[C] [Wittrs] Re: Wittgenstein and Theories
- From: Sean Wilson <whoooo26505@xxxxxxxxx>
- To: wittrsamr@xxxxxxxxxxxxx
- Date: Wed, 23 Dec 2009 20:29:44 -0800 (PST)
(J)
I'm traveling for the holidays. Might not be online tomorrow (don't know). So
here is a much-too long reply. I'll start with agreements, then move to the
only real point that I see a problem with.
1. First, very much appreciated the RPM quote dealing with statute books. If
you know of any other references that mention law or legal practice, I would
appreciate it if you sent them along. That was great.
2. Don't have any quarrel with the idea that philosophical entanglement
(properly conceived) is rich, and that untying knots is laborious. Or that
there is genuine work of this sort needed all over the place.
PEDAGOGY
3. The issue as I understand it now is whether traditional approaches in
epistemology could be undertaken if the approaches are not taken too seriously.
If TJB, for example, is itself administered as a loose matter (or as a
discussion starter). Or, perhaps, if TJB and Gettier could themselves be put
to Wittgensteinian ends (therapy).
Although not what I originally addressed, let me offer my thoughts here. I
would think that it would be good for philosophy as an academic discipline to
adopt an apologetic approach to these things in a post-Wittgensteinian world.
One of the reasons why is practical: Wittgenstein isn't around any longer. And
if philosophy therefore were to adopt as its central mission "getting the
thinking noggin going" -- not, as it were, solving problems -- then even
energies spent upon spinning wheels would surely serve legitimate pedagogical
ends. In fact, I can categorically state from my own experience in philosophy
classrooms that going through and participating (in trying to solve) Gettier
problems and the like were very important to me eventually becoming
Wittgensteinian. And I do not say this as criticism. I had the most wonderful
epistemology instructor in the world. And it took me a long while to shed those
outlooks, but I still greatly respect him
today.
And for what it is worth, I do believe that philosophy as traditionally
conceived -- even with its false problems -- is very important to the academy.
Teaching kids to think conceptually and deeply is something that other fields
desperately need. I know in political science, where philosophy is shunned, the
insight can be staggeringly shallow and the ideas only surface-level.
So there is nothing that I have said that would strip pedagogical value from
being exposed to a diverse philosophical program. Ultimately, though, to take a
discussion about the value of an avuncular TJB beyond the aims of diverse
pedagogy, one really needs an example.
4. Regarding TJB as conveying merely a sense of knowledge, I think this remark
regarding wishing is better: "And after all, there is not one definite class of
features which characterize all cases of wishing (at least not as the word is
commonly used). If on the other hand you wish to give a definition of wishing,
i.e., to draw a sharp boundary, then you are free to draw it as you like; and
this boundary will never entirely coincide with the actual usage, as this usage
has no sharp boundary." (BB,19).
ANTHROPOLOGY
4. I'm in great disagreement over the anthropology problem, but I think the
sense of my point here is not understood. (It rarely is). Philosophy is surely
not "anthropology," just as it it not (strictly speaking) "art." But the
relationship of both anthropology and art to
philosophy-properly-conceived must be greater than science or mathematics. The
point here is that what "knowledge" ultimately is, is a function of its uses in
the language culture and its cognition within the form of life. These are the
"inputs" of philosophy-properly-understood. (I know that this won't be
understood. I'd like to link to something on the discussion board, but the
server is down).
Here is where I am ultimately going. (I've got to go home). Knowledge is a
family resemblance. It's in the service of a particular kind of grammar. The
only thing that philosophy-proper can do ON THE MERITS -- putting
aside pedagogy -- is show people the resemblance and how to navigate it. To
show them what the grammar entails and to help them escape pitfalls. In this
sense, philosophy is like coaching. Only if we do it on the basis of the
individual (rather than the class), it looks more like "therapy." But the end
result is never "what knowledge is," it is what the language game of knowledge
entails -- and, more generally, how to navigate a lexicon and doctor other
people's grammar.
I'm tired J. I don't now what else to say. Happy holidays.
Dr. Sean Wilson, Esq.
Assistant Professor
Wright State University
Personal Website: http://seanwilson.org
SSRN papers: http://ssrn.com/author=596860
Discussion Group: http://seanwilson.org/wittgenstein.discussion.html
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