[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: "J" <jpdemouy@xxxxxxxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Sun, 20 Dec 2009 21:06:54 -0000
JRS,
This wasn't addressed to me, though I was mentioned. I thought I'd chime in to
respond, though I am increasingly thinking my answer might be quite different
from Sean's on certain points.
> I see you doing and recommending therapy as a cure for
> theory, dissolving the word and the question.
You may have noticed that my take on the rejection of "theory" and "theses" is
somewhat different. In many cases, our respective takes on how to avoid
reading Wittgenstein as self-refuting would not make a difference in practice,
but in one respect there is a big difference: telling someone who is not a
Wittgensteinian (and doesn't want to be) that theorizing or theses have no
place in philosophy is not a legitimate move by my lights. Particular theses
and theories must be confronted and the impulse to theorize perhaps eventually
dissipated.
Rules against theorizing are relevant only to those committed to doing
Wittgensteinian philosophy (according to a particular account of what that
means).
> You gave some quotes and comments about theory.
> Wittgenstein also talked about rules, laws, proofs,
> surveyability, and normativity. In some of these
> areas, dissolving the question was not an appropriate
> answer, and yet, perhaps there is a common approach, a
> Wittgensteinian grammar, to be seen.
The idea of "assembling reminders" and of a "perspicuous presentation" might
suggest something like a "theory", though the reminders assembled may be
nothing more than truisms which individually would certainly not deserve to be
called "theses" or "theories". The important thing is not something that can
be summarized in a theory but consists in "seeing connections" so we no longer
feel that "(we) do not not (our) way about".
How far can we go in this? Does Hacker's approach, with the idea of "logical
geography" go too far toward "theory" to still be Wittgensteinian? Reasonable
interpreters could disagree, though I think it should be clear that a Kripke or
Dummett could only be called "Wittgenstein-influenced" and certainly do engage
in objectionable (by Wittgensteinian lights) theorizing.
> I still invite people to find the positive terms, rather
> than simply practicing the ritual of therapy. That's
> because I find much that is positive in Wittgenstein, and a
> steady practice of therapy merely numbing.
"Therapy" is one simile. "Surveyability" and its connections with finding our
way about is another. Any simile can create only a partial picture and we have
to be guided by Wittgenstein's practice if we are to understand him. And, dare
I say it, by the "spirit" of his approach. To the extent that we may suppose
that we have grasped such a thing.
JPDeMouy
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