Cayuse wrote:

>Joseph Polanik wrote:

>>we are discussing the way in which 'philosophy can talk about the
>>self'; but, it is not clear that you accept that there is a self that
>>philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not the human
>>being, the human body or the human soul.

>>do you?

>I do -- it is the stream of experience, and not something that in some
>inexplicable manner "experiences" that stream.

well, then, here is the problem: you deny that the philosophical self,
the stream of experiences, is capable of first-person self-referencing.

LW, of course, had more sense than that. for him the philosophical self
is that which can say "I am my world (the microcosm)". TLP 5.63

Joe

--

Nothing Unreal is Self-Aware

@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@
http://what-am-i.net
@^@~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~@^@

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Joseph Polanik wrote:
> Cayuse wrote:
>> Joseph Polanik wrote:
>>> we are discussing the way in which 'philosophy can talk about the
>>> self'; but, it is not clear that you accept that there is a self
>>> that philosophers may talk about, a self or an 'I' that is not the
>>> human being, the human body or the human soul.
>
>>> do you?
>
>> I do -- it is the stream of experience, and not something that
>> in some inexplicable manner "experiences" that stream.
>
> well, then, here is the problem: you deny that the philosophical self,
> the stream of experiences, is capable of first-person self-referencing.

First-person language use appears within the stream of experience.
It has an application when referring to the physical organism,
but the mode of speech "bewitches" us into misconceiving an
"experiencer" as something /other/ than the physical organism.

> LW, of course, had more sense than that. for him the philosophical
> self is that which can say "I am my world (the microcosm)". TLP 5.63

LW claims that "I am my world (the microcosm)", but he does
*not* claim that it is the philosophical self that makes this claim.
Moreover, the very next paragraph reads "There is no such thing
as the subject that thinks or entertains ideas" (5.631).

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--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@...> wrote:
>
> ... probably should have said the new "devil"
> ----------------------------------------------------------
> So, my point is simple: confusion is the new "god."
>
> SW
> Knowledge as confusion,knowledge as ignorance,knowledge as intelligence.

The definition of knowledge is a matter of on-going debate among philosophers in the field of epistemology. The classical definition, described but not ultimately endorsed by Plato[1], has it that in order for there to be knowledge at least three criteria must be fulfilled; that in order to count as knowledge, a statement must be justified, true, and believed. Some claim that these conditions are not sufficient, as Gettier case examples allegedly demonstrate. There are a number of alternatives proposed, including Robert Nozick's arguments for a requirement that knowledge 'tracks the truth' and Simon Blackburn's additional requirement that we do not want to say that those who meet any of these conditions 'through a defect, flaw, or failure' have knowledge. Richard Kirkham suggests that our definition of knowledge requires that the belief is self-evident to the believer.[2]
In contrast to this approach, Wittgenstein observed, following Moore's paradox, that one can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so". [3] He goes on to argue that these do not correspond to distinct mental states, but rather to distinct ways of talking about conviction. What is different here is not the mental state of the speaker, but the activity in which they are engaged. For example, on this account, to know that the kettle is boiling is not to be in a particular state of mind, but to perform a particular task with the statement that the kettle is boiling. Wittgenstein sought to bypass the difficulty of definition by looking to the way "knowledge" is used in natural languages. He saw knowledge as a case of a family resemblance. Following this idea, "knowledge" has been reconstructed as a cluster concept that points out relevant features but that is not adequately captured by any definition.[4]
>
> Wkipedia

thank you
sekhar
> ==========================================
>
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>

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "void" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:

> The classical definition, described but not ultimately endorsed
> by Plato[1], has it that in order for there to be knowledge at
> least three criteria must be fulfilled; that in order to count as
> knowledge, a statement must be justified, true, and believed.

There's an implicit assumption there, that knowledge consists of
statements. Why is that assumption made? To me, it surely seems
wrong.

Regards,
Neil

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--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, Joseph Polanik <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> Oh! So It's Common Ground You Want?
>
Wikipedia

Self-Knowledge and the Division of Memory
Self-theories have traditionally failed to distinguish between different sources that inform self-knowledge, these are episodic memory' and semantic memory. Both episodic and semantic memory are facets of declarative memory, which contains memory of facts. Declarative memory is the explicit counterpart to procedural memory, which is implicit in that it applies to skills we have learnt; they are not facts that can be stated.

