Sean, I probably ought not to have tossed in a jab like that and perhaps should simply withdraw it, first, because it's not a topic I much care to discuss but having made the remark, I ought to be willing to defend it; second, because it's liable very quickly to get entangled existing threads I wish to avoid; third, because a wide range of activities and research are described as "cognitive science" and to simply dismiss it all as "stupid" would be asshattery on my part, but what I said is too easily read that way; and fourth, because to the extent that there are real philosophical confusions at work in "cognitive science", a simple dismissal is wholly inappropriate. At the same time, you've politely asked for some elaboration and I think it right that I provide that. My issue with "cognitive science" in general, apart from any particular philosophical misunderstandings that may go under that name, is the self-image of philosophy that it represents. It presents itself as an interdisciplinary field, embracing cognitive psychology, linguistics, computer science, and so on, along with philosophy. Now, to the extent that the role of philosophy here is something like the philosophy of science, i.e. an inquiry into the methods and concepts of the natural and social sciences, that's fine. A Mach, a Hertz, or an Einstein considered such questions alongside questions specific to physics and there's no reason not to think that philosophers and scientists in collaboration might not benefit in an analogous way. But the role of philosophy in such an enterprise is not like this. Rather the philosopher-cum-"cognitive scientist" fancies himself as a collaborator in constructing theories regarding the nature of mind, thought, and so on, presents himself as contributing not just to human understanding but to human knowledge. To the extent that he does so, he is a, e.g. a psychologist, by my lights, but the self-image of philosophy as "cognitive science" rests on the sophistical arguments of Quine, which purport to demonstrate a seamlessness between empirical and conceptual investigations and call for a "naturalistic turn" in philosophy. Of course, if I may speculate, circumstances beyond the acceptance of Quinean arguments about analyticity or undetermination may motivate such a turn. By linking philosophy with research into AI and such, philosophers can claim for their work potential significance to military and commercial interests. No, we aren't just wasting the kids' time having them reading dusty old books, examining pointless questions posed by ancients, or worrying about nuances of meaning, we are forging ahead to the future, we're about progress, discovery... and all that good shite! It is more this sort of attitude to which I was alluding in my ill-advised remark. I hope that is adequate explanation. JPDeMouy PS As my exchanges with Kirby may indicate to someone who cares enough to notice, I am not opposed to interdisciplinary discussion and not opposed to philosophy having relevance to science education or technological progress. I want to be clear about that. If philosophy has value in unexpected ways, that's all well and good. It is this need to justify philosophy in those terms and the attendant muddles about what philosophy is and can do to which I object. > J wrote: "Politics being what they > are though, many philosophers would rather identify > themselves with stupidities like so-called "cognitive > science", doing "important" work." > > ... could you give us a little more here? What > makes cognitive science objectionable in your view? (Just > wanting a little more info. I'm not sure what these issues > are). ========================================= Need Something? Check here: http://ludwig.squarespace.com/wittrslinks/