[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "jrstern" <jrstern@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Thu, 24 Dec 2009 00:55:01 -0000
--- In Wittrs@xxxxxxxxxxxxxxx, "J" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> BBB pp. 18-19 Instead of "craving for generality" I could
> also have said "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular
> case". If, e.g., someone tries to explain the concept of number and
> tells us that such and such a definition will not do
> or is clumsy because it only applies to, say, finite cardinals
> I should answer that the mere fact that he could have
> given such a limited definition makes this definition extremely
> important to us. (Elegance is not what we are trying for.) For why
> should what finite and transfinite numbers have in common be
> more interesting to us than what distinguishes them? Or rather, I
> should not have said "why should it be more
> interesting to us?"--it isn't; and this characterizes our way of
> thinking.
Outstanding, I was not familiar with this quote, seems to relate
to some of the problems he had with Godel, much less Turing.
And overall, on this point, I am more on Wittgenstein's side.
Not that Turing was *actually* on the other side here, but I think
that Wittgenstein saw the resemblance of Turing's halting problem
solution and Godel's incompleteness results and took them as one
- and the above says
why Wittgenstein would just not find incompleteness results
interesting, at least not necessarily so, without further
argumentation - that is perhaps not utterly unknown, but seldom
really elaborated.
(Others argue for the "elegance" of a concise and universal
principle, but that's exactly what Wittgenstein dismisses here)
Josh
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