A basic schematic representation of memory showing the 'locations' of semantic and episodic memory.
[edit]Episodic Memory
Main article: Episodic memory
Episodic memory is the autobiographical memory that individuals possess which contains events, associated emotions, and knowledge around a given context. This kind of declarative memory provides an individual with a personal narrative and a view of their selves as existing throughout a period of time.
[edit]Semantic Memory
Main article: Semantic memory
Semantic memory does not refer to concept-based knowledge stored about a specific experience like episodic memory. Instead it includes the memory of meanings, understandings, general knowledge about the world, and factual information etc. This makes semantic knowledge independent of context and personal information. Semantic memory enables an individual to know information, including information about their selves, without having to consciously recall the experiences that taught them such knowledge.

If there is no memory there is no content of knowledge
Knowledge is the content humans contain as the world.

thank you
sekhar

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--- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "void" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:

Semantic memory does not refer to concept-based knowledge stored about a
specific experience like episodic memory. Instead it includes the memory of meanings, understandings, general knowledge about the world, and factual information etc. This makes semantic knowledge independent of context and personal information. Semantic memory enables an individual to know information, including information about their selves, without having to consciously recall the experiences that taught them such knowledge.
> thank you
> sekhar
> =========================================

This is an interesting remark Sekhar. What is the link?

The reason I find it interesting is because I'm not sure there is such a distinction as the text is making, i.e., that there is something like "semantic memory" that differs from the narrative ("episodic") memory it is being contrasted with.

If one goes back to the experience I posted about here of when I was driving up the east coast through South Carolina and saw a sign I didn't initially understand and then, after an instant, I did, one of the things I noticed at the time was that my instant of understanding (when the meaning of the sign suddenly clicked for me) was accompanied by a number of associative images in my head. This suggested to me that the understanding was just these connected images and that, though it was unlikely others ever make exactly the same connections we do, still we achieve common understandings when we make enough similar connections to yield a larger, complex picture that we can share at some more general level.

Of course, it is at least possible that the understanding I suddenly achieved was something else, i.e., a moment of insight that then prompted that multiplicity of mental images (even if the images seemed indistinguishable from the understanding to me at the time). Thus one could say that the images were a byproduct of that understanding, not part of the process of understanding itself.

While I think that the leaner explanation here is the one that doesn't posit more than we "see" and that this will be the one that says understanding just IS the network of connected representations that happen in the mind in concert with any instance of understanding (the associated images), I remain open to the possibility that some other phenomenon is at work.

It bears noting, as well, that if there is a separate and distinct instance of understanding, apart from the associative connections that occur, this could suggest at least a dualist picture of mind, i.e., that understanding really is some special mental occurrence that is more than just so many related representations (which computers would be as capable of delivering as brains).

So there are some implications here for the question of whether brains and computers really are just alike, or at least alike enough to enable it to be at least theoretically possible to produce minds on computational machines.

SWM

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--- In WittrsAMR@yahoogroups.com, "SWM" <wittrsamr@...> wrote:
>
> --- In Wittrs@yahoogroups.com, "void" <wittrsamr@> wrote:
>
> Semantic memory does not refer to concept-based knowledge stored about a
> specific experience like episodic memory. Instead it includes the memory of meanings, understandings, general knowledge about the world, and factual information etc. This makes semantic knowledge independent of context and personal information. Semantic memory enables an individual to know information, including information about their selves, without having to consciously recall the experiences that taught them such knowledge.
> > thank you
> > sekhar
> > =========================================
>
> This is an interesting remark Sekhar. What is the link?

>
> SWM
>

Dear sir

You may search Wikipedia chapters knowledge or memory

thank you
sekhar
> =========================================
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Kirby,

(During our exchanges, I find myself picturing the videogame character "Kirby" bouncing around tetrahedra - though that's not how the game looked. I hope that observation doesn't offend. It's on no way meant to trivialize your points.)

>
> I think you were clear, and I'm encouraged you would spend
> some energy
> on this thread.

I find the subject interesting, certainly. You've indicated that I've been able to help and I don't feel I'm wasting my time as can sometimes happen in these threads.

> You point out that a tabular arrangement of rows and
> columns is easy
> to read, whereas a grid of triangles is less familiar,
> more
> problematic, even if it provides a logically consistent
> model of
> multiplying lengths to get area. In making the
> transition, one is
> likely to slip up, make mistakes.

There are mistakes one can imagine, such as failing to see that the bowling pin arrangement doesn't fit what we're meant to do here, but I wouldn't quite say that such mistakes are my principal concern.

How "easy to read" one representations is compared to another is closer to the point, but it might be closer to say that I'm not sure how to read one as I would the other. Or that they don't say the same things.

As an approach to length and area, the concerns I've raised are not a problem at all, as far as I can see. If we are approaching this as "magnitudes" rather than "multitudes", the differences between the two uses of "n x n" are less significant. But the background of why one might be more inclined to accept the squares as a picture of n x n (multitudes), why this picture better reflects different aspects of the calculation, might be something to acknowledge up front, to emphasize the differences so that there is no charge of "sleight of hand" or "sophistry".

