[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sat, 26 Dec 2009 04:03:50 -0000
SW,
I want to bring this back around to the earlier question of my disputing
"knowledge is justified, true belief" as an example of a theory, because it
seems the connection to later remarks of mine has been lost.
What I wish to emphasize is that "justified, true belief" in itself is not a
good example because it depends upon how the statement is used, what surrounds
it, what arguments are made in relation to it. It may be a grammatical remark,
albeit poorly expressed and perhaps poorly thought. But it may also be a
theory. What I want to question is the idea that the form of the statement in
itself makes it in some way objectionable, that it should be stigmatized as
"theory" on the basis of form alone.
The issue as I understand it now is whether traditional
> approaches in epistemology could be undertaken if the
> approaches are not taken too seriously.
There's a lot to unpack here. Which "tradition"? And what constitutes one
approach rather than another?
If we take a remark of the same form and approach it differently, is that not a
different approach?
And if we approach it differently, must that be any less "serious"?
If Gettier's observations and examples are used as the basis for a research
program to find the "correct" definition of "knowledge" (as has happened), then
is the "therapy" needed one of saying that the initial remarks and the attempts
to answer them are misguided or one of examining the assumptions the motivate
this dialectic?
And note: one can readily read Gettier himself (who wrote a very short article
and has had little to say on the subject beyond that, especially compared to
the ink others have spilled) as actually challenging the whole idea that a set
of necessary and sufficient conditions defining "knowledge" is a reasonable
goal. Given his studies under Norman Malcolm, I don't find such a reading at
all implausible.
The challenge to the "justified, true belief" account does not itself offer a
further definition. I don't think Wittgenstein would find fault with that at
all! Recall a remark recorded by Bouwsma, "Now, when it comes to those early
dialogues, one on courage for instance, one might read and say, 'See, see, we
know nothing!' This would, I take it, be wholesome." (Wittgenstein:
conversations, 1949-1951)
Now, a "wholesome" response may not be the goal of "therapy" (though it may be
a useful step in the process). Such skepticism may also be very confused and
lead to other confusions. It depends on the individual.
My take away from Gettier: sometimes the warrant for saying, "I only thought I
knew," need not be a matter of what one believed having been false. It may be
warranted by one's seeing that one's grounds, though perfectly reasonable, were
in some way defective, though what they seemed to support was nevertheless true.
And that is a valuable insight into the grammar of "I know" and "I thought I
knew".
And if
> philosophy therefore were to adopt as its central mission
> "getting the thinking noggin going" -- not, as it were,
> solving problems -- then even energies spent upon spinning
> wheels would surely serve legitimate pedagogical ends.
Indeed. Boncampagni's "vaccination" is one way of putting it that I find
appropriate.
I know in political science, where
> philosophy is shunned, the insight can be staggeringly
> shallow and the ideas only surface-level.
I am reminded of the closing remarks of the PI regarding the state of
psychology as a science. And as well, from CV, "Man has to awaken to wonder ?
and so perhaps do peoples. Science is a way of sending him to sleep again."
And from _Zettel_, "Some philosophers (or whatever you like to call them)
suffer from what may be called `loss of problems'. Then everything seems quite
simple to them, no deep problems seem to exist any more, the world becomes
broad and flat and loses all depth, and what they write becomes immeasurably
shallow and trivial. Russell and H. G. Wells suffer from this."
> 4. Regarding TJB as conveying merely a sense of
> knowledge, I think this remark regarding wishing
> is better: "And after all, there is not one definite class
> of features which characterize all cases of wishing (at
> least not as the word is commonly used). If on the other
> hand you wish to give a definition of wishing, i.e., to draw
> a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like;
> and this boundary will never entirely coincide with the
> actual usage, as this usage has no sharp
> boundary." (BB,19).
>
That too would be appropriate, though I wouldn't say "better". That would
depend on the circumstances of the remark.
The fact is that he did consider partial definitions, definitions that do not
cover all cases but cover many, to have value in some circumstances.
(An aside: note that he inadvertently put forth a thesis here. Compare the
remark here about "wishing" with the discussion of "game" in which we are led
to such a conclusion and told not to think but look, but we are not simply,
"there is not one definite class of features which characterize all
(proceedings we call 'games')")
> 4. I'm in great disagreement over the anthropology
> problem, but I think the sense of my point here is not
> understood. (It rarely is). Philosophy is surely not
> "anthropology," just as it it not (strictly speaking) "art."
The practice of philosophy (as Wittgenstein would have it) is "an art" in the
same (perfectly legitimate) sense that psychotherapy is an art or that oratory
is an art. Philosophical writing is (usually) not poetry however, and not just
because it typically lacks meter. Our relationship to these things is
different. From LWPP II
653. Proverbs are sometimes hung on the wall. But not theorems of geometry. Our
relation to these two things.
