[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Tue, 22 Dec 2009 19:49:05 -0800 (PST)
(J)
... I would never dispute that "definition" is a family. Nor, "theory." And I
did not claim (or mean to!) that epistemology had described itself accurately.
I also no more feel that I have shown prejudice for TJB than you have shown
allegiance for it. What I thought I was saying was straight forward:
Theory-of-knowledge courses generally proceed from the misguided question of
"what is knowledge?" This leads students into thinking that this question is a
puzzle in need of a conjured answer. The standard answer is TJB. And the way
TJB is vetted is by example and counter-example. And by the time Gettier is
pulled out, students are led to believe there is some crisis that philosophers
need to solve.
The answer to the puzzle is never to propound the initial question. Rather, it
is to show students that the question causes the problems. And
that "knowledge" merely is what it does in anthropology (the language culture),
and that the only thing one can ever do here is become especially keen with
regard to its conditions of assertability across its various senses. And if
students are trained like this, they would be more concerned with Moore
claiming to know he has a hand than with Gettier. Why? Because, then, they
could see that doubt-removing grammar is being taken out of its ordinary and
useful context under warrant of language confusion. Gettier does not need an
answer; it needs "therapy."
Now, what I think you are doing is defending TJB by saying its just a safe
witticism of some sort. It doesn't count as a "theory" (or law, or
property-list). It doesn't have its mojo. I have no objection to that. But I
was originally asked what would be an example of a theory Wittgenstein
opposed, and I said TJB, which, in your vernacular, probably could have
been said "TJB with glory."
Let's try it this way. What would be a true theory of knowledge that was not
scientific? Can you think of one? Consider this question in the light of the
following Wittgensteinian ideas: a scientific theory is one that
requires information. Philosophy only re-arranges what is already known. It
doesn't produce new information. If we were truly to present theories of
knowledge, no one would object to them (because they would either be confirmed
or not in science). In other words, there would be no PHILOSOPHICAL reason to
object to a theory of knowledge, because philosophy has no business in it.
One last point. On whether W agreed with TJB would really be a function of what
would be taken to disagree with it in your eyes (and what signficance either
has). If asked whether knowledge was "TJB" by a student, I can imagine
Wittgenstein offering any of the following replies: (a) depends upon what that
means; (b) not if that is a theory; (c) "knowledge" expresses doubt-removing
grammar; (d) look and see; (e) only in a sense; (f) it sounds like a false
problem; (g) what's the dictionary say?; (h) are you not an English speaker?;
and (g) it doesn't matter what it means so long as conditions of assertability
are understood and free from knots. He would NEVER have said, "no,
because Gettier refuted it. We're still trying to solve that one." So I'm
unclear as to what W is claiming to support here. If its just the TV Guide, I
guess I'm in agreement.
Regards and thanks.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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