(Apart from the mission of educating teachers, encouraging the students to think of different ways we use pictures, to think about concepts like "grouping" and "correlation", would be beneficial.)

>
> The tetrahedral model of 3rd powering is somewhat alien as
> well,
> compared to the cubic.
>
> This isn't a show stopper though, as reassurance is what
> we're after.

Reassurance of what?

I wouldn't suggest at all that my remarks show that there is anything wrong with the different approaches. I wouldn't speak of "show stoppers", no.

I think the compact packing of spheres might be your best lead for demonstrating applicability here. It's easy to visualize, easy to show using diagrams and models, obviously relevant to a variety of problems.

> These low level grammatical details might come up in a
> philosophy
> course at the university level, when math teachers are
> still in
> training. However, a curious high schooler could
> easily motivate the
> discussion, which is why it pays to be well prepared.

Indeed.

>
> We wouldn't use Russell-Whitehead's Principia to prove 1 +
> 1 = 2 in an
> everyday classroom, either.

No. But I also wouldn't accept that PM shows what arithmetic operations "mean".

> But then is "n-squared" appropriate terminology here?

It has potential to mislead but that can be corrected.

> We're working
> with n x n triangles. One could say "n-triangled" or
> "n to the 2nd
> power" instead.

Those are viable alternatives, yes. "N-triangled", aside from being a bit "cute" has the problem, etymologically, of suggesting the number 3 (where etymologically, "squared" does not suggest 4) and possibly being confused with raising to the third power.

That's not an objection, more just an anticipation of where a student might get confused.

The objective is not to therefore
> forsake squaring,

Obviously not.

> only to show that "squaring" and "2nd powering" may be
> logically
> decoupled, likewise "3rd powering" and "cubing".

I wonder about this way of putting things. And I wonder if it's necessary.

Here's a diagram showing a triangle made up of smaller triangles that are similar. We can calculate the number of smaller triangles that make up the larger by counting the triangles along two of the sides and multiplying.

We do something analogous with a square made up of smaller squares. And we take this as a picture of the operations N x N or N-squared.

(No one should dispute any of that.)

Therefore...

(Here's where you meet resistance.)

The operation N x N can be applied in both cases, whether or not we call the cases "the same" in any other sense. What sense is relevant here? Isn't this a matter of wanting to persuade someone to adopt a way of speaking? And is that way of speaking important?

("...the four sides of the cube."

"Um, a cube has six sides."

"The top and bottom aren't 'sides', asshat!")

If we say that one is one of many applications of the operation n x n. while the other is a picture of what we mean by "n x n", no one could object!

If we say that we can use the triangle rather than the square as a unit of area, this may arouse suspicion. A reminder that we can readily convert between the units to whatever precision needed (they are only "incommensurable" in a philosophically innocent sense) and check the calculations made using triangles against calculations using squares ought to alleviate that.

Then we have simply a method that is more efficient for some purposes.

> Yes, you're defending the practicality of our rectilinear
> 90-degree-
> based conventions.

It isn't just a question of practicality. What I hope to convey is that what the "90-degree-based conventions" show as a picture of arithmetic operations is different. Yes, there is an analogous "input" and "output" with the triangular case, but not all of the same transformations.

"Seeing as" is important here. An n x n square can be seen as n columns or as n rows. And each column (or row) is the same arrangement (squares in a lined up or stacked) making their grouping perspicuous. Being the same in this sense, the connection between multiplication and addition is clarified: n x n is a stack of n height (or in a line, n length), n times ("times" as literal repetition: the same again). And that they are the same is not just a matter of their having the same arrangement (grouping) but their lining up (correlation).

What corresponds to grouping, to correlation, or to "the same again" with the triangles?

Also, with squares, we also have the ability to form rectangles, n x m, which obey the same rule of multiplication and exhibit the other aspects mentioned above. What is an "n x m" triangle, where n does not equal m? And can n x m still be multiplied?

One of the colored graphics you showed previously does show how this works, but it is not really analogous to the "n x n" triangle in the way that the n x m rectangle is analogous to the n x n square.

To put it in your terms (?), the "n x n" when speaking of triangles belongs to a different "namespace". Or rather, the relationship between the arithmetic operation and the pictures is not the same here as it is with the square. That's not because the later is the "correct" picture or because the triangles are "sophistry", as your Midwestern interlocutor might have it, but just because the connection between the operation and the square involves more than just the fact that you can count the squares along each edge and multiply them to arrive at the same total as counting all of the squares within the larger square.