[PI II, xi, p. 205c]
and PI II, including the cross-referenced remark:
For when should I call it a mere case of knowing, not seeing?--Perhaps
when someone treats the picture as a
working drawing, reads it like a blueprint. (Fine shades of behaviour.--Why are
they important? They have
important consequences.)
You need to think of the role which pictures such as paintings (as
opposed to working drawings) have in our
lives. This role is by no means a uniform one.
Page 205
A comparison: texts are sometimes hung on the wall. But not theorems
of mechanics. (Our relation to these
two things.)
> But the relationship of both anthropology and art to
> philosophy-properly-conceived must be greater than science
> or mathematics.
Why? How is that to be measured? And is not anthropology also a science?
Philosophy is not an empirical discipline. Anthropology (as much as physics)
is.
Logic is the business of philosophy but part of logic (a very small part,
according to Wittgenstein's usage) is now a part of mathematics.
The point here is that what "knowledge"
> ultimately is, is a function of its uses in the language
> culture and its cognition within the form of life. These
> are the "inputs" of philosophy-properly-understood. (I know
> that this won't be understood. I'd like to link to something
> on the discussion board, but the server is down).
Hmmm. Okay.
I do not at all disagree that the actual use of the word "knowledge" in our
language games is the relevant thing. But how we use that familiarity, the
role it plays is philosophical discourse, makes all the difference in the
world. Logic is not an empirical discipline. It is neither anthropology nor
psychology. "Anthropological" data do not explain nor yet do they provide the
ground for philosophical understanding, partly because (on a Wittgensteinian
view) philosophy is not in the business of offering explanations nor in the
business of stating theses that are to be given grounds and partly because, as
Frege and Husserl both demonstrated (with psychologism, though it applies as
much to "anthropologism"), attempts to explain or ground logic in that way lead
to contradictions, vicious circles, and nonsense.
I don't disagree with your other remarks. Again, I am emphasizing that the
role of a statement like "knowledge is justified true belief" is not, on the
basis of its form alone, to be stigmatized as "theoretical". Though even if it
is not used to express a theory (which it may be), it may be problematic on
other grounds.
What such a statement says may be something with which Wittgenstein would
largely agree (and I earlier presented textual evidence to support that claim),
though he would surely have considered such a statement to be quite limited if
its role is to serve as a definition.
I want to distinguish between what may be a poorly expressed and poorly thought
grammatical remark and the expression of a theory. The form of the statement
alone does not allow us to make that distinction.
A better example of a "theory" and an illustration of where these go wrong by
Wittgenstein's lights would be Russell's Theory of Types.
(The reason it is a better example, aside from being a likely candidate
historically for something Wittgenstein might have had in mind, is that we know
that Russell called it a theory as well as quite a lot about the context of it.
And I want to say" context is key here.)
Suppose that Russell had said:
"Here I've created a calculus. In it certain transformations can be shown to
be analogous to certain transformations we perform with the system of natural
numbers. Now in this system, we speak of classes. But the calculus has
certain rules for the introduction of classes in order to avoid paradoxes like
this..."
I want to say: whether or not he saw much point to such an activity (and
whether or not he saw the creation of such calculi as relevant to philosophy),
Wittgenstein would not have objected to this!
But instead, what Russell (and Whitehead, who disavowed the Theory of Types)
wrote in the Preface to _Principia_Mathematica_:
"We have examined a great number of HYPOTHESES for dealing with these
contradictions; many such HYPOTHESES have been advanced by others, and about as
many have been invented by ourselves.
...the form of the doctrine which we advocate appears to us the most PROBABLE,
and because it was necessary to give at least one perfectly definite theory
which avoids the
contradictions." (emphasis mine)"
Now, there are a number of other observations that Wittgenstein has made
regarding the system of PM, the Theory of Types, and related issues, but these
remarks from Russell by themselves seem to clearly show a way of talking about
logic that is deeply misleading if not profoundly confused.
Verificationism is often regarded as a theory. It is certainly a thesis. We
find this in some members of the Vienna Circle under Wittgenstein's influence
and in Wittgenstein himself during his transition.
It is also one of the "theses" explicitly identified as such by Waissman in
_Thesen_, a work originally begun in collaboration with Wittgenstein. This
book, I would suggest, is a good clue to white Wittgenstein specifically has in
mind when he eschews theses in philosophy.
WWK p. 244, from _Thesen_
"To say that a statement has sense means that it can be verified."
"The sense of a proposition is the way it is verified."
PR pp. 199&200
How a proposition is verified is what it says. Compare the generality
of genuine propositions with generality
in arithmetic. It is differently verified and so is of a different kind.
The verification is not one token of the truth, it is the sense of the
proposition. (Einstein: How a magnitude is
measured is what it is.)
But apropos of salvaging the grammatical insight in a statement that might have
been presented as a thesis or theory, we have in the PI
353. Asking whether and how a proposition can be verified is only a
particular way of asking "How d'you
mean?" The answer is a contribution to the grammar of the proposition.
JPDeMouy
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