[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories

  • From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
  • To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
  • Date: Thu, 17 Dec 2009 11:16:35 -0800 (PST)

... I just had a thought.

I've always been troubled by how certain remarks of Wittgenstein are 
understood. In particular, the ones about theorizing. Wittgenstein quite 
clearly told his students that he was never presenting a theoretical account of 
anything and that to do so was inherently problematic. Examples:

1. During the Christmas break in 1930 in discussions he said with Schlick and 
Waismann, he said, 

(a). "For me, a theory is without value. A theory gives me nothing." (Monk, 
304). 

(b). And in another context: "If I were told anything that was a theory, I 
would say, No, no! That does not interest me -- it would not be the exact thing 
I was looking for." (305)  

(c) And again, in another context: "You cannot gain a fundamental understanding 
of mathematics by waiting for a theory." (307)   

2. When lecturing in 1938, Wittgenstein had used as an example the 
deterioration of the German musical tradition. Rush Rhees, one of his students, 
then asked Wittgenstein about his theory of deterioration --  to which 
Wittgenstein reacted, horrified, "Do you think I have a theory? Do you think 
I'm saying what deterioration is? What I do is describe different things called 
'deterioration.'" (405)

3. "It was important to Wittgenstein's conception of his philosophical method 
that there could be no disagreements of opinion between himself and Turing. In 
his philosophy he was not advancing any theses, so how could there possibly be 
anything to disagree with? When Turing once used the phrase, 'I see your 
point,' Wittgenstein reacted forcefully: 'I have no point.'  If Turing was 
inclined to object to what Wittgenstein was saying ...  it could only be a 
question of giving meaning to words. Or, rather, it could only be a question of 
Turing's not understanding Wittgenstein's use of certain words." (419)

I had always maintained this strand of Wittgenstein's thought was misunderstood 
by many people. Some people read it as saying that conceptualism or abstract 
sort of thinking is disallowed. This is clearly not the case. My old way of 
saying it was this: Wittgenstein is against "formalism, not conceptualism." I 
would say: he's against making certain subjects (language, art, etc) into a 
mathematics or a logic. In what are incredibly radical lectures, he was also 
against making mathematics itself into a kind of "mathematics" or logic in the 
sense that I am now speaking.

But I think I have found a better way to say this. It came upon me when 
ordering coffee today. Here is the way to say it. Wittgenstein is against LAWS, 
not "theories." That is, he has a particular use of "theories" that is 
formalistic and pristine. When he says "theory," he means a proposition that is 
a candidate to become a law. Theories as law-candidates. I don't mean law in a 
legal sense (though it be a cousin in the family); I mean "law" like "natural 
law" or the the "iron law of oligarchy," or "the law of physics," etc. Unified 
theory. The one true proposition. 

The idea is this. Whenever someone formally places a theory into play, what 
they are doing is offering the candidacy of a proposition. If the proposition 
survives its candidacy (in the academy), it becomes a sort of law for the thing 
in question.

So Wittgenstein is against these rituals. He's against this whole activity. And 
the best way to say it TODAY is to simply re-read the passages above, 
substituting the word LAW for theory. Wittgenstein is against the offering 
of laws for understanding. Understanding does not consist in the ritual of  
trying to propound laws. Wittgenstein is NOT against conceptual accounts of 
things that actually occur (e.g., games). He's not against thinking and 
pondering. He's not against "picturing" (because it can't be avoided), but he 
does want you to understand what "picturing" is. What he is 
fundamentally against is an approach to understanding wherein a person will try 
to produce a law for the activity -- at least for language, ethics, aesthetics, 
mathematics and many others. (One assumes he is not against something like this 
in science. But maybe even here, it could have issues). 

Regards.
 
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html 



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