He is right to object to "it means the same here", though he offers no clear grounds that I can see.

But if I've helped you see what would be good grounds for that objection, perhaps by pointing out the differences as well as the similarities, such conflicts can be averted.

I have no objection, provided
> we're free to
> establish / explore a logically permitted alternative in
> some
> lessons. We want to keep using that concentric
> hierarchy with its
> volumes table.

Certainly! I have no objections to any of this!
>

JPDeMouy

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Kirby,

> Yes, your insights are on target.

That's reassuring. I was somewhat concerned that I might be missing the point. You have an enthusiasm for ideas that is admirable and enjoyable but I can find it difficult to find the crux of the issue in some of your posts. That may in part be that I am not really "mathematical".

> It would be counter-productive to try converging these
> starkly
> contrasting approaches into some kind of hodgepodge,
> pretending the
> differences are of little consequence.

Honestly seeing both similarities and differences is always a challenge.

>
> On the contrary, given the 60-degree-based approach seems
> more alien
> and unfamiliar, we need to capitalize on its novelty.
> The idea of
> "something new under the sun" at so accessible a level is a
> feature,
> not a bug, as we say in the IT business.
>

>
> You're saying we want to avoid provoking a defensive
> reaction among
> our teachers, and I think that's right.

Yes. And to seek out for ourselves what might be important distinctions even where their objections might seem little more than prejudice.

>
> One approach is to suggest that brief forays into this more
> alien
> content helps stabilize student understanding of the
> conventional
> content.

I would tend to suppose that it would. "Objects of comparison" helping us to command a clear view, as it were.

We're getting into empirical, measurable
> questions here, as
> to whether that's true or not.

yes

An analogy:
> wrapping one's brain
> around Linux leaves one feeling stronger and more competent
> in Windows
> as well.

Actually, it made me abandon Windows and never go back, though I get your point.

(And do you really want an analogy that makes Windows rather than POSIX out to be the standard? I suppose on the consumer desktop in the US, it is the de facto standard. Do you know that in Spain, each of the regional governments has its own Debian- or Ubuntu-based distribution customized for use in schools and government? Admittedly, Spain is a much smaller market, but perhaps someday they'll be remembered as trailblazers for this. One can dream.)

> Tribes with language games, forms of life. Here we've
> got the
> dominant cubists and I tiny ethnic minority (like gypsies)
> with a
> somewhat counter-intuitive alternative, one that seems to
> hold water.

I may be missing the point (As I said, I'm not particularly mathematical.) but for all that I've done to emphasizes differences, I'm actually not seeing this as particularly radical. Not like, e.g. Reimannian geometry. It seems less like a fundamentally different calculus and more like an add-on that can be readily assimilated into the larger structure. And all that is "counter-intuitive" is the philosophical gloss, not the procedures themselves.

Again, I may be missing something.

JPDeMouy

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AB,

There is much in what you say with which I'd agree. Just a few comments...

> It isn't good for business, that's clear, it
> makes all philosophers unemployed!

I actually believe that your vaccination metaphor shows a role for philosophers that is both a contribution to human welfare and human understanding and is consistent with Wittgenstein's insights.

Politics being what they are though, many philosophers would rather identify themselves with stupidities like so-called "cognitive science", doing "important" work.

> 1. Both aim to show something instead of saying
> it;

Could you elaborate on where you find something like a saying/showing distinction in the later work?

The closest analogy that comes to my mind is "that understanding which consists in 'seeing connexions'." (PI 122), ut this doesn't seem to entail any suggestion that such connections are ineffable.

>
> 2. Both perspectives risk to be
> self-contraddictory;

Any text can be taken to be self-contradictory but as Sean and I have discussed, there are specific ways that the later work could easily be taken to be self-refuting. He and I have somewhat different accounts of why this is not the case. In any case, this is not the sort of clear paradox we find in the _Tractatus_.

Perhaps you have something else in mind? Or a different take on the rejection of theses and theories?

> 4. In Tractatus, the end is to see the world rightly;
> in the Investigations, what we get is, again, a vision, but
> this vision is intended to let us go back to our original
> and spontaneous life, in a pragmatic perspective that we
> can't find in the Tractatus.

I think I know what you mean here. Something like a return to the ordinary, a "healthy understanding". I hesitate at "pragmatic" because of the philosophical baggage that word carries (likely more so in the US!), but if you simply mean something like "attuned to our practices", then that's right.

JPDeMouy

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J wrote: "Politics being what they are though, many philosophers would rather identify themselves with stupidities like so-called "cognitive science", doing "important" work."

