. You may call either a "theory." The key is that you understand that in one method there is behavior-ritual X and in another there is behavioral-intervention Y. The things that are king in Y have family resemblance to X, because the grammar of "theory" is about kingship. (Or perhaps we should say "answership"). But that doesn't make X's candidates for Kingship (answers) the same as Y's. It only makes them cousins. I like the new language game I invented: the "end-theory." That's really what it is. --- In WittrsAMR@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "BruceD" <wittrsamr@...> wrote: > > > Could you offer an example of a "law" in philosophy which W would find > inappropriate and why he would? > ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/