... could you give us a little more here? What makes cognitive science objectionable in your view? (Just wanting a little more info. I'm not sure what these issues are).
 
Regards and thanks.

SW

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Sean,

I probably ought not to have tossed in a jab like that and perhaps should simply withdraw it, first, because it's not a topic I much care to discuss but having made the remark, I ought to be willing to defend it; second, because it's liable very quickly to get entangled existing threads I wish to avoid; third, because a wide range of activities and research are described as "cognitive science" and to simply dismiss it all as "stupid" would be asshattery on my part, but what I said is too easily read that way; and fourth, because to the extent that there are real philosophical confusions at work in "cognitive science", a simple dismissal is wholly inappropriate.

At the same time, you've politely asked for some elaboration and I think it right that I provide that.

My issue with "cognitive science" in general, apart from any particular philosophical misunderstandings that may go under that name, is the self-image of philosophy that it represents. It presents itself as an interdisciplinary field, embracing cognitive psychology, linguistics, computer science, and so on, along with philosophy.

Now, to the extent that the role of philosophy here is something like the philosophy of science, i.e. an inquiry into the methods and concepts of the natural and social sciences, that's fine. A Mach, a Hertz, or an Einstein considered such questions alongside questions specific to physics and there's no reason not to think that philosophers and scientists in collaboration might not benefit in an analogous way.

But the role of philosophy in such an enterprise is not like this. Rather the philosopher-cum-"cognitive scientist" fancies himself as a collaborator in constructing theories regarding the nature of mind, thought, and so on, presents himself as contributing not just to human understanding but to human knowledge.

To the extent that he does so, he is a, e.g. a psychologist, by my lights, but the self-image of philosophy as "cognitive science" rests on the sophistical arguments of Quine, which purport to demonstrate a seamlessness between empirical and conceptual investigations and call for a "naturalistic turn" in philosophy.

Of course, if I may speculate, circumstances beyond the acceptance of Quinean arguments about analyticity or undetermination may motivate such a turn. By linking philosophy with research into AI and such, philosophers can claim for their work potential significance to military and commercial interests. No, we aren't just wasting the kids' time having them reading dusty old books, examining pointless questions posed by ancients, or worrying about nuances of meaning, we are forging ahead to the future, we're about progress, discovery... and all that good shite!

It is more this sort of attitude to which I was alluding in my ill-advised remark. I hope that is adequate explanation.

JPDeMouy

PS As my exchanges with Kirby may indicate to someone who cares enough to notice, I am not opposed to interdisciplinary discussion and not opposed to philosophy having relevance to science education or technological progress. I want to be clear about that. If philosophy has value in unexpected ways, that's all well and good. It is this need to justify philosophy in those terms and the attendant muddles about what philosophy is and can do to which I object.

> J wrote: "Politics being what they
> are though, many philosophers would rather identify
> themselves with stupidities like so-called "cognitive
> science", doing "important" work."
>
> ... could you give us a little more here? What
> makes cognitive science objectionable in your view? (Just
> wanting a little more info. I'm not sure what these issues
> are).

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Sean,

"Dictionary definitions" are but one kind of definition. And there were definitions long before there were dictionaries. There are definitions by divisio and by partitio, definitions by genus and differentia, definitions by necessary and sufficient conditions, and so on. Denying that some of these are definitions, calling them "formalisms" instead flies in the face of established usage.

That a particular ideal to which we may aspire in seeking and offering definitions may be chimerical, i.e. that we may not find a set of necessary and sufficient conditions that capture our use of a word, is an important point. That a definition may not be at all what we need to remove philosophical puzzlement is also important. But whether a definition is part of a theory (in any objectionable sense) depends on the context, the assumptions behind the deployment of the definition, the debates surrounding it. A definition (formal or otherwise) may simply be a grammatical remark.

Formal definitions are not Wittgenstein's preferred way of presenting grammatical remarks - and for good reasons - but that does not mean that he would reject them simply for being formal definitions, stigmatizing them as "theories" on that basis.

As far as stigmatizing "justified true belief" on the basis of its being part of the Theory of Knowledge, that argument is fallacious, because "the theory of knowledge" is not the name of any particular theory but rather the name of a field of investigation within philosophy, just as "literary theory" is not the name of any particular theory. (In recent decades, "theory" has been used synonymously with "deconstruction", showing some ignorance of the range of approaches "literary theory" includes.) Likewise, some of Wittgenstein's insights on formal logic are discussed under the rubric of "logical theory" (where Oxonians divide "philosophy of logic", "philosophical logic", and "logical theory", assigning different topics and problems to each) without thereby implying that Wittgenstein subscribed to some theory called "Logical Theory".)

"Justified true belief" can be treated as a theory, or approached with a theorizing attitude, or it may be simply a grammatical remark. As the latter, it misfires in certain respects but that can happen with any grammatical remark. There's also a good deal that is correct about it. And Wittgenstein accepted much of what such a definition says...

Quoting from _On_Certainty_ with my own remarks in parentheses:

12. --For "I know" seems to describe a state of affairs which guarantees what is known, guarantees it as a fact. One
always forgets the _expression_ "I thought I knew".

(Ask yourself, why would "I know" even "seem" to guarantee what is known to be a fact? And why does the _expression_, "I thought I knew" cast doubt on that guarantee?)

13. For it is not as though the proposition "It is so" could be inferred from someone else's utterance: "I know it is
so".

(A says that A knows that p does not imply p.)

Nor from the utterance together with its not being a lie.

(A honestly says that A knows that p does not imply p. A's honesty in the matter is not what is it issue.)

--But can't I infer "It is so" from my own utterance "I
know etc."? Yes;

(I can infer p from my own knowing that p. It would be a contradiction to say both that I know p and that not-p. Why? Because the truth of p is part of what we mean by saying "I know that p". If it is not the case that p, then it is also not the case that I know that p. Hence the _expression_, "I thought I knew".)

and also "There is a hand there" follows from the proposition "He knows that there's a hand there".

(Note well the contrast between the proposition "He knows that p" and his claim to know that p, considered just previously.)

But from his
utterance "I know..." it does not follow that he does know it.

(I've seen people get confused by this passage because of the distinction between the utterance of "I know..." and the proposition "he knows..." The proposition does imply the truth of p, though the proposition could be false. The fact that he utters it, even sincerely, implies no such thing.)

14. That he does know remains to be shewn.

18. "I know" often means: I have the proper grounds for my statement.

(In other words, my statement is justified. But note, he does say "often", not "always".)

So if the other person is acquainted with the
language-game, he would admit that I know. The other, if he is acquainted with the language-game, must be able to
imagine how one may know something of the kind.

42. One can say "He believes it, but it isn't so", but not "He knows it, but it isn't so".

(Further emphasizing the "truth" condition of knowledge.)

Does this stem from the
difference between the mental states of belief and of knowledge? No.--One may for example call "mental state" what
is expressed by tone of voice in speaking, by gestures etc. It would thus be possible to speak of a mental state of
conviction, and that may be the same whether it is knowledge or false belief.

(Note, in contrast with "justified true belief", Wittgenstein emphasizes a contrast we often draw between "knowledge" and "belief" rather than treating knowledge as a species of belief. But he also speaks of a "mental state of conviction" that may be expressed by both.)

To think that different states must
correspond to the words "believe" and "know" would be as if one believed that different people had to correspond to
the word "I" and the name "Ludwig", because the concepts are different.

23. If I don't know whether someone has two hands (say, whether they have been amputated or not) I shall believe
his assurance that he has two hands, if he is trustworthy. And if he says he knows it, that can only signify to me that
he has been able to make sure, and hence that his arms are e.g. not still concealed by coverings and bandages, etc.
etc.

(Again, justification.)

91. If Moore says he knows the earth existed etc., most of us will grant him that it has existed all that time, and also
believe him when he says he is convinced of it. But has he also got the right ground for his conviction? For if not,
then after all he doesn't know (Russell).

(He doesn't know if he doesn't have grounds, even if we do grant the truth of what he says.)

407. For when Moore says "I know that that's..." I want to reply "you don't know anything!"--and yet I would not
say that to anyone who was speaking without philosophical intention. That is, I feel (rightly?) that these two mean to
say something different.

(Here he seems to be at least tentatively granting the possible use of "I know" outside of philosophy that is more akin to what he would have philosophers replace with "I am certain". People do sometimes use "I know" when they cannot give grounds - when giving grounds is not possible - but philosophers ought to be more careful. So, he's granting a use that does not not involve being justified but he would object to that usage in philosophical discussion.)

438. It would not be enough to assure someone that I know what is going on at a certain place--without giving him
grounds that satisfy him that I am in a position to know.

441. In a court of law the mere assurance "I know..." on the part of a witness would convince no one. It must be
shown that he was in a position to know.
Even the assurance "I know that that's a hand", said while someone looked at his own hand, would not be
credible unless we knew the circumstances in which it was said. And if we do know them, it seems to be an
assurance that the person speaking is normal in this respect.

563. One says "I know that he is in pain" although one can produce no convincing grounds for this.--Is this the same
as "I am sure that he..."?--No. "I am sure" tells you my subjective certainty. "I know" means that I who know it, and
the person who doesn't are separated by a difference in understanding. (Perhaps based on a difference in degree of
experience.)
If I say "I know" in mathematics, then the justification for this is a proof.
If in these two cases instead of "I know", one says "you can rely on it" then the substantiation is of a
different kind in each case.
And substantiation comes to an end.

JPDeMouy

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(J)

...  I would never dispute that "definition" is a family. Nor, "theory." And I did not claim (or mean to!) that epistemology had described itself accurately. I also no more feel that I have shown prejudice for TJB than you have shown allegiance for it.  What I thought I was saying was straight forward:

Theory-of-knowledge courses generally proceed from the misguided question of "what is knowledge?"  This leads students into thinking that this question is a puzzle in need of a conjured answer. The standard answer is TJB. And the way TJB is vetted is by example and counter-example. And by the time Gettier is pulled out, students are led to believe there is some crisis that philosophers need to solve.  

The answer to the puzzle is never to propound the initial question. Rather, it is to show students that the question causes the problems. And that "knowledge" merely is what it does in anthropology (the language culture), and that the only thing one can ever do here is become especially keen with regard to its conditions of assertability across its various senses. And if students are trained like this, they would be more concerned with Moore claiming to know he has a hand than with Gettier. Why?  Because, then, they could see that doubt-removing grammar is being taken out of its ordinary and useful context under warrant of language confusion. Gettier does not need an answer; it needs "therapy."  

Now, what I think you are doing is defending TJB by saying its just a safe witticism of some sort. It doesn't count as a "theory" (or law, or property-list). It doesn't have its mojo. I have no objection to that. But I was originally asked what would be an example of a theory Wittgenstein opposed, and I said TJB, which, in your vernacular, probably could have been said "TJB with glory." 

Let's try it this way. What would be a true theory of knowledge that was not scientific? Can you think of one? Consider this question in the light of the following Wittgensteinian ideas: a scientific theory is one that requires information. Philosophy only re-arranges what is already known. It doesn't produce new information. If we were truly to present theories of knowledge, no one would object to them (because they would either be confirmed or not in science). In other words, there would be no PHILOSOPHICAL reason to object to a theory of knowledge, because philosophy has no business in it.

One last point. On whether W agreed with TJB would really be a function of what would be taken to disagree with it in your eyes (and what signficance either has). If asked whether knowledge was "TJB" by a student, I can imagine Wittgenstein offering any of the following replies: (a) depends upon what that means; (b) not if that is a theory; (c) "knowledge" expresses doubt-removing grammar; (d) look and see; (e) only in a sense; (f) it sounds like a false problem; (g) what's the dictionary say?; (h) are you not an English speaker?; and (g) it doesn't matter what it means so long as conditions of assertability are understood and free from knots. He would NEVER have said, "no, because Gettier refuted it. We're still trying to solve that one."  So I'm unclear as to what W is claiming to support here. If its just the TV Guide, I guess I'm in agreement.         

Regards and thanks.

Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html

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Sean,

Apparently, I misunderstood you on several points. I appreciate the clarifications.

> Theory-of-knowledge courses generally proceed from the
> misguided question of "what is knowledge?" This leads
> students into thinking that this question is a puzzle in
> need of a conjured answer.

Is the question misguided? It is potentially misleading, but are those who ask or attempt to answer it necessarily misled?

Consider whether a paraphrase such as "What do we count as 'knowledge'?" or "How is the word 'knowledge' used?" would be acknowledged as such or whether they would object with, e.g. "No, I'm not concerned with playing games with words. I want to get to the essence of what knowledge truly is"?

And how will they respond to examples of knowledge? Are they dismissed as not even a suitable starting point, as with Socrates?

(Note: dismissing the value of examples as a starting point and dismissing partial definitions like "justified true belief" are both problematic:

BBB pp. 18-19 Instead of "craving for generality" I could also have said "the contemptuous attitude towards the particular
case". If, e.g., someone tries to explain the concept of number and tells us that such and such a definition will not do
or is clumsy because it only applies to, say, finite cardinals I should answer that the mere fact that he could have
given such a limited definition makes this definition extremely important to us. (Elegance is not what we are trying for.) For why should what finite and transfinite numbers have in common be
more interesting to us than what distinguishes them? Or rather, I should not have said "why should it be more
interesting to us?"--it isn't; and this characterizes our way of thinking.

The standard
> answer is TJB. And the way TJB is vetted is by example
> and counter-example. And by the time Gettier is pulled
> out, students are led to believe there is some crisis that
> philosophers need to solve.

Whether it is a crisis is a matter of the seriousness with which we view our confusion. That is a distinct matter from how we would characterize the nature of the problem and the possibilities for its solution. Taking our puzzlement seriously, experiencing "deep disquietudes", and supposing that the answer is a theory are different matters.

PI 111. The problems arising through a misinterpretation of our forms of language have the character of depth.
They are deep disquietudes; their roots are as deep in us as the forms of our language and their significance is as
great as the importance of our language.--Let us ask ourselves: why do we feel a grammatical joke to be deep? (And
that is what the depth of philosophy is.)

Consider some biographical data you've recently shared. Knowing that people dying from bombs dropping all around called continuing with philosophical work into question. Knowing that he was dying from cancer did not. This places the value for Wittgenstein of grappling with philosophical puzzlement into some perspective. And note: unlike the period after the _Tractatus_, Wittgenstein did not stop doing philosophy once he had had the insights of PI 1-188.

>
> The answer to the puzzle is never to propound the initial
> question.

NO!

Or rather: that is only an answer for some people and for some problems.

I'm reminded of the old Vaudeville joke:

"Doctor, it hurts when I do this."

"Well, then don't do that."

Sometimes, that answer is perfectly sound medical advice. Not always.

And consider Anna Boncampagni's metaphor of philosophy as vaccine.

Z 460 In a certain sense one cannot take too much care in handling philosophical mistakes, they contain so much truth.

Rather, it is to show students that the
> question causes the problems. And that "knowledge" merely
> is what it does in anthropology (the language culture),

Obviously, you don't mean that the legitimate uses of "knowledge" are limited to the use of that word in the practice of anthropology. Should I suppose that you mean that the question of "knowledge" is an anthropological question and the answer anthropological?

This is wrong, though it is a common mistake, because Wittgenstein does make comparisons between his methods and anthropology. But philosophy is not anthropology. To equate them is to make the same mistakes Frege criticizes in his attacks on psychologism. (And Wittgenstein recognized the importance of these points.) The anthropological perspective is one perspective from which to consider a philosophical problem.

RPM III.65 Are the propositions of mathematics anthropological propositions saying how we men infer and
calculate?--Is a statute book a work of anthropology telling how the people of this nation deal with a thief
etc.?--Could it be said: "The judge looks up a book about anthropology and thereupon sentences the thief to a term
of imprisonment"? Well, the judge does not USE the statute book as a manual of anthropology.

RPM III.72 (partial) It is clear that we can make use of a mathematical work for a study in anthropology. But then one thing is not
clear:--whether we ought to say: "This writing shews us how operating with signs was done among these people", or: "This writing
shews us what parts of mathematics these people had mastered".

and
> that the only thing one can ever do here is become
> especially keen with regard to its conditions of
> assertability across its various senses.

And why couldn't sating that knowledge is justified true belief be simply a misfiring - or merely incomplete - attempt at stating "conditions of assertibility"? Why must it be stigmatized as a "theory". (Someone may offer it as such, but that has more to do with the context than with the form of the statement itself.)

And if students are
> trained like this, they would be more concerned with Moore
> claiming to know he has a hand than with Gettier.

Would he? Gettier-style problems are interesting in their own right.

Why?
> Because, then, they could see that doubt-removing grammar
> is being taken out of its ordinary and useful context under
> warrant of language confusion. Gettier does not need an
> answer; it needs "therapy."

Both need 'therapy". I am not seeing the contrast here.

(snipping where we are largely in agreement.)

If asked
> whether knowledge was "TJB" by a student...
He would NEVER have said, "no,
> because Gettier refuted it. We're still trying to solve
> that one."

No. But he might well have said something along the lines of (PI 68):

It need not be so. For I can give the concept 'number' rigid
limits in this way, that is, use the word "number" for a rigidly limited concept, but I can also use it so that the extension of
the concept is not closed by a frontier

Or something not unlike the remark in BB p. 57

It is as if someone were to say "a game consists in moving objects about on a surface according to certain
rules..." and we replied: You must be thinking of board games, and your description is indeed applicable to them.
But they are not the only games. So you can make your definitions correct by expressly restricting it to those games.

And he might well have used Gettier-style examples as showing cases for which such a definition is inadequate.

(You do know, by the way, that Edmund Gettier was a student of Max Black and Norman Malcolm and was strongly influenced by Wittgenstein? Not that that proves Wittgenstein would have condoned his work, but it is at least interesting in light of this discussion.)

Examining the failures or inadequacies of definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is part of the process of coming to appreciate insights such as thinking in terms of symptoms and criteria, family resemblances, and the flexibility and openness of boundaries. Just saying not to define terms in that way or not to ask questions that would seek such definitions is an evasion of the problems that give value to these hard won insights.

JPDeMouy

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